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 ABSTRACT
 
This study of Los Angeles Times reportage of the 1991
 
Persian Gulf War considers how written news affects
 
readers. Theories of how language develops different
 
connotation/ how metaphor affects understanding/ and how
 
cultural myth affects writers' and readers' approaches to
 
events all apply. Roland Barthes' theory of how cultural
 
myth is formed and affects understanding of the world is
 
examined and applied to Times reportage. The impact of
 
metaphor on the way readers perceive events/ particularly
 
pertaining to war/ is examined as explained in the work of
 
George Lakoff/ Mark Turner/ and Mark Johnson. Metaphors
 
prevalent in Times reportage have been identified and found
 
to relate directly to the basic survival needs/ life
 
furthering needs/ and social needs of all people. The
 
concern of linguist and media critic Noam Chomsky/ that the
 
press is a tool of political power groups/ is considered.
 
Certain mythically determined positions on the war held
 
by Americans and allies/ the Iraqis/ and other Arabs are
 
illustrated and explained. Their similarities are noted.
 
Times reportage emerges as writing that cannot help
 
but reflect prevailing cultural myths. Metaphorical concepts
 
employed in the reportage give discerning readers clues about
 
the approaches and sources of the writers. Times readers must
 
assume responsibility for applying information in reportage
 
to their own personal mythologies/ thus forming new meanings.
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AUTHOR'S NOTE
 
since many writers are represented numerous times in
 
several different articles, sometimes two or three in the
 
same day's issue of the Times, in order to correctly
 
identify from which article information has been taken for
 
attribution, I have increased the information in the
 
attributing parentheses to include, in addition to the
 
author's last name and page number, the first one or two
 
words of the title of the article as such; (Healy, "Bush
 
Orders. . ." AS).
 
In chapters 2 and 3 where specific figurative language
 
is the subject of discussion, the examples will be set off
 
in bold type to aid the reader.
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Introduction
 
The "mother of all battles" was Saddam Hussein's
 
description and metaphoric warning of what enemies of Iraq
 
would encounter if they tried to free Kuwait. This
 
expression, along with many others from both sides of the
 
Persian Gulf War of 1991, depicts the various factions'
 
attitudes toward the conflict. Because scholars often
 
differ about how ideas and beliefs are expressed in
 
language, these differing approaches raise questions
 
concerning how we regard and respond to what we read in
 
the newspaper. As the press chronicles the day's events,
 
do written ideas and beliefs shape readers' attitudes and
 
beliefs or do they simply reflect the attitudes and beliefs
 
of the readers? Or do they do a little of both? And
 
whatever the effect of this reportage, should it be a
 
matter of concern to society at large?
 
Readers commonly complain that the press is biased, but
 
often the only evidence to support this criticism is that
 
readers believe the press supports a viewpoint different
 
from theirs. While in the United States, freedom of the
 
press is a fundamental right, Americans still expect
 
reportage to be fair, honest, and responsible while also
 
echoing their own beliefs. So where do these complaints
 
originate?
 
Several linguists offer theories on the power of
 
 language that provide explanations about how thoughts are
 
shaped/ how those thoughts are expressed in language/ how
 
that language is used in reportage/ and how that reportage
 
may influence the attitudes of readers.
 
Roland Barthes offers his theory of myth to explain our
 
cultural attitudes and beliefs about the world. Barthes
 
argues convincingly that culturally determined myths
 
saturate media/ both visual and verbal/ thus his theories can
 
be applied to news reportage. If his theories are accurate/
 
in a multicultural society such as ourS/ instead of a
 
newspaper being able to report only fair and accurate "factS/"
 
it also reports "myths." These "myths" originate in the
 
various reporters' mythically chosen language and syntax as
 
well as in the readers' cultural responses to that language
 
and syntax. Barthes' approach illuminates how and why
 
reportage seems biased to some readers. Other writers also
 
offer arguments to explain the impossibility of total
 
objectivity in reportage. Tom Koch/ journalist/ speaks of
 
The News as Myth, while JerrolB. Manheim and Peter C.
 
Sederberg/ political scientists, describe the power of
 
language to influence people politically.
 
since language has such power to influence people's
 
beliefs and actions, what evidence of the cultural belief
 
systems embodied in these myths can be identified and
 
explained? Rhetoricians and linguists George Lakoff, Mark
 
Johnson, and Mark Turner stress the prevalence of metaphors
 
, 2 ■ 
 in our language. These metaphors/ they explain/ are so ^
 
embedded in our language that we often are unaware of their
 
presence or impact; yet/ they argue/ our thinking would be
 
severely limited without their use. For instance/ "life is a
 
journey" suggests that we move from a starting place to an
 
ending place on "the road of life." When we have become
 
successful/ we "have arrived" and when things go bad, we
 
"take a wrong turn" or "get off the track." This
 
metaphorical journey was used and understood in reportage
 
of the Persian Gulf War as reporters described the allies*
 
progress in driving Hussein's troops out of Kuwait. But
 
) ' ■■ ' ■ 
Lakoff/ Johnson, and Turner argue that our common cultural
 
metaphors shape our thinking rather than just reflect our
 
thinking. If they are correct, then our metaphor of "life
 
is a journey," which suggests a beginning, forward
 
movement, and a finality at the end, would contrast with
 
another culture's metaphor that "life is a circle," which
 
suggests continuity in a never-ending cycle where death
 
might be perceived as less final. Lakoff, Johnson, and
 
Turner's ideas of metaphor and their impact on how we
 
think and believe can be important in analyzing news
 
reportage; for if writers' use of specific metaphors and
 
other figures of speech may shape our thinking, we as
 
readers need to be conscious of that power and read with
 
more critical awareness.
 
Noam Chomsky, a noted linguist and political
 
commentator/ skips the potential impact of our cultural
 
mythology and metaphors as they may be expressed in general
 
language. He directly names the press for being a puppet of
 
manipulative political forces. He complains that although
 
the press likes to think its reporting is objective/ often it
 
deliberately promotes its own political message. In his book
 
Language and Politics/ he insists reportage in the Los
 
Angeles Times is equivalent to Orwell's Newspeak/ because he
 
believes the reporters and the public had reached such a
 
deep level of indoctrination regarding America's involvement
 
in Vietnam and Nicaragua/ that they were not even aware they
 
were being fed propaganda (726-727). Barthes' theory of
 
myth could explain that Chomsky's complaints are largely
 
Chomsky's own mythical opinion. However/ a closer look at
 
Chomsky's claims may reveal the basis for his reasoning.
 
A study which examines written news in the light of the
 
three approaches (Barthes* theory of myth; Lakoff/ Johnson/
 
and Turner's explanation of the power of metaphor; and
 
Chomsky's argument that the press is biased by political
 
indoctrination) is important if we acknowledge that
 
newspapers have the power to educate/ inform/ and influence
 
the attitudes of the public. Furthermore/ because newspapers
 
comprise a daily history of events/ past issues become an
 
archival reference and a primary source for researchers on
 
any number of social/ political/ scientific/ or historic
 
subjects. A thorough understanding of how newswriting
 
produces meaning should illuminate any bias in reportage as
 
well as enable readers to obtain a greater understanding of
 
the levels of meaning in newswriting.
 
The Persian Gulf War of 1991 is a major, short-term
 
event which received comprehensive reportage in the Los
 
Angeles Times. Not only does the newswriting of the events
 
of the war represent the thinking of divergent cultural
 
myths, but the language reveals distinguishable patterns of
 
metaphor.
 
In the winter of 1990-91, much of the public was
 
apprehensive ebout another major military conflict after the
 
tragic results of Vietnam. Pro-military factions were
 
suspicioue of the press, for they believed that the Vietnam
 
War was lost because the press' criticism of U.S. involvement,
 
graphic and bloody battlefield photographs, and coverage of
 
anti—war activities at home, demoralized American troops
 
while it encouraged the North Vietnamese to believe that most
 
of the American public was against the war. As a result, in
 
the Persian Gulf War, the press was not allowed free access
 
to troops or battle zones, and all reportage not gathered
 
during official press briefings was subject to military
 
censorship. But other factors of war had changed as well: a
 
United Nations sanctioned coalition of 28 nations under the
 
leadership of the United States was authorized to carry out
 
measures against Iraqi forces to remove them from Kuwait.
 
Also, technology had dramatically changed the types of
 
weapons used by the allies/ and the U.S. military personnel
 
were now all volunteers. Finally/ based on what readers
 
knew from the media/ as more and more news was presented/
 
the enemy/ Saddam Hussein/ and his reasons for the war as
 
well as his reported brutal behavior, made it nearly
 
impossible for American readers to excuse his actions. All
 
of these factors changed the climate of war reporting from
 
the conditions of Vietnam, where reporters were allowed in
 
the field with the troops. Support among citizens in the
 
United States had declined as the war stretched out over ten
 
years. American casualties mounted while the military was
 
limited to the role of support for the South Vietnamese
 
rather than allowed to use all its weapons and strength.
 
While in the Gulf War we may note these new conditions which
 
might affect ease of information gathering for reporters, we
 
will deal with what was printed. We will find through a study
 
of the language of this news reportage that differences in
 
cultural beliefs, or myths, led to the ultimate conflict of
 
war as well as to certain elements in reporting the war.
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis will examine the idea
 
of cultural myth as explained by Roland Barthes and see how
 
George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner explain and
 
justify the power of metaphorical concepts in our language.
 
It will study the opinions of Noam Chomsky and see how he
 
argues that newspapers serve as propaganda for the power
 
structure. Chapter 2 will Identify the patterns of
 
metaphorical language common in the reportage and consider
 
its likely effect on readers. Chapter 3 will discuss
 
how myths of the American government/ the American
 
military/ the American people/ and their European allies are
 
expressed in the Times. In addition/ Chapter 3 will
 
contrast those beliefs with the Iraqi position as well as
 
those of other Arabs both in support of and against Hussein.
 
Finally/ this thesis will analyze how cultural myth and
 
figurative language are used in the Los Angeles Times'
 
reportage of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and will
 
consider how this reportage is likely to affect readers.
 
Chapter 1
 
Three Critical Approaches as Foundations
 
for Examining News Reportage
 
Most readers of the daily paper probably assume that
 
the stories they read will inform them about such events as
 
plane crashes/ weather reports/ sports events/ and
 
government actions. Because the newspaper labels these as
 
news/ most readers will consciously read these stories
 
expecting to learn unvarnished facts. But what appear to
 
be plain news stories may not be so plain. A reader may
 
feel that a particular reporter did not treat a subject
 
fairly. When people read the daily newspaper/ a way of
 
connecting with others/ they want to read writing that both
 
informs them of daily events/ and by its approach to the
 
subject/ supports what they believe. When what they read
 
subverts their basic value system/ they are likely to complain
 
that the newspaper is biased politically—too far to the
 
right or too far to the left. Just as there are millions of
 
people in the United States representing many cultural
 
backgrounds/ no single newspaper/ no matter what its
 
positions on important issues/ can please everyone. Yet the
 
daily newspaper is still an important source of information/
 
and the responsibility entrusted to news writers is great/
 
for the printed word can become both a political tool that
 
may influence thinking and an historical record of what is
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happening. This raises the question/ is it possible or
 
necessary for reportage to be completely objective/ devoid of
 
myth or metaphor?
 
Two problems arise in writing that tries to be
 
absolutely objective. First/ newswriting cannot help but be
 
reductive. In a battle report/ for instance/ every
 
soldier's thoughts/ fears/ and actions cannot be reported.
 
Every explosion/ accident/ failure/ success/ and performance
 
of each piece of equipment cannot be cataloged. A whole
 
library could not contain a thorough written report of all
 
that happens in any one day. So newswriting has/ of
 
necessity/ evolved its own code to make a massive situation
 
manageable. The whO/ what/ why/ when/ where/ and how of an
 
event are identified to give the reader an essential picture
 
of what went on/ and the narrative requires that the most
 
important facts be presented first/ and those details deemed
 
less important appear in order of declining importance.
 
This is important. It is someone's subjective decision.
 
Consequently/ much information that may be of interest to
 
some readers will be left out. By following the code/ and by
 
being a reductive narrative/ a news story may omit the
 
larger context of an event. Yet/ to a mother whose son might
 
be involved in a battle/ the whO/ what/ why/ when/ and where
 
of the big picture is not nearly as important as how her son
 
has fared. She would want to see a different set of w's
 
according to her perspectives. She might question the very
 
 need for the battle at all/ and then the use of particular
 
strategies/ equipment/ and manpower to carry it out. These
 
concerns of hers would all revolve around the personal
 
attachment she has to her son. But to the general directing
 
the battle/ her son is anonymous, an expendable resource/ a
 
means to help achieve a larger goal. Here, we have a hint of
 
the difficulty for newspapers to satisfy, educate, or even
 
appease all their readers by the content and approach of
 
their story selection.
 
Second, and even more significant than the reductive
 
nature and codes of writing required in news stories, are the
 
commonly held beliefs of any culture, or, according to Roland
 
Barthes, the myths, which we will examine in the next
 
section.
 
Roland Barthes' Theory of Myth
 
Mytl^s shape the way news is reported to fit the culture.
 
Barthes asserts "that myth is a system of Communication, that
 
is a message" (Barthes Reader 93). He explains how myth
 
develops
 
. . . it is human history which converts reality
 
into speech, and it alone rules the life and
 
the death of mythical language. Ancient or not,
 
mythology can only have a hlstoricai foundation,
 
for myth is a type of speech chosen by history:
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 it cannot possibly evolve from the •nature' of
 
things.
 
Speech of this kind is a message. It is
 
therefore by no meanS confined to oral speech.
 
It can consist of modes of writing or of
 
representations. . . (Barthes Reader 94).
 
Barthes, then, believes that our culture's mythology grows
 
out of our history, and this mythology may be seen in many
 
forms Of expression, including language. Barthes' discussion
 
of semiology refines his argument. He says
 
. . . any semiology postulates a relation
 
between two terms, a signifier and a signified.
 
This relation concerns objects Which belong to
 
different categories, and this is why it is not
 
one of equality but one of equivalence. We
 
must here be on our guard, for despite common
 
parlance which simply says that the signifier
 
expresses the signified, we are dealing, in
 
any semiolOgical system, not with two, but
 
with three different terms. For what we grasp
 
is not at all one term after the other but
 
the correlation which unites them: there are
 
therefore, the signifier, the signified, and
 
the sign, which is the associative total of
 
the first two terms (Barthes Reader 97).
 
He illustrates his argument by telling how he associates
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roses with passion. The roses themselves/ devoid of any
 
meaning/ are the signifier. The passion he somehow
 
historically associates with roses becomes the signified/ and
 
by adding the two together/ he arrives at the sign (Barthes
 
Reader 97/ 98). To him/ roses carry the extra overlay of
 
meaning of passion/ and when roses and passion are combined/
 
he has "passionified" roseS/ a meaning perhaps quite
 
different from someone else whose own history overlayed roses
 
with their sad use on a funeral wreath.
 
Now if we lay a string of these signs in a phrase or
 
clause/ we have a syntagm/ each word of which can be
 
absolutely packed with different meanings to different
 
people/ depending on their own personal histories. If we
 
then multiply these syntagms into a complete narrative/ we
 
can see that there can be endless possibilities for
 
interpretations by readers/ perhaps even as many
 
interpretations as there are readers. These separate
 
interpretations of written work are sometimes called the
 
"reading" of a piece.
 
A newsWriter/ then/ is faced with a dilemma if he or she
 
hopes to write objective facts that will satisfy all
 
readers; for there really is no absolute/ objective truth.
 
As Barthes says/ no two humans ever can share histories
 
identical in every way. Their choice of language will
 
reflect their own histories. Although the differences in
 
this language choice may seem trivial/ it is possible that
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the subtle connotative effect of differences between
 
particular words over a period of time could affect the
 
beliefs of readers. Critics who identify bias in a major
 
paper such as the Los Angeles Times must assume the
 
responsibility to consider and evaluate perspectives which
 
come from the myths consciously or unconsciously expressed
 
by the writers. These become apparent through the writers'
 
choice of words with their subjective connotations/ the
 
writers' choice of what data to accentuate by their placement
 
and amount of attention in a story/ who is quoted/ and which
 
specific comments of the interviewee are used. Seeking
 
"perfection" in expression must be given up by both readers
 
and writers/ for no two people can agree on even a
 
definition of perfection. However/ both readers and writers
 
must understand that writers should try to tell the "truth"
 
as best as they can. Each culture or society has
 
different histories/ hence differing ideals and beliefs.
 
Barthes calls these ideals and beliefs myths/ which seem so
 
natural to a society or culture that they become a form of
 
"common sense" describing how things are. Barthes further
 
explains that a society's myth is what is so well understood
 
that it "goes without saying/" or it is just known and
 
doesn't need verbal explanation (Rustle of Language 65).
 
Any major newspaper which strays too far from
 
expressing its readers' cultural myths will lose readers'
 
confidence or narrow its audience only to those who feel
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Gomfortable with the paper's position. A society or
 
culture's myth system may or may not be compatible with
 
another culture's. A newspaper such as the Times with its
 
multicultural readership faces the dilemma of trying to
 
satisfy many beliefs, yet still keep a wide circulation and
 
advertising base so that it can remain financially solvent.
 
A newspaper must cover news as comprehensively as it can,
 
then leave individuals to decide for themselves how the news
 
will affect them. Yet all of us need a myth-system to hold
 
our ideas together. If we follow Barthes' argument, we must
 
conclude that both newswriters and their readers will
 
gravitate toward those myth-systems that are closest to their
 
own histories, for it is those that will seem most natural to
 
them.
 
Barthes amplifies how myth is actually manifested
 
throughout modern societies
 
Myth. .. can be read in anonymous statements
 
of the press, advertising, mass consumption; it
 
is a social determinate, a reflection. . . myth
 
consists in turning culture into nature, or at
 
least turning the social, the cultural, the ideo
 
logical/ the historical into the 'natural;' what
 
is merely a product of class division and its
 
moral, cultural, aesthetic consequences is
 
presented (stated) as a natural consequence;
 
the quite contingent grounds of the statement
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become/ under the effect of mythic conversion.
 
Common Sense, Right Reason, the Norm, Public
 
Opinion. . . (Rustle of Language 65).
 
Barthes' conception is presented so as to assume that society
 
embodies a prevailing myth. He explains how writers may
 
be affected by their own cultural myths
 
Within any literary form there is a general
 
choice of tone, of ethos if you like, and this
 
is precisely where the writer shows himself
 
clearly as an individual because this is where
 
he commits himself. A language and style are
 
data prior to all problematics of language, they
 
are the natural product of Time and of the
 
person as a biological entity; but the formal
 
identity of the writer is truly established
 
only outside the permanence of grammatical norms
 
and stylistic constants where the written
 
continuum, first collected and enclosed within
 
a perfectly innocent linguistic nature, at last
 
becomes a total sign, the choice of a human
 
attitude, the affirmation of a certain Good
 
(Writing Degree Zero 13-14).
 
Barthes is not alone in his explanation of significance
 
and influence of cultural myths. Some agree nearly
 
completely with his assertions, while others add their own
 
interpretations. Kenneth Burke's position is nearly
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identical with Barthes', although he calls "motivation" what
 
Barthes calls "history." Burke says, . . each man's
 
motivation is unique, since his situation is unique, which is
 
particularly obvious when you recall that his situation also
 
reflects the unique sequence of his past" (103). A person's
 
motivation then, will be driven by his or her experiences
 
which make up each person's history.
 
Peter Sederberg amplifies mythological ideas of a
 
culture and calls them "shared meaning." Then he claims
 
that all our ". . . outpourings, whether physical (e.g.,
 
tools and other cultural artifacts) or behavioral (e.g.,
 
language, organizations, etc.), attain a reality that
 
confronts us as external to and independent of ourselves.
 
This external 'reality' turns back upon us and shapes our
 
responses" (4). Sederberg has gone beyond simply
 
describing our shared meanings to asserting that these
 
shared meanings influence our thinking. His theory raises a
 
question. If shared meanings can influence our thinking,
 
can they also be distorted, made into what we want to
 
believe by the way they are written or the "reading" we give
 
them?
 
Claiming that as we try to make sense of things, we
 
create myth, Henry Tudor says
 
A myth, I suggest is an interpretation of
 
what the myth-maker (rightly or wrongly) takes
 
to be hard fact. It is a device men adopt in
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order to come to grips with reality; and we can
 
tell that a given account is a myth, not by the
 
amount of truth it contains, but by the fact that
 
it is believed to be true. . . (17).
 
He later amplifies his idea to include history. ". . . much
 
that passes for history is properly speaking myth or is shot
 
through with mythical ways of thought. . ." (123).
 
Tudor, however, does not indicate how he or anyone else
 
could know how much truth an account contains, because each
 
individual's truth is his or her own, and who is to be the
 
judge of what truth is except by a potentially faulty
 
measure against Barthes' "Common Sense"? Thus, the press
 
faces its dilemma-r-whose "truth" should they express? Fred
 
Siebert directs his remarks directly at how the press
 
reflects the society about which it writes: ". . . the
 
. . . ■ , . ■ , I 
press always takes on the form and coloration of the social
 
and political structures within which it operates.
 
Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby
 
the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted"
 
(1). We shall see if this rather cynical attitude toward the
 
press is borne out in the war reportage of the Times.
 
Newspaper writers themselves, during the explosion of
 
knowledge in this last half century, have carried on a
 
continuous dialectic concerning the approaches newspapers
 
should assume, accepting for themselves the fact that their
 
writings carry some influence and that they are charged with
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the responsibility of wielding that power wisely. Although
 
they may not identify myths as they have been discussed so
 
far in this paper, they forever face the problem of choosing
 
whose myth to report. Herbert J. Altschull describes the
 
difficulty
 
It is, of course, always to be kept in
 
mind that journalism does not exist in a
 
vacuum, apart from the world of human
 
experience and the society in which the
 
journalist lives. Reporters and editors are
 
part, often a significant part, of their
 
political, economic, aesthetic, and cultural
 
environment. The practice of journalism
 
never has been and cannot ever be separated
 
from the values present in the cultural
 
tradition of America. . . The press is
 
granted liberty but is then confronted by
 
the logic of license. People swear that
 
they should be guided by the reason of their
 
minds, but find that they remain pulled by
 
the emotions in their hearts. They swell
 
with unquestioning patriotism in defending
 
their national interests—and then are drawn
 
to a yearning for international brother
 
hood. The dualisms of big and small, of
 
urban and rural, of belief in freedom and
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trust in authority/ all play their parts
 
(4-5).
 
A respected journalist/ James Reston, narrows the
 
problem down even more as he considers reportage of
 
government affairs including our nation's military
 
conflicts. He acknowledges the dilemma caused by reporters'
 
loyalty to country. Patriotism, definitely a cultural
 
belief or myth, is at stake
 
American reporters worry about this
 
dilemma between their obligation to the
 
truth and their obligation to their country
 
much more than is generally realized. They
 
know that they often embarrass officials by
 
reporting the facts, and even interfere with
 
public policy dccasionally, but they go on
 
doing it because, somehow, the tradition of
 
reporting the facts, no matter how much they
 
hurt, is stronger than any other (ix).
 
When Reston discusses "truth" here, he is likely using
 
the term synonymously with cold facts, bare o!f the larger
 
context of an event, for he adds later, "The conflict
 
between the men who make and the men who report the news is
 
as old as time. News may be true, but it is not truth, and
 
reporters and officials seldom see it the same way" (3).
 
Without directly identifying Barthes' mythical differences,
 
Reston shows an awareness of the idea. And he offers a
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thoughtful way for the press to handle the multi-sided issues
 
of national concern, including warfare. He says
 
The problem is to present the great
 
issues as a series of practical choices:
 
let the people look at the alternatives
 
as the President has to look at them and
 
try at the end to decide among the hard
 
and dangerous courses (87).
 
This suggestion is idealistic, and it is probably
 
impossible for a paper to keep up with the reporting that
 
would be required to keep the readers informed of all the
 
problems facing the President. It would also be impractical
 
in that many Presidential decisions must be made quickly,
 
not allowing time for public input, but it would allow for
 
more informed evaluation of the decisions made. Reston's
 
suggestion has exposed his recognition of the reductive
 
nature of hews.
 
It is evident that the forces behind how news is
 
written and presented are complex. While the simple,
 
formulaic code of the inverted pyramid organization of facts
 
from most important to least important and the reliance on
 
the who, what, why, when, where, and how of a situation
 
sound at the surface to be safe, factual, and objective, we
 
can see that objectivity is impossible. If we think we know
 
that an editorial opinion is just that, an opinion, and
 
that the readers are free to accept it or not, the premise
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 that readers will make a critical judgment of the worth of
 
the opinion also is not that simple. For if we accept
 
Barthes' theory of myth and acknowledge that words and
 
phrases don't mean exactly the same thing to any two of us
 
because none of us has identical histories, and that whatever
 
groups we fall into are groups because of some broad
 
historical similarities, then we may hope to read news
 
writing that generally supports our beliefs. Additionally,
 
we will apply our own "reading" or interpretation to the
 
newswriting. If we also consider that any news writing that
 
must follow a code is automatically reductive, limited
 
writing, at this point there is no choice but to
 
consciously reject the myth that newswriting can be
 
objective.
 
We have looked broadly at the backgrounds writers and
 
readers bring with them to reports of events. The next step
 
will be to examine the whole idea of prevalent metaphors and
 
see how they may reflect, affect, and effect cultural
 
myths as used in the Times' reportage of the Persian Gulf
 
War of 1991.
 
* * *
 
Metaphoric Expression and How It Affects Newswriting
 
While Barthes explained for us that "every message is
 
the encounter of a level of expression (or signifier) and a
 
level of content (the signified)" (Semiotic Challenge 73),
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 we now move on to more complex syntagms, chains of words.
 
These syntagms often contain metaphoric concepts which add
 
another layer of meaning when we use them to explain our
 
original idea. Lakoff and Johnson explain: "The essence of
 
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing
 
in terms of another" (4); and Lakoff and Turner amplify
 
the Importance of that simple concept by arguing that we
 
would be severely limited In Our ability to communicate
 
without metaphor/ for they enable us to form thoughts
 
. . .- metaphor is an integral part of our
 
everyday thought and language. And it is
 
irreplaceable: metaphor allows us to under
 
stand our selves and our world in ways no
 
other modes of thought can.
 
Far from being merely a matter of words/
 
metaphor is a matter of thought—all kinds
 
of thought: thought about emotion/ about
 
society/ about human character/ about
 
language/ and about the nature of life and
 
death. It is indispensable not only to our
 
imagination but also to our reason (xi).
 
Lakoff and Turner's powerful idea suffuses all written
 
expression.
 
While we expect metaphors in literary works to display
 
new insights into human conditions/ and we expect metaphors
 
in advertising and political campaign rhetoric to try to
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gain our confidence/ we must admit that metapliors also
 
suffuse writing we would like to trust/ such as newswriting/
 
and that they have the power to Influence us. As readers/
 
we have the responsibility to understand the nature of
 
metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson add/ "The most fundamental
 
values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical
 
structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture"
 
(22).
 
Of particular concern to people interested in the
 
persuasive power of newswriting is whether readers are aware
 
of the power of metaphor to affect their understanding.
 
Lakoff and Turner believe that some metaphors are so embedded
 
in our understanding that we are unaware of their use
 
They are systematic in that theire is a fixed
 
correspondence between the structure of the
 
domain to be understood (e.g./ death) and
 
the structure of the domain in terms Of
 
which we axe understanding it (e.g./ departure).
 
We usually understand them in terms of
 
common experiences. They are largely
 
unconscious/ though attention may be drawn
 
to them. Their operation in cognition is
 
mostly automatic. And they are widely
 
conventionalized in language/ that iS/
 
there are a great number of words and
 
idiomatic expressions in our language
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whose interpretations depend upon those
 
conceptual metaphors (51).
 
Here, the authors have gone beyond meaning in single
 
expressions to include entire metaphorical concepts.
 
Sederberg enlarges on how powerfully these concepts may
 
affect how we see reality
 
Many of these metaphorical constructions
 
of reality are so deeply embedded in our
 
thought processes we fall to recognize
 
them for what they are and thus miss what
 
they obscure as well. The choice we face
 
in thinking about the world is often
 
between metaphors rather than between
 
metaphor and the direct representation
 
of reality (153).
 
It follows then that if reality becomes blurred by
 
metaphorical concepts, we may be led to take actions that
 
may not be understood by people who see the world from a
 
different metaphorical approach. Differing metaphorical
 
approaches are language-based portions of what makes up
 
each culture's myth. This would concur with Barthes'
 
explanation of what is "signified." Lakoff arid Turner
 
identify many prominent and common metaphorical concepts so
 
embedded in our language that they become what Barthes calls
 
"natural," what we don't consciously think about, or what
 
"goes without saying."
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Lakoff and Turner divide these metaphorical concepts
 
into three types: the experiential are ". .. metaphors
 
that are imaginative and creative. . . are capable of giving
 
us a new understanding of our experience. Thus/ they can
 
give new meaning to our pasts, to our daily activity, and to
 
what we know and believe" (139). Without these, we would be
 
severely limited. "Merely viewing a non-physical thing as
 
an entity or substance does not allow us to comprehend very
 
much about it" (Lakoff and Johnson 27). For example, a
 
person who has never experienced war would have difficulty
 
conceptualizing its horrors until, perhaps, it is explained
 
by a metaphor such as "the blood swollen god" (from Stephen
 
Crane's The Red Badge of Courage) where readers could
 
visualize a monster gorging itself on the blood of its
 
victims.
 
The orientational metaphors provide a spatial
 
comprehension, such as "good is up" as in "Things are
 
looking up." Lakoff and Johnson add, "Individuals, like
 
groups, vary in their priorities and in the ways they define
 
what is good or virtuous to them. . . Relative to what is
 
important for them, their individual value systems are
 
coherent with the major orientational metaphors of the
 
mainstream culture" (24). These orientational metaphors can
 
be found prominently in the Times' reportage of how
 
flag-waving and yellow ribbon displaying indicated what
 
position people took in relation to the war.
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But the most powerful metaphors that may actually shape
 
behavior, Lakpff and Johnson define as structural metaphors
 
Structural metaphors allow us to do much more
 
than just orient concepts, refer to them, quantify
 
them, etc., as we do with simple orientational and
 
ontologicai metaphors; they allow us, in addition,
 
to use one highly structured and clearly delineated
 
concept to structure another (61).
 
For example, they Say, "To give some idea of what it could
 
mean for a concept to structure an everyday activity, let us
 
start with the concept ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor is
 
reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of
 
expressions" (5). Some examples they give to illustrate how
 
this metaphor is so commonly used are, "I've never won an
 
argument with him," and "I demoiished his argument" (5).
 
We can apply the "argument is war" metaphor to
 
dialectical argument which appears in newswriting in obvious
 
opinion pieces such as editorials. Lakoff and
 
Johnson explain, "The only permissible tactics in this
 
RATIONAL ARGUMENT are supposedly the stating of premises,
 
the citing of supporting evidence and the drawing of logical
 
conclusions" (63). That writers believe they have rational
 
arguments to write about underlines Barthes' explanation of
 
how our shared experiences make up our cultural myths. These
 
shared cultural myths make up the foundation for rational
 
argument, and even rational argument can lay a foundation
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for cultural conflicts. Lakoff and Johnson show how
 
metaphorical concepts help frame cultural myths
 
imagine a culture where an argument
 
is viewed as a dance, the participants are
 
seen as performers, and the goal is to
 
perform in a balanced and aesthetically
 
pleasing way. In such a culture people
 
would view argument [sic] differently, carry
 
them out differently, and talk about them
 
differently. But we would probably not
 
view them as arguing at all: they would
 
simply be doing something different (5).
 
Now while that idea of seeing things differently makes
 
sense, it seems the major cultures of the world do not
 
subscribe to such a peaceful approach. Kenneth Burke, while
 
not specifically identifying metaphors, but calling concepts
 
"idioms," actually expresses a parallel approach to the
 
metaphor, argument is war. He writes
 
In any event, the world as we know it,
 
the world in history, cannot be described
 
in its particularities by an idiom of
 
peace. Though we may ideally, convert the
 
dialectic into a chart of the dialectic
 
(replacing a development by a calculus),
 
we are actually in a world at war—a world
 
at combat—and even a calculus must be
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developed with the dialectics of
 
participation by 'the enemy'—hence the
 
representative anecdote must contain
 
militaristic ingredients. It may not be
 
an anecdote of peace—but it may be an
 
anecdote giving us the purification of
 
war (337).
 
If our cultures are shaped by mythical conceptual
 
systems, and if we also have adopted a conceptual system
 
that pits different cultural beliefs against one another
 
that predispose toward conflicts, and if argument is a type
 
of war, then it is no wonder that so many conflicts arise in
 
the pluralistic American society, let alone the vastly
 
varied cultures of the world.
 
In addition, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors
 
possess the power to move us to action
 
Metaphors may create realities for
 
us, especially social realities. A
 
metaphor may thus be a guide for future
 
action. Such actions will, of course, fit
 
the metaphor. This will, in turn,
 
reinforce the power of the metaphor to
 
make experience coherent. In this sense
 
metaphors can be self-fulfulling
 
prophecies (156).
 
That this idea should be taken seriously today is seen
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easily by most Americans vho are well aware of the power of
 
advertising, and how it moves us to consider and possibly
 
change our personal appearance, diet, recreation, habits,
 
and environment, even though most of us may deny that it was
 
advertising that moved us to change, if we take these same
 
metaphors that express our cultural beliefs and apply them to
 
news reporting, which most of us do consider seriously, we
 
can see the vast potential for power. Metaphorical concepts
 
can form a framework for news writing, an<3 writers may
 
express cultural myths, even as a reporter thinks what he or
 
she reports are facts. When we add the reader's own response
 
to the written reportage, we can see how, even though
 
newswriting is carefully crafted with fairness and honesty,
 
the possibility exists for distorted representation of events-

Sederberg identifies another problem with using language
 
that can alter the writer's intended message. He argues
 
that if we wish to change one meaning in a commonly held
 
belief conveyed by metaphors, we can alter it only if we
 
have another meaning to take its place
 
Our lives take shape under the
 
impact of a web of associations and
 
meanings which are not necessarily of
 
our making or choosing. Such ties cannot
 
be transcended through a simple act of
 
will; the meanings we reject continue
 
to inform our responses, if only because
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we react against them. Moreover# even if
 
we manage to loosen the grip of a particular
 
meaning/ we do so only by embracing
 
another. There is no metasemantic ground
 
on which we may stand; to respond
 
differently is still to respond. . . (5).
 
The newspaper/ then/ may have the power to provide new
 
metaphoric concepts. If reportage imposes its own
 
metaphorical concepts on a society instead of trying to
 
represent the existing concepts of a society/ then it
 
may have usurped power. Lakoff and Johnson equate those who
 
make the metaphors with those who have the power. "In a
 
culture where the myth of objectivism is very much alive and
 
truth is always absolute truth/ the people who get to impose
 
their metaphors on the culture get to define what we
 
consider to be true—absolutely and objectively true" (160).
 
This statement suggests that newswriters are among those in
 
promient positions who have the opportunity "to
 
impose their metaphors on the culture" (160). We may then
 
ask if newswriters understand the boundaries of what is fair
 
in their reportage? Do they understand their power/ and do
 
they knowingly manipulate language to use that power? Two
 
sources would suggest that/ industry-wide/ the press is quite
 
concerned with government censorship affecting "freedom of the
 
press." The press makes no conscious effort to present any
 
cultural mythology/ but limits itself/ at least in its
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ovn definition of its responsibility/ to being accurate,
 
which means reporting only substantiated facts. Robert M.
 
Hutchins* 1947 publication, A Free and Responsible Press,
 
resulting from a major meeting of journalists, became a
 
seminal report on the role of the press in this century. It
 
identifies both the threat to freedom of the press and the
 
need to tell the truth, but it also recognizes that in our
 
rapidly changing society, the press must assume some
 
responsibility for educating the public. But the
 
Commission's report falls short of proposing a code of ethics
 
that touches on the powerful concepts behind the language
 
reporters may use. In fact, some thirty-three years later,
 
Brian Brooks, et al/ are still recognizing the lack of
 
generally acknowledged standards. Brooks says,"Without an
 
industry-wide code of conduct, we must pick our way through
 
the maze of ethical and unethical practices to distinguish
 
the good from the bad" (445).
 
In spite of this lack of a clear-cut code of ethics or
 
conduct in reporting, evidence of what the press thinks should
 
constitute quality work can be found in reporters' own guide
 
books. "We should all attemt to bring quality writing, wit,
 
and knowledge to our work. If we succeed, newspapers will be
 
not only informative, but also enjoyable; not only educa
 
tional, but also entertaining; and not only bought, but read"
 
(Brooks 251). Brooks has left out objectivity as a standard
 
in favor of readability. Nowhere did either of these sources
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 Indicate they recognized the importance of the metaphoric
 
and mythical effect of their reportage.
 
However/ J. Herbert Altschull in his book. From Milton
 
to McLuhan; The Ideas Behind American Journalism,
 
philosophically argues with the journalistic definitions
 
of what newswriting is
 
Journalists rarely if ever present bare
 
facts, almost never in the exact order in
 
which they took place. What purports to be
 
reality in the newspapers and on radio and
 
television is inevitably a reconstruction of
 
reality, to fit the needs and requirements of
 
journalism. . . Journalists who seek to make
 
their stories interesting by pulling out for
 
the lead the most dramatic aspect of an event
 
are inevitably distorting reality, for reality
 
is always neutral. Reconstruction and reor
 
ganization of events into the forms of
 
journalism are aesthetic pursuits, retelling
 
of happenings in the style of literature (23).
 
Altschull goes so far as to suggest that figurative
 
language in a news story distorts reality. But the question
 
remains, whose reality?
 
The journalistic 'story' is inevitably a
 
mixture of fact and fiction and hence unreal
 
. . . The professional ideology of American
 
32
 
journalists holds that vhat appears in the
 
news media represents the truth or is at
 
least 'accurate* in the sense of being real.
 
Yet figurative speech is not real. It
 
substitutes stylistic structure for
 
reality (24).
 
In spite of these apparent flaws impeding objectivity
 
in reporting, given that no two humans or cultures are
 
identical, readers who criticize newswriting should be aware
 
of the forces behind that writing, then expect to evaluate
 
that reportage knowing its potential flaws. Headers should
 
not expect to find their own cultural myths always
 
regurgitated back to them by the press. A good chance
 
exists that portions of any group's favorite beliefs could be
 
flawed and possibly destructive to society's improvement for
 
everyone, as in reportage which reinforces ethnic prejudice.
 
Furthermore, intellectual growth hinges on exposure to new
 
ways of understanding. Perpetual reinforcement of the same
 
belief system without any tests of its value would hinder a
 
culture's growth. Readers may grow intellectually if what
 
they read occasionally helps them reevaluate their beliefs.
 
It is clear that myths and metaphors help convey our
 
cultural understanding of the world. Yet deciding which
 
metaphors should express whose myth poses endless problems
 
which impede objective reporting and objective reader
 
interpretation.
 
33
 
 Next, we will address another problem in
 
interpretation of the news.
 
* * *
 
Noam Chomsky and the'Message Behind the Meaning
 
We have identified common myths about the press itself.
 
The first is that it is an objective record of daily history,
 
that it simply mirrors the day's events. The second is
 
exactly the opposite, that the press is biased. It is
 
liberal if you are conservative politically, and right-wing
 
if you are liberal. But there is no completely
 
satisfactory description of how the press is or even should
 
be. Critics of the press find cause for concern because of
 
what they perceive to be the biases in reportage, for
 
these biases carry messages that may move people to behave
 
in ways the critics deem inappropriate. We have seen that
 
myth and metaphor may affect how writers approach their
 
subjects, we have seen what may influence readers in how
 
they interpret a reporter's words. The power of cultural
 
myths and the way writers perceive and explain these beliefs
 
through metaphoric concepts preclude the possibility of the
 
press being able to express absolute truth.
 
Differing perspectives on how the press handles this
 
dilemma and how the situation can be improved are offered by
 
several critics. One of the most prominent is Noam Chomsky.
 
He has little good to say about news organizations, for he
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asserts that they serve as conduits for elite organizations
 
to indoctrinate the public. He suggests that much news of
 
political affairs falls into the category of propaganda.
 
In Language and Politics/ Chomsky responds to an
 
interviewer's question about the objectivity of the press
 
Q. Do news organizations lend themselves
 
to any sort of systematic analysis or do
 
individual idiosyncrasies and judgments
 
varying from operation to operation
 
prevent any sort of general logic?
 
A. . . .when you move to issues of more
 
fundamental concern/ to what is real power
 
in the Country—questions of foreign
 
policy/ questions of national military
 
policy and so onv or general questions of
 
national economic policy/ policies that
 
really affect people with real power—/
 
in that case one finds that the pressure
 
of the system of indoctrination/ of the
 
party line/ becomes very heavy/ and there
 
are very few people who deviate from it
 
or who even perceive it. They think
 
they're being quite objective/ but you
 
can easily demonstrate that they're
 
operating within a framework of shared
 
assumptions that is very far from obvious
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and often very far from true (437).
 
Chomsky's "shared assumptions" would likely be described more
 
tolerantly by Barthes as cultural myths. The limitation on
 
Chomsky's opinions is that he wants the power to define what
 
is "true." Anything that doesn't meet his definition of
 
truth/ or his mythical perspective, is wrong. His generality
 
about government trying to indoctrinate people with its party
 
line is too broad, and his complaint that the press parrots
 
the party line is his opinion. Why Chomsky is so hard on the
 
press might be explained if one examines his attitudes toward
 
the political power structure
 
It is crucially important to prevent
 
understanding and to divert attention from
 
the sources of our own conduct, so that
 
elite groups can act without popular
 
constraints to achieve their goals—which
 
are called 'the national interest' in
 
academic theology (The Chomsky Reader 124).
 
He suggests that some of this writing is crafted deliberately
 
to manipulate and control the thinking and behavior of the
 
readers. If we put in perspective the historical context of
 
his stance, it may help explain his position, for he was an
 
assertive activist against the United States' involvement in
 
the Vietnam War. He explains further
 
The process of creating and entrenching
 
highly selective, reshaped or completely
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 fabricated memories of the past is what
 
we call •indoctrination' or 'propaganda*
 
when it is conducted by official enemies,
 
and 'education,' 'moral instruction' or
 
'character building' when we do it our
 
selves. It is a valuable mechanism of
 
control, since it effectively blocks any
 
understanding of what is happening in the
 
world (The Chomsky Reader 125),
 
But Chomsky fails to suggest how we are to know what is
 
happening in the world unless we are present at each and
 
every event so that we may decide for ourselves. Chomsky's
 
cynicism suggests that his own personal and cultural history
 
has produced a myth that determines both government and the
 
press as combined enemies of the truth. Not only
 
does Chomsky's own myth underlie his opinions of the press'
 
response to politics, but he also demonstrates by his
 
opinions of the press how Barthes' theory of myth produces
 
divergent opinion.
 
Others share milder versions of Chomsky's claims. Tom
 
Koch in his book. The News as MVth, links the propaganda
 
description to the reductive code of newswriting
 
Contemporary journalism does have
 
as a central function the role of
 
propagandist in a modern democracy.
 
Further, it appears that role is
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mundanely fulfilled through a structural
 
transformation based on what linguists
 
define as a unary grammar. This results
 
in a narrative pattern that defines events
 
in terms of official statement and not
 
through any critical method that would
 
place the news in its broader content.
 
Thus there is a consistent and generally
 
accepted shift of information from the
 
boundary to journalistic information
 
levels (182).
 
This means that if writers rely on quotes from officials to
 
explain the whO/ what/ why, when/ and where of events, then
 
the official is the one who gets to interpret the meaning of
 
the facts. The reductive nature of news stories does not
 
permit the writer to explain the broader context of meaning
 
behind the facts and quotes. Koch feels that reporters
 
should add the larger context to news stories to make them
 
less propagandistic.
 
Jay Newman describes the role of the journalist from
 
another approach: "He deals in much the same archetypes as
 
the creative writer does, and he confirms traditional myths
 
and invents new ones" (99). Newman sees the journalist akin
 
to fiction writers whose works are suffused with archetypal
 
and mythic foundations. In spite of Chomsky's distrust of
 
the press' motives, mythical foundations behind how stories
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are vritten don't have to be bad. John Hartley explains
 
They [myths] are a product of the active
 
generative process of language/ formed
 
and reformed according to the relations
 
between social groups and forces. Thus
 
one of the primary functions of the news in
 
any medium is continuously to signify myths
 
through the everyday detail of 'newsworthy'
 
events (29).
 
We could argue/ according to Hartley/ that without the
 
foundation of mythical thought, there would be no
 
understandable news stories to tell to groups of readers.
 
Still/ readers finally must bear ultimate responsibility for
 
evaluating what meaning they see in any news. And even when
 
readers have assumed responsibility, there still is no
 
perfection. Sederberg sums it up: "We never perfectly grasp
 
who we are or how we fit into a wider community because we
 
have no steady high ground on which to stand and take a
 
reading. As Nietzsche pointed out, all seeing is perspective
 
seeing; all truths are perspective truths" (7). Thus, news
 
is never, and cannot be, any one absolute truth to all
 
people.
 
Having now arrived at a point where we understand that
 
no two people can ever see or understand anything in
 
exactly the same way, but only partly by sharing broad
 
cultural myths, our next step is to examine the metaphorical
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structures and other figurative language used by Times
 
reporters as they covered the Persian Gulf War of 1991. We
 
will see how these metaphorical structures suffuse the
 
writing and expose the cultural myths of the various sides
 
in the war/ and finally, we will consider what it all means.
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Chapter 2
 
Metaphorical Structures and Their Power to Affect Meaning
 
in January/ February, and March of 1991, the Los
 
Angeles Times produced a daily account of the Persian
 
Gulf War. The reportage reveals an array of metaphorical
 
concepts that expresses our conscious and unconscious
 
cultural myths.
 
A careful examination of the subjects of these metaphors
 
suggests a rather simple pattern illustrated in the
 
Diagram on page 42. If we begin in the center of the diagram,
 
we find the heart and the blood—both central to any life.
 
In the second circle radiating outward from the center are
 
other body parts, often used synechdocally to represent
 
the whole person. These parts also symbolically represent
 
the particular power or function of the part, as in the ear
 
representing hearing, listening, or understanding. In the
 
body responses circle are sex, birth, life, death, kill,
 
disease, and eat (which may represent consuming, conquering,
 
or obliterating). The fourth circle deals with home,
 
domestic functions, and conditions that affect life in the
 
local environment such as light which symbolizes knowledge
 
and hope, and dark which represents ignorance and despair.
 
Extending outward to the fifth circle are social and
 
work-related interactions with other people, such as
 
buying, constructing, or taking a journey. In the sixth
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Diagram Of Metaphorical Subjects
 
Used in the Los Angeles Times
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A way of looking at how we understand metaphors as seen in newswriting
in the Los Angeles Times suggests an ever-widening circle. Beginning in the 
center with the heart and blood, we expand outward through the body, 
home, work, and political influences until we reach the final circle of 
spiritual beliefs and values. 
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circle we find broad political ideas and issues, our
 
questioning or acceptance of maninade forces that would
 
control us. Finally, in the outer circle, the farthest from
 
our bodies and daily lives, we enter into the spiritual or
 
metaphysical realm. This realm involves our ethical sense
 
of right and wrong and beliefs in higher powers who may have
 
control over us, e.g. the word hell is used to describe
 
suffering.
 
While all of these metaphorical concepts are present
 
in the Times' war reportage, some are more important for
 
describing how we understand armed conflict than others,
 
such as those dealing with the safety of our bodies, as in
 
"bloody" battles or "killing" tanks.
 
After surveying specific examples of common metaphors,
 
we will then focus more closely on the ones that are of
 
particular significance to warfare. We will see how Saddam
 
Hussein relies heavily on religious metaphor to justify his
 
cause, how the Iraqi people and other identifiable groups
 
understand and use many of the same body and home related
 
metaphors. Military language uses many Social Interaction
 
and Work related metaphors, especially those describing
 
machines and entertainment. We will see how the Times' war
 
reportage includes stories representing many mythical
 
approaches to the war, and all of it is embedded with
 
metaphors.
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Interior Body Metaphors
 
We begin our examination in the center of the Diagram
 
of Metaphorical Subjects (p. 42) with heart and blood
 
figures. These metaphors are found in reportage from both
 
sides of the conflict. We find that as reporters use
 
metaphors in their own texts/ they also subtly add to the
 
effect of their stories by their choices of whom and what to
 
quote and the metaphors their sources use. Both contribute
 
to the overall slant or effect of a given story.
 
Without the proper functioning and balance of the
 
heart and blood, we know we have no life. To threaten to
 
spill the blood and to destroy the heart strikes at our
 
basic need to survive. We know that loss of blood may mean
 
grave danger and destruction of the heart means death.
 
"Having heart" means having the ability or desire to
 
continue life or having compassion for another's
 
plight. "Bloody" represents the unnatural loss of the very
 
essence of life. It's caused by external injury, and it is
 
an alarm that life could end. The use of the word "blood"
 
in this sense, can immediately cause listeners or readers
 
to become uneasy. Using "bloody" in war talk threatens
 
danger and strikes at a most fundamental level of survival
 
instinct.
 
In the following examples, we can see how reporters
 
show both the Iraqis and the allies using and understanding
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the power of the word "blood" In Its various forms. From
 
the American perspective, we read, .. Hussein is
 
looking for—blood for blood,' said . . . a military
 
analyst" (Wilkinson and Broder, "Allies Push. . ." Al);
 
"Defiant orders broadcast . . . what analysts described as
 
a strategy to bleed the U.S.—led forces in battle. . . He
 
[Hussein] wants to see American blood. . ." (Gerstenzang
 
and Williams,"Ground War. . ." A1+); "Saddam Hussein, his
 
back against the wall, is defiantly preparing for a bloody
 
test of that theory" (McManus, "To Hussein. . ." Al); and
 
". . . the tank commander gathered his troops around him as
 
the possibility of a bloody ground war, and death, loomed"
 
(Chen, "Use Fear. . ." A5).
 
From the Iraqi's perspective we find similar use of
 
"blood" with its overtones of loss of life: "Baghdad Radio
 
said President Bush and his family will be haunted 'until
 
doomsday' for Bpilllng civilian blood" (Kennedy and Healy,
 
"Allies Press. . ." A4); and "'Iraq will severely revenge
 
every drop of its martyrs* blood,' the Baghdad Radio
 
broadcast declared. . ." (Fineman and Williams, "Iraqis
 
Vow. . ." A1+).
 
While blood represents life, the heart represents
 
metaphorically the ability or desire to continue living, or
 
our compassion for others, or the center, or most
 
important part of a matter.
 
Showing the "desire to continue," Mark Fineman writes
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 about and quotes "one Western Military analyst/ 'that the
 
heart of the Iraqi army just isn't in this fight" ("For
 
Soldiers. . A5). To exemplify heart shoving "compassion
 
for others/" Norma Zamichow and Amy Wallace write/
 
". . . the fate of the two Marines—the first deployed from
 
the west Coast apparently to be taken as POWs—gripped
 
residents' hearts" ("Wives Find. . ." All). To illustrate
 
how heart may mean the "center of a matter/" David Lauter
 
says/ "Basra serves as the headquarters of the Republican
 
Guard/ the seasoned force that Cheney once Called the heart
 
of Hussein's power" ("Allies Prepare. . ." A1+).
 
The use of blood and heart metaphors for fundamental
 
concepts such as life sustainment/ courage/ and "center of
 
a matter" is widespread in both the American and Iraqi
 
cultures. Barthes might describe these blood and heart
 
metaphors as examples of "common sense/" evident in the
 
beliefs of both cultures.
 
* * *
 
Exterior Body Metaphors
 
Other body parts beside the heart are also frequently
 
used as we see in the second circle of the Diagram (p.42).
 
Parts of the exterior body/ such as ear/ eye, skin/ shoulder/
 
arm/ hand/ and hair are used to explain an action or an
 
accomplishment. They are commonly used in ordinary language/
 
but we can see by the following examples that they are used
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in war reportage, both in the writers' own texts and in
 
quotes from others.
 
We will begin with "arms." From the Middle English
 
arm meaning "shoulder" to the Latin armare meaning tools or
 
weapons, we can see a reasonable association between arm as
 
"shoulder" to arm as "weapon" if we think of physical
 
combat by butting with shoulders or striking with arms,
 
then extending that image by adding weapons wielded with
 
arms. For example, ". . . Fitzwater also said Bush would
 
insist that Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait and Iraq must
 
physically 'lay down their ants' to show that they are
 
retreating" (Wilkinson and Williams, "Iraq Orders. . ." Al).
 
Here, the idiomatic expression "lay down their arms" means
 
to drop their weapons and cease fighting. As a part of the
 
arm or elsewhere on the body where physical strength is
 
developed, we understand the muscle's power. Military
 
strength can also be called "muscle" as in "Only the United
 
States has the politcal stamina and military anscle to shape
 
such events" (Ahmed B7).
 
Hands have the metaphoric ability to maintain control
 
or enable action to occur. After an American pilot is
 
downed behind enemy lines and while he waits for rescue,
 
he describes his actions: "'. . . some kind of big hand
 
takes over for you and you start doing things without
 
realizing'" (Chen, "Bailout. . ." A6). If the hands are
 
restrained, we understand an impairment of power. David
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 Lauter writes: . .U.S. and British officials opposed
 
the move, fearing it would tie the hands of military
 
commanders in case talks with the Iraqis break down" ("Iraq
 
Accepts. . ." A1+).
 
Another hand action gives a clue to an attitude showing
 
supplicating behavior: "[Gen.] Neal said '. .. We're not
 
going in there vith hat in hand by any stretch of the
 
imagination'" (Wilkinson, "U.S. Troops. . ." Al). We
 
associate removal of the hat and holding it in the hand
 
with showing respect for a person deserving honor.
 
Hand-holding suggests agreement and support, while staying
 
the hand suggests restraint, as used by Doyle McManus: "And
 
he [Bush] sent Eagleburger to Jerusalem for three days of
 
high-visibility hand holding with the Israeli government
 
. . .the Israelis .. ."stayed their hand" ("Doomsday. . ."
 
A1+). And hand-wringing suggests anxiety: "In recent years
 
there has been a lot of hand-vringing about declining U.S.
 
power and influence" (Flanigan, "War May. . ." Dl). Hands
 
may also be used to indicate small, imprecise measurement,
 
as in, ". . . American generals and strategists. ..
 
concluded. . . that successful military compaigns should be
 
founded on a handful of clearly defined concepts. . ."
 
(Broder, "Schwarzkopf's . . ." A1+). For the reader,
 
various functions of the hand can be understood
 
metaphorically to suggest behaviors of political bodies.
 
The entire head is widely used to illustrate the
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center of power. Loss of the head means death literally, or
 
figuratively, end of power. Sheryl Stolberg quotes Larry
 
Baldwin's comments on ending the war: "'Off with Saddaa's
 
head and then we'll go home'" (A9+). If Saddam
 
figuratively loses his head, he has been removed from
 
leadership. Leading with the head indicates direct
 
confrontation, as in John Broder's use of Schwarzkopf's
 
comments on our strategy; "'Our plan initially had been to
 
. . . do exactly what the Iraqis thought we were going to
 
do—and that's take them head-on into their most heavily
 
defended area'" ("Schwarzkopf's . . •"A1+). Douglas Jehl
 
reports that ". . . its [Iraq's] 20,000 or so soldiers
 
charged for nearly four days across the desert, as part of
 
a massive American flanking attack that turned to headlong
 
pursuit as Iraqi forces sought to leave Kuwait" ("Images
 
. . ." A1+). Readers will understand these head-first
 
metaphors to suggest urgency.
 
Parts of the head also may be used metaphorically.
 
The face may suggest assuming responsibility, as in "It
 
will help that they [Americans] face those challenges with
 
a new confidence and opportunities, born of success in the
 
Gulf War" (Flanigan/ "War May . . ." Dl). Or face can be
 
used to express honesty, as in "'. . . Saddam Hussein has
 
once more shown his true face,' Kohl told journalists in
 
Bonn" ("Europe. . ." A12). The nature of things can be
 
represented by face as in "Gen. Kelly said . . . the
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allies' 'high technology weapons worked and actually
 
changed the face of modern warfare'" (Wilkinson and Healy,
 
"As Truce. . A1+). This example may be further
 
explained by thinking of person to person interaction, in
 
which we gather awareness of one another by observing each
 
other's facial expressions, for they give clues of the
 
Other's attitude. When used metaphorically, references to
 
the face can give readers hints about the attitudes and
 
behaviors of the subjects of discussion.
 
Another use of face entails avoiding shame. In this
 
war particularly, since many Arabs felt the United States
 
was again imposing its will on the Middle East, the use of
 
face as an expression for maintaining dignity such as by
 
"saving face" or "losing face" becomes common; ". . . Lisa
 
Horvath Blume> 25, works in the development office of the
 
Denver Art Museum. 'I'm glad it's over, but I'm worried
 
that the Arabs are going to feel they've been humiliated and
 
will retailiate,' she said. 'Face is very important in
 
the Arab culture'" (Bearak A1+). If the Arabs lost "face,"
 
American readers would understand that the enemy was
 
shamed, and shame can be associated with losing.
 
Other parts of the head are also used liberally, both
 
as nouns that may show symbolic powers, but also as
 
particular functions of them or by them that may express an
 
attitude or mood. For example, "Bush is 'biting bis lip'
 
to contain his unhappiness with Gorbachev's diplomatic
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efforts. . (Nelson, "Bush Reported. . ." Al). Readers
 
will understand the physical action of biting his lip to
 
signify holding back emotional expression.
 
Eyes and ears represent knowing, awareness. For
 
example, "When Schwarzkopf's intelligence picture faltered.
 
Army commandos and Marine Corp reconnaissance teams became
 
the eyes and ears of the Central Command" (Healy, "Special
 
Forces. . ." A1+). The effect of using the sense organs,
 
eyes and ears, metaphorically, immediately suggests to the
 
reader the functions of those organs. We understand that
 
the commandos and reconnaissance teams are gathering
 
information bout the enemy's whereabouts and movement.
 
Other uses of eye may more literally describe seeing or
 
being seen. Commonly known in general usage are "right
 
before their eyes," "the public eye," or go "eyeball to
 
eyeball." A black eye can represent having suffered a
 
figurative setback in a conflict. The Times prints a story
 
about a town in California whose leaders invited all those
 
military persons resisting the war to find sanctuary there.
 
"'Arcata has received a blaclc eye,' said the group's
 
president. . ." Morrison and Murphy, "Flashbacks. . ."
 
A1+). The town's "black eye" occurred when the townspeople
 
disagreed with the leaders who had declared the town a
 
sanctuary. The citizens resented the idea of their town's
 
reputation becoming unpatriotic.
 
Ears can represent failure to communicate or
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repudiation/ as in "Hussein's deceits have fallen on deaf
 
ears" (Summers/ "Hussein's Deceits. . ." A8+). An unusual
 
Times, story shows ears representing a conquest. After
 
having killed an opponent/ the conqueror cuts off the
 
enemy's ears as a trophy; "Some reviewers drew a parallel
 
between the ancient enemy [of Israel]/ Haman/ and the new
 
one/ Saddam Hussein. In some homes/ where a traditional
 
cookie called Haman*s ear is served/ families changed the
 
name to Saddam's ear" (WilliamS/ "Israel. . ." (A12).
 
Rather than possessing the literal ear of Saddam/ the
 
cookies are symbolic representations of the ear/ and
 
further/ they can be completely eliminated by devouring
 
them.
 
Letting out information is often associated with
 
the functions of the mouth. We are familiar with the
 
expression "giving voice tO/" which means communication
 
using words. Withholding information also may be
 
associated with the mouth. "Throughout the conflict/
 
allied military commanders have been extremely
 
tight—lipped about Iraqi casualties" (Gerstenzang/
 
"Tens of. . ." A8+). "Tight-lipped" means the lips are
 
closed preventing the mouth from uttering words/ therefore
 
no information is being revealed.
 
Personification can also be expressed through sounds
 
from the mouth. "'They [Iraqi troops] shoot all the time,
 
said [Kuwaiti] Dr. Baroon: 'They just hear the voice of
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the plane and start shooting'" (Drogln, "Kuwaiti
 
Doctors. . A1+). A plane's sound becomes a human
 
voice bearing a message of danger. In another example^
 
"In a city apparently savaged by Iraqi occupiers. . . the
 
throaty grruabling of tanks and gun trucks shortly after
 
dawn brought a fearful populace out of hiding. . ." (Murphy
 
and Drogin, "Crowds. . ." A1+). Readers may sense that
 
tanks and gun trucks take on a dangerous, monster-like life
 
with their "throaty grumbling."
 
Finally, with the head, we can determine offense by
 
figurative actions, such as "It proved much easier to get
 
us [reporters] out of his hair" (Balzar, "No war. . ."
 
A8+). Just as no one wants pesky knots, twigs, or insects
 
caught in their hair, neither does an official want to be
 
bothered by pesky reporters. The hair metaphor trivializes
 
the efforts of the reporters by comparing them to something
 
pesky caught in the hair. In another more violent
 
metaphor, we read "• • • th^ 24th Mechanized Division
 
formed a further piece of the noose closing around [the
 
neck of] the Republican Guard" (Broder, "Schwarzkopf's
 
War. . ." A1+). Readers will understand the choking of a
 
noose as a deadly danger, therefore if the Republican Guard
 
has a noose around its neck, it is in danger of being
 
defeated.
 
Metaphors that describe violence to the bodies of our
 
enemies and fear that our bodies will be hurt by enemies
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suffuse our language. These metaphors indicate an
 
understanding of conflict that entails hurting our enemy
 
more than our enemy hurts us. For example/ "Some U.S.
 
Army troops have affectionately pinned a wartime nickname
 
on President Bush: 'THDMBSCSEffS.' . . . Said Lt. Col.
 
Bill Chamberlain. .. 'At every corner, George turns the
 
thiunbscrevs on Saddam Hussein. . ("Bush. . ." A8).
 
Readers will understand Bush's strength over Saddam by
 
the idea that he can torture him with symbolic
 
thumbscrews.
 
The following examples show how we may understand
 
military strength by comparing it to the condition of
 
other body parts: ". . . the soldiers' desire to save
 
their own skins" (Sahagun, "Objectors. . ." All);
 
". . . Washington expected Riyadh to grow weak-kneed"
 
(Lamb, "Ferocity. . ." A9+); "Iraqi forces . . . have
 
been left with little stonach for battle. . ." ("At
 
the Outset. . ." B4); ". . . coalition forces cut off
 
the main body of Iraq's Republican Guard. .
 
(Wilkinson, "Iraqis. . ." Al); "'. . . we are not after
 
the total destruction of Iraq, breaking its backbone'"
 
(Gerstanzang, "Soviet Peace. . ." A1+); ". . . Clausewitz
 
warned that 'sooner or later someone will come along
 
with a sharp sword and lop off [their] ams'" (Summers,
 
"Hussein's Deceits. . ." A8+); and "'We are not
 
planning to . . . disneaber Iraq,' he said" (Gerstenzang
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and Williams/ "Bush Halts. . A1+). The last two
 
suggest violence so severe they border on butchery.
 
These violent expressions of harm to the body somewhat
 
parallel the literal violence of war. They come
 
close to giving readers accurate sensory images of
 
battlefields.
 
Add the humiliation of blows to the buttocks to the
 
idea of winning/ and we have the very colloquial/ "It
 
felt good .. . We kicked their asses/' said Capt. Bill
 
Wainwright. . ." (Kennedy/ "Allies Battle. . ." A6).
 
The idea of kicking ass goes farther than just winning a
 
battle. It adds the idea of disgracing the enemy and
 
seeking revenge. "We're going to . . . spank them
 
pretty hard. . .• said Maj. Craig Huddleston" (Balzar/
 
"U.S. Marines. . ."Al+). Spanking the enemy suggests
 
the humiliation one might inflict on a child as
 
punishment.
 
If metaphors truly motivate our actions/ then our war
 
like actions are rooted in how we perceive our very body
 
processes and our atavistic/ survival-of-the-fittest
 
mentality. Times reportage merely reflects these
 
metaphoric ways of understanding. Those who complain
 
about the violence in our society might find an explanation
 
for its cause in our language. If metaphors do lay a
 
foundation for action/ and if we wanted to and could change
 
our metaphors into more peaceful/ productive figures/ it
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might help change our old/ violent ways of seeing the world.
 
Body Response Metaphors
 
As we move from the Exterior Body circle of the
 
Metaphorical Subjects Diagram (p.42) into the third area
 
of Body Responses/ we find violence and aggression still
 
used prominently. Although life/ birth/ and the body
 
position of "stand" as it means supporting an idea are
 
common thoughout our language/ those of killing and dying
 
are obviously linked to the violence of war. Sexual
 
conquest (power over) and devouring (eating) one's opponent
 
are also Used against the enemy and link back to the
 
survival-of-the fittest mentality. War is also seen as a
 
disease/ and that idea lends itself to cures for the
 
disease.
 
As a voluntary body response/ the sexual conquest of
 
rape as a metaphor packs a chilling effect on readers.
 
Readers know the literal act of rape is to shame/
 
humiliate/ overpower/ and Control a victim with sexual
 
aggression. Therefore/ the metaphorical use of rape to
 
describe the behavior of an enemy is to place that enemy in
 
the most abhorent light. Rape is generally understood as a
 
masculine aggressive behavior/ which historically has
 
suited male soldiers. As women soldiers assume more combat
 
roles/ we may see the rape metaphor's current masculine
 
56
 
connotation change to neutral gender; or possibly/ women
 
warriors will assume different metaphors to describe their
 
way of handling conflicts. As Sederberg says, . . even
 
if we manage to loosen the grip of a particular meaning/ we
 
do so only by embracing another" (5). The masculine rape
 
metaphor used to describe the behavior of enemies/ however/
 
remains strong. If reporters describe Saddam as a rapist/
 
their own attitude toward him is clearly revealed. And
 
that is what they do. "While the world waited/ Saddam
 
Hussein systematiGally raped/ pillaged and plundered a tiny
 
nation .. ." (Gerstenzang/ "Had 'No. . ." A1+). Hussein
 
personally is called a rapist: "The victims of the rapist
 
will simply grow in number. . .\ until someone has the
 
courage to forcibly put a stop to it. . ." (Buccola B6). By
 
choosing to use the forms of rape to describe his actions/
 
the reporters have chosen a most repugnant term to put
 
Hussein in a hated and disgusting light. Readers may
 
sympathize with the abject humiliation of the victims/
 
and understand the destruction of their sense of safety/ and
 
the exertion of brutal power over them. This type of
 
reporting cannot be called objective/ but it shows how
 
language grows out of and reveals the writers' myths.
 
other clearly masculine metaphors have to do with the
 
condition of and use or malfunction of the penis. Erection
 
and performance may be used to show power or control over a
 
victim/ but to "screw up" suggests incorrect penis function.
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"Mother fucker/" a name suggesting the tafooo idea of incest/
 
may be used to insult someone who is perceived as depraved
 
or incompetent. These penis references may be used in a
 
variety of ways. For instance/ "We have not/ as some might
 
suggest/ 'gone off half-cocked•" (Baker/ "Baker Test. . ."
 
AlO). Half-cocked is doing it wrong/ whereas the
 
implication is that going off fully cocked is powerful.
 
"•From now on/ I say 'screw it/' one voice said slowly.
 
'All those mothers [mother fuckers] die'" (Jehl/
 
"Soldiers. . ." A7). "Screw it" suggests unrestrained
 
masculine sexual performance. The soldiers don't need to
 
control themselves anymore. The "mother fucker" reference
 
implies that they [the Iraqis] are so depraved that they
 
deserve to die. Another example says "Already the heat-

seeking Chapparral missiles on his rig bore new inscriptions/
 
one of them simply labeled: 'Dp Tours'" (A7). This
 
inscription suggests that the enemy is threatened with
 
humiliation by using the idea of sexual assault. Another
 
says/ "'When things don't go their way/' said retired Gen.
 
Edward C. Meyer. .. 'they tend to screw up badly'" (Freed/
 
"Boning . . ." A1+). They are so incompetent that they
 
can't perform well. Finally/ according to a British TV
 
analyst/ "Why don't we just admit it was a cock-up and that
 
it won't happen again?'" (Tuohy/ "British . . ." AS). Once
 
again/ the metaphorical reference is to a malfunction of the
 
penis.
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Most of these masculine metaphors for sexual aggression
 
or sexual malfunction are spoken by male troops. They shov
 
a disquieting metaphorical approach in which sexual force
 
and concern about correct penis function are used as weapons
 
against an enemy.
 
The concept of devouring the enemy's flesh also
 
conveys the idea of conquering an enemy. If he is killed
 
and eaten/ we have conquered his body and even used it as
 
food to strengthen ourselves. This harks back to the
 
hunter/hunted stage of early man. For instance: ". ..
 
from Augustus Richard Norton. . .'It may well make regional
 
powers think twice about gobbling up their neighbors. . .
 
or "according to Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr. . . 'If it goes
 
badly, we'll be in the sonp. . . In this same article,
 
another government figure continued the metaphor: "Harold
 
Brown . . . says . . .'One effect of this crisis is that it
 
will raise the appetite of all countries . . . for
 
high-technology weapons'" (Wright, "Gulf Lesson .. ."
 
All).
 
Reporter John Balzar creates for us a mood almost like
 
the suspense buildup in a horror story: "In the vast sands
 
of nothingness to the north, they lay in wait, stropping
 
their steel and thirsting for the blood of young Americans
 
("When the . . H2). Later Mark Fineman quotes a
 
Jordanian refugee from Kuwait as he supports Saddam;
 
"'Saddam will eat you Americans alive! ... He can eat
 
59
 
everything. He can eat rocks, snakes, donkeys, trees,
 
missiles and soldiers'" ("Cult of . . A1+). Another
 
article offers, . . a senior official said. . .'If you
 
made it impossible for Iraq to defend the area, you could
 
be serving up a tasty aorsel for Iran'" (McManus and
 
Kempster, "U.S. Forging. . ." A1+). These metaphors for
 
eating the enemy, which break the universal taboo of eating
 
human flesh, are particularly powerful, and they appear in
 
both American and Iraqi/Arab expressions. Readers all can
 
understand their primitive foundation: when we eat
 
something, we have to kill it first.
 
Television critic Howard Rosenberg carries the eating
 
metaphor into his comments on war reporting seen on CNN and
 
the BBC. He says, "There are plenty of bones to pick with
 
CNN's continuous spewing of raw, evolving stories. . .", and
 
"These [battle tape snippets] were tastes with most of the
 
real war .. . left to our imagination. . . Many news-hnngry
 
Americans ... are eating up every crisply spoken word of
 
the BBC" ("Between Media . . ." A9). Rosenberg's use of
 
the eating metaphor suggests that the viewers of CNN are
 
piggishly gobbling up without thought what is broadcast.
 
Christopher Kenneally continues the idea: ". . . instan
 
taneous electronic coverage of allied bombing raids,
 
military press conferences and Iraqi responses feed a
 
seemingly insatiable global appetite for up-to-the-moment
 
news" ("'The Beeb', . ." F9). Here, readers may associate
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the hunger for news with an anlmal-lIke feeding frenzy.
 
From the primitive sexual dominance and eating
 
metaphors relating to bodily functions/ we move to images
 
of birth and death/ disease and injury/ then curing. Body '
 
position is used/ as in standing up to show support or lying
 
down to show giving up. Images and metaphors that
 
particularly apply to warfare are those of disease or
 
injury/ curing/ and dying.
 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is called a disease.
 
Yousef/ a Kuwaiti flyer/ said/ "'When we have to drop bombs
 
on our own fields/ we feel frustrated. But we have to take
 
the dirt out of it anyway. It's a cancer. We need to take
 
it out'" (Murphy/ "Skills of . . ." Al). Readers will
 
know cancer is potentially deadly and may require surgical
 
sacrifice of some healthy tissue to remove it all/ therefore
 
if enemy occupation is likened to a cancer/ even some of
 
the Kuwaitis' own land must be sacrificed to get it all out.
 
other illness metaphors include pain and blindness.
 
[Regarding Iraqi POWs] ". . . one Pentagon official said/
 
'It's not nearly as bad as having to root them out of bunkers.
 
But it's still a big pain'" (Richter/ "Masses of . . ." A1+).
 
Even having to deal with POWs is physical suffering/ as in
 
pulling a damaged tooth out by its roots. As blindness
 
hinders one's ability to identify placement of objects
 
around him or her/ so blindness in battle can be understood
 
when soldiers are thwarted from taking accurate aim at their
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targets. "Iraqi gunners were forced to fire blind" (Drogin/
 
'"Saddam Line'. . ." A1+).
 
Moving away from actual battle, we find illness
 
metaphors used for other war-related difficulties:
 
"Airlines, however, continued to suffer through one of the
 
worst travel seasons on record as the ground war unfolded"
 
(Shiver D1+); "In addition, the Gulf War is bloafing the
 
U.S. Budget deficit" (Risen A21); or "'The fact that Iraq
 
has moved so quickly to accept allied terms for ending the
 
war indicates they know they are burting,' said one
 
Administration official" (Lauter, " Iraq Accepts. . ."
 
A1+). Readers can understand the war-caused hardships
 
borne by airlines, the increasing U. S. deficit, and Iraq's
 
problems in terms of physical illness which they have
 
personally experienced.
 
As war and Its related difficulties are seen
 
metaphorically as bodily disease or injury, so treating the
 
"illness" of war, or seeing war itself as a healer, involves
 
metaphors related to healing or curing. Using surgery to
 
correct a problem sounds precise, sterile, yet urgent:
 
"After nearly 48 relentless hours of surgical cruise missile
 
strikes and bombing runs, Baghdad resembles a ghost town"
 
(Fineman, "Baghdad's . . ." Al). Another reporter on the
 
same day uses the same metaphor: ". . . the air war will
 
continue to feature high-tech surgical strikes" (Healy,
 
Raids on . . ." AS). And that is close to what the missile
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 strikes actually were: precise/ sterile to the missile
 
crews that fired them from hundreds of miles away/ and
 
purposefully urgent.
 
The Patriot missile is seen as a cure: .. an
 
anti-missile missile called Patriot was proving the allies
 
[sic] most effective Scud antidote" ("Hostile Skies. . ."
 
H8). The expression "healing the wounds" is common/ as in
 
"'I think this war has healed the vounds of the Vietnam War'
 
said Maj. Baxter Ennis" (Chen and Richter/ "U.S. Shakes
 
. . ." Al). If readers understand a wound that won't heal/
 
they should be able to compare the unsatisfactory end of
 
the Vietnam War to a long-festering wound that has finally
 
healed. Mental and/or spiritual healing is addressed as
 
well. "Only time will give full measure of the catharsis
 
of the Persian Gulf War/ but it is inconceivable that the
 
war initiated the exorciss Of the Zionist d«soii from the
 
Saudis' political psyche" (Norton/ "The Wreckage . . ." M1+).
 
"Catharsis" and "exorcism" represent the letting go of
 
something bad. "Demons" represent the ultimate evil. For
 
author Norton to suggest that the war was a cleansing and
 
that to the Saudis the Zionists were demons in need of
 
exorcising/ is writing using metaphors so dramatic that
 
their use may polarize readers for or against the war and
 
the Zionists.
 
All of these metaphors dealing with illness and
 
healing are applied broadly to nations or groups/ but when
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 we move to the subject of the body's death/ two
 
contradictory things happen: the expressions try to soften
 
or dehumanize the dying/ or they do the opposite by focusing
 
in with excruciating detail on the awfulness of death. The
 
softening effect is seen in words like "loss/" "casualty/"
 
"sacrifice/" or "collateral damage" for death/ but some
 
expressions are even more unsympathetic toward death/ such
 
as "At the Pentagon/ one operations officer who declined to
 
be identified said news reporters were 'making too big a
 
deal' of the 12 Marines dead. 'The Iraqis losb up to 500/'
 
the officer said. 'We waxed them'" (Kennedy/ "Allies Battle
 
. . ." A1+). Even pro-military readers are likely to be
 
put off by the officer's uncompassionate description of
 
killing.
 
One particularly expressive piece of writing is done
 
by Douglas Jehl. If soldiers are to survive/ he captures
 
the need for them to see the dead enemy dehumanized. One
 
wonders whether Jehl is writing this account to satirize the
 
macho "killer" instinct or to try to capture accurately the
 
larger context of the mental state of soldiers who must
 
suppress emotion as they bury enemy dead
 
'Some of those guys [Iraqi soldiers] are
 
not going to get a proper burial/' Col James
 
Riley said of the enemy forces now arrayed
 
in front of his infantry brigade. 'Some of
 
these are going to be laid to rest right
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 there in the holes they've been sitting in.
 
They're just going to be covered up as we
 
go by.•
 
'Now that's a sad thing/' he said/ 'but
 
I don't want you to be sad about it.'
 
His voice rose a notch and took on a
 
tougher edge. 'Because those soilbitclies
 
are the same trlgger-pnllers that are out
 
there trying to kill you. And if any of
 
you have any problems with that, then
 
you're in the wrong business.'
 
... 'My goal is for this to be a
 
killer brigade/' Riley told his officers
 
carefully/ chomping methodically on a wad
 
of Red Man tobacco almost always lodged
 
against his cheek. 'Killers survive'
 
("Veterans. . ." A7).
 
This is another obvious example of a story that could not be
 
considered objective. It is written in the style of a novel
 
as it makes a tough-guy character out of Riley. By adding
 
sensory details such as "his voice rose a notch and took on
 
a tougher edge" and telling that Riley was "chomping
 
methodically on a wad of Red Man tobacco almost always
 
lodged against his cheek/" the reader pictures Riley as a
 
theatrical character designed to incite an emotional
 
response such as sympathy/ respect/ or disgust. It is up
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to the readers to respond according to their own cultural
 
backgrounds. This type of writing does have a function/ for
 
it gives a picture of the mood of the troops at the front as
 
it creates a larger context for the plain who/ what/ why/
 
when/ and where of formula newswriting.
 
In contrast to Jehl's article/ Rosenstiel expresses the 
opposite approach to death. The death of some Americans is 
seen in images that pinpoint details which epitomize the 
meaning of the terrible loss. The writer uses emotional 
details such as ". .. a flag-draped coffin. .. a lonely 
bag-pipe playing 'Aaazing Grace/' interviews and pictures of 
tearful wives. ..■onrning var's incalculable cost/ its 
ultiBate loss" (Rosenstiel/ "Dealing With. . ." All). And 
the reportage fOr the death of Americans is often written 
as whole mini-biographies of each soldier/ so that Americans 
can share the sacrifice and the finality of that death. 
Again/ details to capture the idea of the finality of death 
are scattered throughout the sentences 
. . . Marine Lance Cpl. Thomas A. Jenkins/ 
was killed in battle Jan. 29 in a light-
armored vehicle at the Saudi-Kuwaiti 
border. His freckled, stem gaze, frozen 
on the cover of Time magazine/ became a 
tearful reminder of the sacrifice small 
towns across America have made for freedom. 
. . . said Harvey Tomlinson/ a family 
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 friend who watched Thommy grow up at the
 
ranch in the rural Sierra foothills of
 
California's Mariposa County. . . 'This
 
is not going to go away in a day#
 
a week# a nonth or a year* And we feel
 
that.
 
'Death is forever' (Morrison and Murphy/
 
"Flashbacks. . ."Al).
 
As the authors pinpoint specific details of Jenkin's life/
 
that he grew up in rural ranch country/ that he was
 
freckled/ they humanize him to the reader. Then to end with
 
the quote by his friend/ "Death is forever/" adds a dramatic
 
finale. A detail-rich article such as this subtly implies
 
that conflict based on war is vanity/ for the war-death of
 
any loved one is a foolish and extravagant cost to settle a
 
dispute. In fact/ death is at the center of most mythical
 
fear of war for all cultures. For those who may die/
 
there is the fear of being forgotten/ and for the
 
survivors/ death means the absence forever of their loved
 
ones. In some ways for the survivors/ death may be the
 
beginning of a whole new set of metaphors. But for the
 
dead/ death ends all metaphors.
 
* * *
 
Home and Environment Metaphors
 
Moving outside the body/ the next circle of
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metaphorical thought (See Diagram, p. 42) involves^the
 
dwelling place and the knowledge and sensations associated
 
with daily living. Here we find the spatial concepts of up
 
versus down and the passing of time; the sensory concepts
 
of hot versus cold, light versus darkness, and soft versus
 
hard; the associative idea of family members; and then
 
we encounter concepts in the dbmesticity of home such as
 
clothing, and nature as it involves water, fire, plants,
 
animals, and weather. So far in this study, the scope of
 
metaphorical meaning has encompassed the life of the
 
physical body. Now we expand outward to include the safety
 
and life-continuing properties of home. We are still
 
centered on our own survival, a key concern as we try to
 
explain warfare.
 
in general, we use the idea of being up and height to
 
mean being or feeling in control. This can be demonstrated
 
by expressions such as "having the upper hand," "feeling
 
up-beat," or "standing up to an enemy." If we think of
 
being down or under, one is losing control as in the
 
expressions "bringing the enemy down," "backing down," "a
 
low-life," "plummeting hopes," "dragging down," or "living
 
under" the influence of some problem.
 
An example of the up-versus-down metaphor can be seen
 
in David Broder's report of troops' morale before the
 
ground war
 
And morale among American troops is as
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high now as it ever will be, officials
 
said.
 
'You can't keep them at a peak of
 
readiness for very long,' an official
 
said. 'You can bring thea down and take
 
them back up, but you can't do that very
 
many times before you take the edge off
 
("U.S. Military. . ." A7+).
 
Here height or up means being prepared to engage in battle,
 
while "bring them down" suggests relaxing readiness
 
relating to our senses.
 
Temperature, as in degrees of hot and cold, can also
 
relate to receptiveness or rejection. We understand cold
 
to be unfriendly and/br inactive while warm is friendly or
 
very active. For example, "Bush is described as being
 
dismayed and incensed at what he considers Hussein's
 
coldblooded disregard for his own people. . ." (Nelson,
 
"Bush Waging. . ." A1+). Another reporter states, "U.S.
 
officials have also been cool to a cease-fire" (Williams,
 
"Cease-Fire. . ." A7).
 
For an example of hot, meaning active, we read ". . .the
 
U.S. attack helicopters had charged so far ahead of their
 
supply lines in the heat of battle that they were scattered
 
at temporary allied bases. . ." (Chen, "No Place . . ." A1+),
 
or ". . . it [the vessel Princeton] has a hot line to give
 
immediate news. . ." (Keich "Navy Wives. . ." A9+). Both
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 of these examples illustrate the idea of heat causing
 
increased activity.
 
Another sensory perception common to our home
 
environment is our perception of light. Light enables us
 
to see, therefore to be able to protect ourselves from
 
danger/ while dark means absence of being able to see/ which
 
can leave us vulnerable to danger. Taking this to a more
 
abstract level/ we might say that light is often used to
 
show presence Of knowledge/ understanding/ or good/ while
 
dark may represent ignorance/ harmful intentions/ or evil.
 
These are used by both sides in a war and may take various
 
forms such as in "glimmer of hope/" "in the dark/" "fading/"
 
"illuminating/" "ray of light/" "sun" and "shadow/"
 
"blackout/" "black list/" and "black humor."
 
The light versus dark metaphor is understood and used
 
by both sides of the conflict. Reporter Kenneth Freed
 
explains the Iraqi official position on terrorism. "Iraq
 
. . . said Baghdad-sponsored terrorists will soon strike
 
against American and allied targets worldwide and turn
 
President Bush into 'a hostage in his Black House*" ("Iraq
 
Predicts. . ." A9). Here/ Iraqis share the interpretation
 
of white or light as good and dark or black as bad by
 
changing White House to Black House. Printing this Iraqi
 
quote in the American press is more likely to convince
 
Americans that Iraq is a legitimate enemy rather than arouse
 
sympathy for Hussein's position.
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By using light and dark to represent knowledge or its
 
lack, Daniel Williams gives us a look at the Iraqi citizens'
 
position. "January 15 is the one concrete milestone of life
 
in the city. Everything else is clouded by rumor and
 
uncertainty. . .Left to drift in the dark, citizens grab
 
avidly at any piece of news" ("Many Baghdadis. . ." A20).
 
Bush uses the good/evil meaning of the light versus
 
dark metaphor liberally in his State of the Union Address
 
As Americans, we know there are times
 
when we must step forward and accept our
 
responsibilities to lead the world away
 
from the dark chaos of dictators, toward
 
the brighter promise of a better day. . .
 
This is the burden of leadership--and
 
the strength that has made America the
 
beacon of freedom in a searching world
 
(Gerstenzang, "'We Will . . ." Al).
 
The Iraqis and Bush each call the other side dark, meaning
 
evil, which suggests that the mythical differences in their
 
approaches toward one another are vast and complex, in spite
 
of the fact that each understands the same metaphor.
 
Hard and soft metaphors also are useful in war
 
reporting, for hard represents strength and resolve, but
 
soft suggests weakness, toleration of wrong, or willingness
 
to abandon a previously, inflexibly held position. The idea
 
of flexibility itself, vacillating between hard and soft,
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 can be used for change.
 
A rather common example of the hard metaphor is used
 
by Sara Fritz; "Even opponents of the President's hard-line
 
policy against Iraq acknowledged that the mood is changing
 
on Capitol Hill" ("Mission's . . ." A9). "Hard-line",
 
indicates that the President's position is firm and
 
unchanging. Harry Summers uses soft to mean weakening the
 
enemy: "All agree that air strikes are essential to soften
 
enemy entrenchments. . ." ("Allied Forces. . ." A8). Hhile
 
"soften" here may sound deceptively gentle, it is a stark
 
contrast to what actually is happening as air strikes are
 
not only destroying enemy weapons, but violently killing
 
enemy troops. The idea of being neither hard nor soft is
 
illustrated by Williams and Gerstenzaiig in "The Soviet Onion
 
... had seen what it called 'new flexibility' in Iraq's
 
position" ("Bush Rejects. . ." A1+). This shows
 
abandonment of a firmly held position infavor of change.
 
Mu broadr scope than up/downand ho/eld,
 
though, are the metaphors drawn from amil relationships.
 
The most well known metaphor naming a family member is, of
 
course, Hussein's reference to the Gulf War as the "mother
 
of all battles." Early on, before the United Nations
 
imposed its January 15 deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal
 
from Kuwait, Hussein warned that any armed resistance to his
 
forces in Kuwait would result in "the mother of all
 
battles." This metaphor had a dramatic effect on the world.
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In a poverful way it ■took the respected relationship of a 
mother and her expected behavior of protecting and nurturing 
her children and used it to describe a terrible and feared 
social upheaval--that of war—in which mothers and children, 
especially sons, may die violent deaths. Radio, television, 
and newspapers worldwide repeated Hussein's threat and took 
it to mean that Iraq would fight viciously with all its 
rumored arsenal of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons. "Mother of all battles" may have become the 
fundamental metaphor of the entire War, but contary to 
Hussein's threats against his opposition, the "mother of all 
battles" was turned against his own troops. 
Another example of the power of family relationships 
to our uhdefstandihg is illustrated b he approach of Arabs 
who joined in the coalition against Hussein' troops. The 
allied Arabs dealt with the problem of having to fight their 
Arab "brothers." This use of brother connotes shared 
mythical, ethnic, and religious backgrounds♦ They were 
fighting on Arab soil against inhabitants of the land whose 
families shared the same religion and historical roots. They 
were exposing to the whole world a "family" breakdown. 
Also related to the home are metaphors using various 
types of animals, most of which would be familiar to a rural 
family for their use for work, food, or clothing. In the 
Times war reportage, both the Iraqis and the allies use the 
people-are-animals metaphors, sometimes as insults because 
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of some foolish or ignorant characteristic of the animals.
 
Animals may be stubborn, like donkeys, or mindless
 
followers, like sheep. The idea of someone being called a
 
hawk because of willingness to attack like the predatory
 
bird or being called a dove because of a non-violent nature
 
like the peaceful bird is widely understood and is used by
 
political figures as well as reporters. Also, aerial combat
 
has been known for a long time as a dogfight. But other
 
not-so-common animal-related metaphors are sprinkled
 
throughout the Times reportage in the writers* own words as
 
well as in the quotes in the stories.
 
The following examples illustrate a fraction of the
 
variety: ". .. allied ground forces exchanged sporadic
 
fire with the Iraqis occupying Kuwait, calibrated their
 
tank cannons, played grim games to psych themselves for
 
close combat and paved the ground awaiting the call to
 
advance" (Balzar, "Ground Troops. . ." A7). The reader
 
will understand "pawed the ground" as behavior of a bull
 
waiting to charge. "Crocodile tears" are known as large,
 
attention-getting tears showing phony emotion. "Syria. . .
 
accused Jordan of shedding 'crocodile tears' over the
 
plight of Iraq" (Freed and Ross, "Egypt Signals. . ." AlO).
 
"'Dead donkeys know no fear,' muttered a middle-age cab
 
driver as he drove blithely through the first air raid
 
warning. . ." (Montalbano, "Turks Near. . ."AlO).
 
"Donkeys" appear as stubborn fools. And, "'The air attacks
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 have left him strategically defanged and attacks on his
 
ground forces will leave him tactically declaved/'said
 
Edward Peck, a former U.S. chief of mission in Baghdad"
 
(Abramson, "Hussein on . . A1+). Saddam's forces, like
 
a fierce lion, cannot fight well without teeth and claws.
 
Two Other uses of the people-are^animals metaphors
 
seem particularly hostile toward the enemy. These
 
metaphors equate the enemy with game to be killed as sport
 
or food, or they denigrate the enemy by name calling which
 
equates the enemy with the weaknesses or undesireable
 
qualities of an animal. John Balzar reports on a
 
helicopter attack: "Basra was the bottleneck through which
 
the Iraqis were trying to squeeze . . . to escape the
 
encircling coalition army. 'it's about as close to a
 
turkey shoot as you can get,'said Lt. Col. Paul Murtha
 
. . ." ("Forward U.S.. . ."A7). Hunters would "encircle"
 
their game, then shoot the turkeys (known for their
 
stupidity) for sport. In another article on the same
 
helicopter battalion, Balzar writes, "Later, he [pilot Ron
 
Balak] recalled, 'a guy came up to me. . . and he said, 'By
 
God, I thought we had shot into a damn farm. It looked
 
like somebody opened up the sheep pen'" ("Apache. . ."
 
A1+). A reader envisions the enemy panicked as sheep
 
mindlessly dashing this way and that.
 
In an example demeaning the enemy by using animal
 
names, Melissa Healy and John Balzar write, "In response to
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 the bombardment/ U.S. pilots said/ the Iraqis have moved
 
their tanks and their artillery around Kuwait 'like
 
cockroaches*" ("Cheney. . ." A1+). Cockroaches are known
 
to readers as disgusting insects attracted by filth.
 
Hussein is regarded as a trained dog as Bearak quotes a
 
citizen: ". . . said Dick KOrnbluth/ a retired businessman
 
. .. 'We have an aggressive dictator brought to heel'"
 
(A1+).
 
Lastly/ within the circle of home environment metaphors
 
is the use of weather. The most obvious/ of course/ is the
 
name the United States gave to the attack when the allies
 
changed their stance from providing a Desert "Shield" to
 
causing a Desert "Storm". The Times reportage is rich with
 
weather metaphors to describe the dramatic actions of
 
weapons used in Desert Storm.
 
Storms themselves and all their features make up many
 
war metaphors. These include references to lightning/
 
thunder/ rain, flood/ wind/ and fire. Before the war had
 
even begun/ we see and hear references similar to those
 
from a weather report. Sara Fritz reports/ "Added Sen.
 
Lloyd Bentsen D-Tex.): 'The outlook for an agreement on
 
some kind of settlement before Jan. 15 is bleak'"
 
("Mission's Failure. . ." A9).
 
The Times editorial on January 11 took up the weather
 
theme: "War reports are like war itself. Some describe
 
moments so quiet there is nothing to hear but heartbeats.
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others cover teiq>eBt8 of thvnder and violence so random
 
. . . that two people seldom can remember them the same
 
way" ("The Pentagon. . B6).
 
After U.S. attacks had begun, we read: "Iraq fired
 
missiles into the civilian populations of Tel Aviv and
 
Haifa early today in a thunderous retaliation as the United
 
States and its allies bombed Iraq and occupied Kuwait for a
 
second day with relentless fury" (Tuohy and Nelson, "Iraqi
 
Missiles. . ." Al). And "In the midst of a widening war
 
Saturday, Jordan's border with Iraq was a caln oasis in the
 
eye of the stora. The expected outflow of refugees fleeing
 
the American-led bombing of Iraq was increasing but not yet
 
a flood" ("Exodus From . . ." A21). If readers imagine a
 
monstrous hurricane-like storm swirling across the land
 
with its calm center (eye) providing only temporary relief
 
from flooding caused by torrential rains, they will be able
 
to picture the dramatic turmoil of war, with refugees being
 
the flood caused by a rain of bombs. In another flooding
 
metaphor by Rudy Abramson we read: "The voice of Saddam
 
Hussein was heard on Iraqi Radio on Sunday for the first
 
time since the deluge of missiles and bombs descended on his
 
military machine" ("Hussein on . . ." AT).
 
Balzar is particularly expressive in his use of animal,
 
home, and weather metaphors
 
. .. troops of the U.S. coalition have
 
responded not just with a rain of bombs
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but with a psychological war campaign and
 
some terrorism of their own—the fright
 
ening bay of a sprawling professional army,
 
locked, loaded, limber and each day seeming
 
to draw closer to the trip wire . . .At
 
night on the front lines between Saudi
 
Arabia and Iraq and occupied Kuwait, the
 
horizon glows orange sometimes. A sunset
 
of fire—the carpet-bombing of B-52s, the
 
low-flying fighter bombers scuttling over
 
targets" ("Troops Send . . ." A8).
 
"Rain of bombs" and "sunset of fire" set a violent weather
 
scene while the "frightening bay" of an army increases the
 
tension as the reader pictures the restless hunt-lust of a
 
pack of dogs. Contrast these violent pictures against
 
"carpet bombing," for "carpet" sounds warm and comforting
 
against a cold floor while "bombing" explodes and destroys;
 
combine the two terms, "carpet bombing," and the effect is
 
disconcerting. The combined effect of Balzar's metaphors
 
creates a vivid scene to help readers understand war's
 
setting.
 
One often used metaphor, calling war a fog, is echoed
 
by several writers but whose origin is pinned down by
 
Richard Falk; "The phrase 'the fog of war' comes to us from
 
the great German military thinker Karl von Clausewitz. The
 
Gulf War, despite being the focus of unprecedented media
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attention, remains in a heavy shroud of fog" ("West
 
Pretends. M5). Here, the fog metaphor, which suggests
 
that what is actually happening cannot be clearly
 
Understood, also is infused with the concept of a shroud, a
 
death wrap, which adds an additional layer of meaning to
 
the events of war, linking Ignorance of what is happening to
 
what could be the worst possible consequence, death.
 
Add clouds to the idea of war and we read: "Before
 
the shooting began, the Pope's unavailing efforts to dispel
 
clouds of war—'an adventure with no return,' as he
 
characterized the crisis—-ranged from prayer to a
 
last-minute peace plan" (Montalbano, "Pope. . ." A8).
 
Here, "clouds of war" metaphorically represent the threat
 
of a gathering storm.
 
The condition of the sea also helps explain strife.
 
For example, "regarding the quality of his judgment, the
 
caliber of his leadership, the determination of his troops
 
and, indeed, the measure of luck he carries, the tide of
 
this 'mother of battles' will turn" ("Today's Pattons. . ."
 
A7). A tide helps sailors launch or land ships, depending
 
on the tide's height and direction. Readers will
 
understand a "turning tide" as one bringing a change in
 
fortune. Daniel Williams uses a sea metaphor to explain
 
Israelis' concerns: "We in Israel must remind ourselves
 
that from now on we will be confronting not only the Arab
 
Coalition of junior partners in the American victory, but a
 
79
 
seething# choppy sea of Arabs, snrging vith inner doubts,
 
seeking new heroes and symbols to identify with,• predicted
 
Ehud Yaari. . ("Israelis Fear. . A9+). This metaphor
 
suggests unrest; no one can predict how the Arabs are
 
likely to respond to the results of the war.
 
We are not alone in using the weather metaphors.
 
The Iraqis use similar concepts: "Iraq's official
 
news agency broadcast reports that the incursions in the
 
Rhafji area were merely 'the beginning of a thimderoas
 
storB bloving on the Arab desert'" (Kennedy and 6rOder,
 
"Allies. . ." A1+). This Storm metaphor implies that the
 
Iraqis are the same as "thunderous storms," and readers will
 
think the Iraqis are tough and dangerous.
 
Finally, we turn to how fire can add powerful meaning,
 
as exemplified by George W. Ball
 
The ending of the Gulf War should
 
force us to recognize that the region
 
is a dark and ill-kept storehouse of
 
flanable naterials capable of bursting
 
into nev conflagrations. A disastrous
 
firestorM might be triggered at any
 
time by an accumulation of corrosive
 
discontents. . ." ("Victory. . ." Ml).
 
Especially around a home, destructive fire represents loss
 
of shelter and utensils for livelihood. It leaves its
 
victims helpless. A "storehouse of flammable materials
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 capable of bursting into new conflagrations" suggests the
 
loss of stored possessions as well as dreaded spread of
 
fire to other structures. If a "firestorm" is generated/
 
it can take on a life of its own and be difficult to stop.
 
"Corrosive" discontents who may ignite this firestorm can
 
smoulder from within until a fire begins spontaneously.
 
These metaphors will alert readers to a dangerous
 
situation.
 
References to home pervade our language and influence
 
our way of understanding. That these home-based metaphors
 
are so prevalent in the writings of Times reporters and in
 
the few pieces of information from the Iraqis suggests at
 
least some metaphor linkage unifying myths between cultures.
 
As we move to the next circle in our Diagram of
 
Metaphorical Subjects (p. 42), the circle of Social
 
Interaction and Work/ we see that our metaphorical
 
perspective still is closely linked to the language of our
 
daily lives.
 
* * *
 
Social Interaction and Work Metaphors
 
Many common metaphorical concepts employ references to
 
what one might encounter in the normal activities of
 
life; recreation/ entertainment/ travel/ and various forms
 
of work. These are frequently used to describe many aspects
 
of life including war.
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For instance/ common metaphors that refer to daily
 
work activities/ those associated with building or
 
construction/ also may be applied figuratively to the job of
 
war. For example/ foundation means a beginning or a
 
fundamental argiiment/ hammer may mean to strike the enemy
 
hard/ or go to great lengths may mean exhausting every
 
possible alternative to avoid conflict.
 
As we see things in terms of construction/ we also
 
find we understand ideas in terms of travel. Times reporters
 
use the broad metaphorical idea/ "life is a journey"
 
(Lakoff and Turner 3-4); that iS/ to live one's life means
 
to move onward/ and in case of war/ it means furthering the
 
war effort. We find terms used for ship navigation to
 
indicate potential progress/ such as in "launching" to mean
 
beginning an attack/ or keeping "an even keel" as in
 
maintaining control. Other less obvious metaphors for
 
journey,are used in expressions such as "guideposts/" which
 
indicate progress/ or the simple "go to war" meaning
 
begin the hostilities.
 
While these journey metaphors are neutral in their
 
emotional meanings of war's changes/ economic or home
 
management metaphors describe the cost of war and provide
 
harsh/ emotional impact when we consider the stark/ ripping
 
away of loved ones that we call the price of war.
 
Two common expressions used throughout the Times war
 
reportage are "the price" and "the cost." Graham E. Fuller
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comments, "We have all paid a high price for this military
 
victory in treasure and blood" (B5), and another writes,
 
"But the Iraqis let loose a last-gasp barrage of heavy
 
antiaircraft fire that cost the lives of eight G.Is. . ."
 
("No Place. . ." A1+). Readers understand the payment of
 
lives in exchange for victory, and as long as the lives
 
spent are strangers, the news may be tolerable. But when
 
the "cost" is a person's own loved one, few would willingly
 
"pay the price."
 
We find variations of expressions showing value. "'War
 
is never cheap or easy,' he [Bush] said" (Gerstenzang and
 
Kempster, "Bush Praises. . ." Al). Saddam is described as
 
extremely mercenary. "British commander . .. Lt. Gen.
 
Peter de La Billiere, took stock this way; ... 'Saddam
 
Hussein is a man who nses hnman life as currency to bny vhat
 
he vants in the world"' (Mealy and Baizar, "Cheney
 
Hints. . ." A1+). in a way, the idea of "spending" lives
 
takes on an almost lustful connotation, where we are driven
 
to fight and spend lives, but afterward, we loathe the
 
cost. "Americans are spending lives,' said Barry P.
 
Bosworth, an economist at the Brookings Institution in
 
Washington. 'They're not spending money'" (Peterson AlO);
 
"We have not spent blood and treasure destroying the Iraqi
 
military machine just to see it rebuilt, for hard currency,
 
by the Soviets" (Krauthammer B7). An editorialist who sees
 
the cost metaphor in a cynical light, writes, "Recently,
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top policy-makers have speculated in public about the
 
possible use of nuclear weapons in retaliation against a
 
chemical attack or to spare American lives in what might
 
otherwise be a costly ground war, seemingly reducing the
 
choice to one of cost-benefit analysis" (Falk M5).
 
Two others' views the Times included show what they
 
think is received in exchange for the cost. "Civilization
 
is bongbt in blood, we've spilled some of ours, but we've
 
gotten sc»etbing for it. Maybe something important"
 
(Clancy B7). Col. Harry G. Summers' military approach sees
 
it unemotionally: "The payoff of all this training was
 
Operation Desert Storm and the blitzkrieg that destroyed
 
Hussein's army" ("Putting Vietnam. . ." A6). The extent of
 
the effect on readers of the cost metaphor is likely to
 
depend on the readers' own involvement in having to "pay
 
the price."
 
Another common metaphor used by Times writers in
 
their own texts as well as in their quotations from others
 
is language describing war as a game. Certainly
 
the impact of the allies' reliance on sophisticated
 
technological weapons that could kill the Iraqi troops out
 
of close-eyesight range, sometimes even hundreds of miles
 
away, made the allied attacks seem somewhat less hideous
 
than on-the-battlefield color video of the bloody ground
 
troops, burned children, or the bodies photographed in the
 
twisted positions where they had fallen that all the world
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could see from the Vietnam War coverage. That the hostile
 
engagements of the Gulf War/ as seen on the computer
 
screens/ resembled video and computer games/ makes the
 
metaphor easy to grasp/ but dangerous if its effect softens
 
the reality Of the real human deaths that were not shown.
 
Once the need for war has been determined/ leaders must
 
find ways to enable the troops to carry out the difficult
 
job. SomehoW/ their minds must be diverted from cold
 
reality in order to have the strength to do what has to be
 
done. The metaphor of war as a game trivializes war as
 
play and avoids the societal problems at the root of war
 
that would better be solved by language rather than force.
 
George Black exposes how leaders use the game metaphor
 
War is the most shattering activity in
 
which a society can engage. Nothing else
 
poses such profound questions of morality
 
and mortality. Yet those who mediate our
 
access to this war—the generals and the TV
 
producers—prefer to channel our thoughts
 
into the most trivial metaphors in our
 
culture: the football field/ the video
 
gaae" (M7).
 
Many common game metaphors which Times readers
 
understand for ordinary situations are also used for war.
 
A sampling of them include boxing and wrestling matches/
 
wagering/ chesS/ cardS/ racing/ and cock fights. Video and
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computer game metaphors are common because of the advanced
 
technological weapons used in the Persian Gulf War. The
 
ideas of playing as in "pretending," daring, and trickery
 
are used as well as the whole structural concept of
 
competition Including game rules, teams, coaching, power
 
plays, scoring, winning, and losing.
 
Metaphors that provide the mildest contrast between
 
game-playing and the reality of dead humans and destruction
 
seem the most harsh and repugnant because of their linkage
 
to play. Yet some soldiers themselves recognize and
 
acknowledge the cynical nature of the metaphor. For
 
instance, "'Everybody needs to stop and think about what
 
they're doing,' said Pfc. Mark Pierson, an Army intelligence
 
specialist. 'They think it's just them up there pushing
 
buttons and such, and think we're the litble toy soldiers
 
out here'" (Jehl and Murphy, "Gonsensus. . ." A9). A few
 
days later, Lee May reports how a church pastor explains
 
more fully
 
Many worried that the glitter of a high
 
technology war, with its computers and
 
videotaped bombing raids, so resembled a
 
coaputerized football game for some people
 
that they fail to see the human losses.
 
'With technology, the war has become
 
almost like a sporting event,' said the
 
Rev. Jack Gloverland, pastor of Unity
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Church of Boulder/ Colo., adding that
 
'many people have allowed the excitement
 
and the idea of vinning • • . to over
 
ride the more subtle/ more truthful
 
emotion of compassion' ("Reality of .. ."
 
All).
 
The pastor has complained that the emotion of compassion
 
has been overridden by the idea of winning. His argument
 
goes to the very root of conflict/ as he values compassion
 
more highly than winning. But without winning/ there would
 
be no game at all.
 
General Schwarzkopf also was cognizant of the game
 
metaphor but wasn't drawing comfort from it: "'Somebody
 
asked me about [whether]this is more like a computer gaoie/'
 
Schwarzkopf added. 'And I said/ "Not to me it's not. . .
 
There are human lives involved here/ and war is going to
 
kill people"'" (Lauter/ "High-Tech. . ." Al).
 
But the game metaphors are used usually without any
 
analysis of their meaning. Reporter DoUglas Jehl writes
 
Off they slogged into the mud/ captains
 
and lieutenants playing the part of an Army
 
battalion and looking little different from
 
a high school football team at midweek
 
practice/ pacing off a play they hoped
 
to nee in the big game" ("U.S.Troops. . ." A9).
 
In the same article/ Col. L. C. Riley is interviewed by
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 Jehl: "'This is our diire-leff;/ oar trap-rlgbt,' he
 
said/ accepting the football coach metaphor" (A9). Jehl
 
acknoviedges the use of the game metaphor/ but doesn't
 
comment on it. By his pointing it out/ however/
 
readers may sense the paradoxical nature of the
 
metaphor.
 
Other nations also use the game metaphor; '"The whole
 
of it is like a great gaoe of chess/' said Maj. Julian
 
James/ chief of staff to the British Army's 4th Brigade.
 
'You don't really smash in and kill all the forces. You
 
just move around and outmaneuver him and at the end of the
 
game/ you say: 'checkmate'" (Jehl and Healy/ "'Casualties'
 
. . ." A1+).
 
The idea is also understood by the Iraqis: "Said
 
antique store owner Tahir [of Baghdad]/ in a typical
 
comment; 'This is a game between Bush and Saddam. It is
 
far above our heads'" (Williams, "Streets Quiet. . ."
 
A1+). The store owner/ unlike the previously quoted
 
military figures/ feels the war is in the control of
 
others. Headers are likely to get the sense of being
 
spectators/ and depending on their cultural approaches
 
toward the war/ will accept the use of the game metaphor/
 
or find that it cynically trivializes death and destruction.
 
Readers may not be aware that most game metaphors are
 
used without calling attention to themselves: "Saddam
 
Hussein attempted to play his grisly tramp card Thursday
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night: a barrage of Scud missiles targeted on Tel Aviv and
 
Haifa but really aimed at touching off another Arab-Israeli
 
war" (McManus, "Iraq Tries. . AlO); "F-15 pilot Capt.
 
Steve Tate described his dramatic encounter. . .Almost
 
instantly he said, he knew he'd scored a hit" (Murphy,
 
"Pilots Relive. . ." A1+); "said Col. Charles Burke. . .
 
•It's just like being in the boxing ring. If yon can knock
 
bin off balance# then yon hit hin a fev aore tiaes# he*11
 
go down'" (Lamb, "Allies Hope. . A1+); ". . . said Col.
 
Ralph Cossa, senior fellow at the National Defense
 
University. . .'it is Hussein who scores points if Iraq
 
suffers civilian casualties'" (Rosenstiel, "Images of. . ."
 
AlH-); and "Having played his Send card# his oil-spill card#
 
his oil-field-fires card, Saddam Hussein has little left in
 
his hand" (Krauthammer, "A Cause. . ."37). Without having
 
to read graphic descriptions of destruction and death,
 
readers can understand how the battle is faring by
 
picturing events in a contest. Use of the game metaphor is
 
a euphemistic approach to what actually happens in war.
 
While describing war as game may seem inappropriate
 
when deaths result from war, seeing War as entertainment as
 
in the "war is theater" metaphor is equally disquieting.
 
Yet that metaphorical concept is also readily used by
 
military sources, and Times reportage employs it frequently.
 
Some of the reporters' own terms and their quotes from
 
military experts originate in military tradition as in
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 "theater of operation/" but most of them reveal the
 
theatrical performance comparison embedded in our
 
understanding. Yet the artificiality/ or maKe-believe of
 
theater itself used in war references/ adds a cynical edge.
 
Terms of theater in common use in society but also in
 
war reportage include scenario/ curtain raiser/ show/
 
behind-the scenes/ opening act/ parade/ sideshow/
 
anticlimax/ and like a movie. Others are orchestrate/
 
choreograph/ dance/ stage/ cast/ play a role/ juggle/ take
 
their cues/ and jump on the bandwagon. Finally/ we find
 
script/ rehearsal/ spotlight/ limelight/ and on the spot.
 
Some of these are included in the following Citations.
 
Even before the war began/ Robert Hunter described the
 
political situation in terms of theater
 
Provided that all the players in the
 
Theater of Crisis now play their roles—
 
Saddam Hussein most of all-—the struggle
 
in the Persian Gulf can be resolved
 
peacefully. . . by rejecting Bush's letter/
 
Aziz did the prospects of peace a favor
 
. . . ThiS/ too/ was an important act of
 
theater—and of serious diplomacy. It
 
preserved the fiction that any concession
 
Iraq makes is to the United Nations/ not
 
to the United States. . .All that is needed
 
now is "plausible deniability" about
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linkage.
 
This can be provided by the honored
 
diplomatic practice of parallelism. Two
 
events occur/ seemingly quite independent/
 
and statesmen deny a connection. But with
 
a vink and a nod/ everyone knows what is
 
happening. . .
 
In diplomacy/ as opposed to war/
 
everyone has to get something. Perhaps
 
allowing Hussein even a crumb will be too
 
much for some people. But if/ in exchange/
 
he concedes the central point of complying
 
with U.N. resolutions/ it should not
 
matter that war was avoided by resort to
 
theater ("The Failure. . ." B7).
 
Hunter is arguing that if theater's safe-^pretending or
 
exploring the "what if. . ." possibilities of actions can
 
lead the audience to prefer peaceful settlement of a
 
conflict/ why not use non-violent means? Most writers/
 
however/ simply embed the theater metaphor without
 
explanation within their stories.
 
After the air war began/ explaining the aerial combat
 
in terms of planned dance appeared in several articles. Kim
 
Murphy's front page story sets a dramatic tone: "The
 
aerial armada that sped toward Baghdad just after midnight
 
Wednesday played out a deadly ballet choreographed to tip
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the combat balance In favor of allied forces in the gulf
 
even before the rolling of the first tank. . ("Pilots
 
Relive. . ." A1+). Although Murphy describes the attack as
 
"deadly," still calling the air attack a choreographed
 
ballet conjures up in readers' minds images of graceful
 
beauty. Such images glamorize the attacks and ignore the
 
terror and destruction caused by them.
 
Another theatrical description of the aerial attacks
 
directly compares them to a well known movie; "As the
 
pictures unveiled by U.S. military officials on Friday
 
clearly demonstrate, the development of laser-guided bombs
 
enables U.S. warplanes to drop bombs down the air shafts of
 
command centers, much as space pilot Luke Skyvalker did in
 
the Bovie 'Star Wars'" (Fritz and Tumulty, "'Smart Bombs'.
 
. ." A9). Since "Star Wars" was a good-fun movie and no one
 
really got hurt, unlike the realistic film "Platoon", the
 
metaphor trivializes the real death and destruction to the
 
Iraqis. Most American readers who support the war are
 
likely to accept the metaphor without complaint.
 
Reporter David Lamb describes General Schwarzkopf for
 
readers by comparing him to an accomplished stage actor
 
For more than an hour he held center stager
 
a one-Ban perforBer before a rapt andience
 
.. . Schwarzkopf, 56, a gruff, amiable
 
ex-paratrooper who looks as though he was
 
born in camouflage fatigues, gave a
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perforaance that voald have done Justice to
 
James Cagney. .. 'The best is yet to come/'
 
the general replied and# turning on his heels/
 
strode off the stage and back to the war"
 
("Schwarzkopf . . A8).
 
By picturing Schwarzkopf as a larger-than-life actor who
 
performs before a "rapt audience/" then exits dramatically off
 
the stage/ the writer has created a hero figure for readers.
 
But Hussein is also seen in terms of theater: "Iraqi
 
President Saddam Hussein's ability to depict himself as
 
defying allied might is striking a chord in the Middle East/
 
casting him as a hero in a region where the underdog wins/
 
merely by surviving" (Rosenstiel/ "Allies/ Iraqis. . ." Al);
 
and "He [Hussein] dohs public masks vith an actor's flourish,
 
each vith its ovn vardrobe—the statesman's European-tailored
 
business suits, the desert leader's flowing tribal iellabas/
 
the commander's drab fatigues and black beret" (Braun and
 
Wilkinson/ "What Sort.. ." Al). Hussein is pictured more
 
as a clever/ deceptive performer than as a hero.
 
Meanwhile, an Army Officer, as eyewitness to allied
 
firepower while safe himself, saw a theatrical spectacle:
 
"He [Army Capt. Mike Wilbur] had lit up a cigarette and sat
 
back to listen to the Righteous Brothers when suddenly the
 
sky was aflame. . . 'It was the Fourth of July to music,'
 
Wilbur said of the artillery shov, pyrotechnics against a
 
jet-black backdrop—and accompanied by warplanes streaking
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home from Iraq. 'All I needed was a beer'" (Jehl, "After
 
Sunset. . ." (A6).
 
If these theatrical comparisons seem cynical In their
 
approach to the deadly seriousness of warfare, Howard
 
Rosenberg, television critic, claims that observers want the
 
thrill of all the action, that war makes exciting
 
entertainment. He explains; "We profess to hate war. But
 
who are we kidding? We love It, at least as It's frequently
 
presented on television, as a romantic abstraction. . . We
 
love war as theater" ("Will Bloodless. . ." A8). If he Is
 
correct In his assessment of television viewers, then It Is
 
no wonder that serious newswrlters might employ the theater
 
metaphor In otherwise plainly written narratives to Increase
 
Interest and understanding.
 
Ralph Vartabedlan points out the macabre military names
 
for personnel-destroying weapons: "They sound like a cast
 
of cartoon characters: Adam, Beehive and Bouncing Betty.
 
Yet they are among the most lethal ordnance ever deployed In
 
battle" ("Ordnance. . ." Al). Readers may not sense the
 
full scope of damage to humans caused by these almost
 
humorous names.
 
Both sides In the conflict are accused of theatrical
 
tactics: . . reports from the U.S. press pool In Saudi
 
Arabia are carefully stage-managed by Pentagon officials"
 
(Bethell, "The Public. . ." B5), and "On the political
 
front, Hussein may dramatize civilian deaths In Iraq In an
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 effort to sway public opinion. . (Broder, "Massive. . ."
 
A1+). These reports suggest that the "pretend" quality of
 
theater is likely to incite distrust among readers
 
concerning news from both the Pentagon and Hussein.
 
But a graphic description/ which also could be a sexual
 
metaphor/ dispels the frivolity of theater
 
. . . British Army Col. Barry Stevens/
 
said earlier this week that military
 
burial groups were working in the battle
 
field. But when asked whether mass graves
 
were being dug or if bodies were being
 
counted as they were buried/ he grew
 
testy. .. *1 am not here to discuss the
 
pornography of war/' he said (Gerstenzang/
 
"Tens of. . ." A8+).
 
Readers will understand the burial of enemy soldiers as a
 
duty/ but the reality of mutilated and rotting bodies is as
 
revolting to one's sense of respect for human dignity as are
 
the excesses of sex portrayed in pornography.
 
At the end of the ground war/ the Middle East political
 
situation is still being presented in theatrical terms
 
The United States has a leading role
 
to play in creating a stable regional
 
order/ but it no longer enjoys the luxury
 
of hogging center stage. Through their
 
contributions/ their forbearance and
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their sacrifices/ Europeans/ Arabs/
 
Israelis/ Turks and even Iranians have
 
all earned a voice in giving shape to
 
regional order (Norton/ M1+).
 
While the idea of theater as a way of describing war
 
carries the nuance of human superficial pretense/ the next
 
idea of war as a machine dehumanizes death as it looks at
 
war by measurement of force against force.
 
A metaphor in common use for the troops/ equipment/
 
weapons, leaders/ and strategies of any country or
 
coalition of countries is the all-inclusive term, "war
 
machine." From this grand scope all the way down to the
 
least important foot soldier, military language has been
 
structured into euphemisms to use words and their meanings
 
as part of the war machine. This means that military
 
strategists carefully design military terminology to avoid
 
words that call attention to human injury, suffering, or
 
death caused by warfare, and substitute words like
 
"collateral damage" to describe civilians and non-military
 
targets hit in attacks, and "casualties" to describe
 
injuries or deaths. "Casualties" sounds like something
 
happenstance or minor in importance. Air raids are
 
"strikes" or "sorties.'' Weapons designed to maim and kill
 
soldiers are "anti-personnel weapons." A battle is an
 
"engagement." An attack is a "mission." Accidentally
 
killing our own is "friendly fire." Flattening acres of
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enemy territory with air strikes is "carpet bombing." All
 
these are part of a "machine," and a machine doesn't bleed
 
or suffer, is hard, cold, repairable, unemotional,
 
expendable, and a machine is just a tool.
 
If the goal is to win, then even language is a weapon.
 
If those both in the fray and on the sidelines are to have
 
the mental strength to carry out the warfare deemed
 
necessary, then armies will avoid language that calls
 
attention to individual suffering and concentrate on
 
language that dehumanizes and turns descriptions of the
 
actions that must be taken into unemotional parts of a
 
machine. If one doesn't think of the flesh of the people
 
inside who are also killed, it is not so hard to "kill a
 
tank," a military expression used to describe an attack's
 
effectiveness. Reporters and those they quote readily use
 
the machine metaphor. That this "war is a machine"
 
metaphor enables soldiers to kill enemy troops who, in
 
turn, may be tryinq to kill them, is plain. That the
 
killing may seem like atrocities to readers but be
 
acceptable to military persjons is understandable if one
 
sees that the troops are operating under the "war is a
 
machine" concept. Pitting humankind's instinct to survive
 
against the tragic realities of warfare provides a
 
conceptual paradox that has spawned violent themes for
 
centuries in world literature. No wonder reporters fretted
 
over being limited mostly in their news-gathering to
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closely-monitored press-pools and official military
 
press-conferences where the "war is a machine" approach
 
could be somewhat controlled. Other reportage gathered
 
directly from the troops had to be cleared by military
 
censors before it could be released/ and yet/ when we
 
understand that the power of language is also a weapon/ we
 
can see why the allied leaders felt such control was
 
necessary. Turning a human "them" into an impersonal "it"
 
helps do that job. In addition/ the "war is a machine"
 
metaphor efficiently explains economic gains and losses.
 
The value of equipment can be measured/ but the value of
 
human life cannot.
 
Colman McCarthy talks about the dehumanizing effect of
 
such language
 
Instead of Dr. Seuss at bedtime/
 
comfort them [children] with Dr. Strangelove/
 
currently played by Colin Powell. Explain
 
that when the general says he will 'kill It/'
 
he doesn't really mean ordering the slaughter
 
of Iraqi human beings/ only the Iraqi *araqr«*
 
He's killing an 'it#* as he says/ not a 'them.'
 
An 'it* doesn't bleed or moan when bombed
 
by U.S. pilots/ no loved ones grieve at home
 
(B7).
 
Broder reports that the highest ranking/
 
decision-making leaders of the U.S. forces understand and
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speak of the enemy troops in terms of a machine.
 
"Successful as they believe the first week has been^ Defense
 
Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of
 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Wednesday conceded that
 
Hussein remains firmly in charge of a vast and
 
veil-equipped killing wichine" ("Iraqi Leader. . ." A6).
 
And the "war is a machine" metaphor continues on down to
 
the troops: "Some of the biggest worries center on the
 
impact of weeks of sand on Apache and Cobra helicopters.
 
These aircraft would play an integral role in a land war
 
by killing Iraqi tanks with their TOW missiles. . ." (Frantz,
 
"Allies'. . ." A5).
 
Another way to dehumanize killing is to personify, or
 
humanize, the machines as the enemy and kill them. David
 
Lamb tells how Lt. Col. Billy Diehl, commander of an F-16
 
Squadron, describes the enemy: . . We don't want to be
 
here a day longer than we have to, but we don't want them to
 
roll in there vith all the defenses and all the artillery
 
and the tanks they still have alive'" ("Allied Planes. . ."
 
A1+).
 
If the writer employs personification, giving the
 
weapons the ability to act on their own by leaving out
 
mention of personnel, then no troops do any killing—just
 
the machinery. Frantz writes of the description of a
 
Warthog pilot: "'I started firing about a mile away,' Swain
 
said. 'Some of the bullets ran through hin, but we weren't
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sure if it was stopped completely. So I came back with the
 
final pass, hit it and it fell apart. . . On the final
 
pass, I shot about 300 bullets at hie. . . We tried to ID
 
the helicopter after we were done and it was just in a
 
bunch of little pieces, so we can't tell what type it was*"
 
("Pilot Chalks. . ." A7). Here, the pilot quoted slips
 
back and forth between the use of the pronoun "him" for a
 
person and "it" for a machine. The Iraqis also personify
 
machinery. Fineman quotes refugees fleeing to Jordan as
 
they describe allied planes: "'These brutal planes knev
 
exactly what they were doing" ("Allies Bombing. . ." A9).
 
An Army officer calls enemy troops "units," then talks
 
about taking them apart as if they were a machine that could
 
be disassembled. This eases the idea of killing real people.
 
Broder reports: "The allied attacking forces will isolate
 
individual units, confront them with superior power at the
 
point of attack and 'dismantle them piece by piece,' a
 
senior Army officer said" ("War's Climax. . ." A1+). But
 
Healy reports that our own troops are also seen as tools to
 
keep our military machine operating: ". . .[William] Cowan
 
added that the use of the elite military commandos in Iraq
 
also reflects the Pentagon's renewed confidence in Special
 
Operations forces as an effective, high—precision tool in
 
the nation's military's toolbox" ("Special Forces. . ." A1+)
 
The "war is a machine" metaphor, although used in this case
 
to explain the function of the Special Operations forces,
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shows them as an important part that may be needed to keep
 
the entire war enterprise operating. But, in the war
 
machine, everyone is dehumanized.
 
The "machine" metaphor may assist soldiers in
 
assimilating the training needed to be able to kill the
 
enemy, yet still some sensitivity to the enemy as human
 
beings remains. Balzar reports
 
'I really feel sorry for them,' said
 
Sgt. Percy Smith from Atlanta. 'I feel
 
like I'm glad that I'm on this side and
 
not on their side. I know they're
 
catching hell'. .. 'Jesus God,' said Cpl.
 
Lee Welverton, of Enterprise, Ala., as
 
howitzers roared and the whump of impacting
 
shells drifted back. 'Jesus God, have
 
pity on their souls. . . You can't help
 
but sometimes remember those are human
 
beings under that firestorm' ("Marines'. . ."
 
(A17).
 
In spite of military training which attempts to turn
 
thinking citizens into non-thinking parts of the war
 
machine, compassion remains in soldiers for their so-called
 
enemy. At the feeling level for soldiers, the enemy is not
 
just a machine, but human> no matter how official military
 
language may describe them. Although metaphor does exert
 
some influence over our attitudes, metaphor is still only
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language/ a tool to aid our communication. Language alone
 
does not define and limit our cultural belief. Our
 
cultural myth comes from our common histories/ and
 
metaphoric language helps us describe events in the light
 
of our myth.
 
Finally/ Times reportage has included Roger Scruton's
 
opinion. He sees the advantage of certain weapons that are
 
really machines that attack only other weapon-machines.
 
Perhaps/ if technology can take us that far/ humans will no
 
longer have to take the place of machines and be dehumanized
 
in the process. He says/ "Let us hope that after the war/
 
Congress will deliberate upon the significance of weapons
 
like the Patriot missile/ and perceive the wonderful
 
advantage/ both military and moral/ of weapons that destroy
 
other weapons/ rather than human beings" (B7). If all
 
conflicts really could be settled as verbal argument only,
 
that would be best. Next best, though, would be real
 
machine against real machine, which would leave human lives
 
out of it, like ideas explored in science fiction. The
 
"war is a machine" metaphor would nO longer be a metaphor,
 
but would be a statement of fact.
 
We can see that as we find it necessary to fight back
 
violently against an aggressive enemy, our military and
 
official language detoxifies the most awful horror of
 
warfare by using "game" and "theater" comparisons while
 
dehumanizing the troops by turning war into a "machine,"
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in which armor attacks armor. As non-official language is
 
used in non-military reports by reporters and those quoted,
 
however, we find the previously described paradoxical
 
heart and blood metaphors used that express the human fear
 
of pain and death.
 
The Times' reports on military briefings and quotations
 
from military personnel, while using the "war is a machine"
 
metaphor, reflects the government's position of using
 
language that will enable the reading public to know what
 
is going on, yet not inflame the readers with graphic
 
descriptions of violence. These could produce "weapons of
 
words" in our midst. If the public is shocked by
 
descriptions of hideous human carnage caused by our own
 
troops, the public may insist that the war be halted. This
 
disunity might lend an advantage to the enemy.
 
The Times gives as much coverage as it can to divergent
 
mythical perspectives on the war. In spite of the tight
 
control of official news available to reporters, locally
 
written stories about people's reactions to the war and
 
editorial comments both for and against the Gulf conflict
 
are printed.
 
In the next section, we will move further outward in
 
our Diagram (p.42) to address metaphors that relate to the
 
world outside ourselves and our homes, the world of
 
politics.
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Political Metaphors
 
The world of political ideas, although usually
 
secondary to the living processes of our bodies and the
 
maintaining of life in the shelter of homes and daily
 
interaction with others, may, in fact, be elevated to
 
primary importance. The mind can overrule the body if it
 
places enough importance on the need for effecting power
 
over others, which may explain how factions of the human
 
race can ever resort to physical warfare in the first
 
place. We have seen in this paper how language, its
 
meanings, its mode of expression, and its interpretation
 
manifests power over us as it affects the approach to the
 
way we live our lives.
 
Language used to describe the political forces leading
 
to war has its roots in conflicting cultural myths, which
 
will be discussed in Chapter 3. This section will examine
 
how political news may become propaganda. If politics is
 
the policies and affairs of a government, then inherent in
 
the politics of any country will be the acting out of the
 
cultural beliefs of the people and leaders of that country.
 
As political leaders promote their policies and actions,
 
their way of expression is known as propaganda. We will
 
note how the Times deals with propaganda in outright
 
discussion in reportage of people's expectations and
 
government's needs.
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When power groups resort to deliberate manipulation
 
of language to achieve certain effects on the population/
 
this becomes blatant propaganda. Some may argue that all
 
power groups use propaganda to a degree. While no reputable
 
American newspaper would set out deliberately to blast
 
blatant propaganda at its readers, some may think they see
 
propaganda even in the pages of the generally respected
 
Times. This can happen if the reader's cultural myth
 
collides with what the Times thinks is news that must be
 
reported. If we read an account of an occurrence that we
 
don't want to know about or that we feel shouldn't be
 
exposed as news, we could see that as propaganda—
 
promoting an unpopular idea. Or, the Times could quote
 
the rather radical opinion of a person with whom a reader
 
seriously disagrees. Or the Times can present in its
 
editorial section the divergent arguments from all sides
 
of an issue, and if readers are not open minded enough
 
to consider the position of others with whom they disagree,
 
those editorial opinions may be seen as propaganda.
 
But propaganda, of concern to serious readers, is
 
distortion of facts by deliberately withholding key
 
information, playing up or down certain details of a
 
situation so that a scene is out of proportion by using
 
euphemisms or understatement, or by deliberately telling
 
readers what the power structure wants them to think as if
 
everyone agrees and there is no other way to think. Who
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then/ if propaganda exists in the pages of the Times, is
 
guilty of such tactics?
 
The Times ran several articles which dealt with the
 
role of the press in Gulf War reporting which may give some
 
clues. While the Times did not obviously state its
 
position on the role of the press, it demonstrated its
 
position by its willingness to run the dialectic about its
 
role. Many people, such as Chomsky, assume that the press
 
should be objective and report events plainly so that the
 
public may understand them, but we know that this is
 
impossible if we accept Barthes' idea of myth. So what are
 
the constraints faced by the Times as it tries to report on
 
an event as large as the Persian Gulf War?
 
Editorialist Amos A. Jordan acknowledges the conflict
 
between press and government: "To some soldiers, the press
 
seems a nuisance in wartime. But the quest for public
 
support of the Bush administration's objectives in the Gulf
 
is as important as the military's drive and valor on the
 
battlefield" (M5). Jordan's remarks suggest that the press
 
itself can give or take away support from the Bush
 
administration's goals. He does not explain if absence of
 
news hinders or helps the administration.
 
Although Rick DuBrow is writing of censorship of
 
television, the following remarks can apply to the press,
 
and he adds the idea that public opinion can also cause
 
pressure on the press to support the public myth.
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He writes
 
"At another time, in another war, the
 
saying was, 'Loose lips sink ships.' Now
 
everybody has loose lips, and what they
 
say is transmitted around the world
 
instantly. And the public is behind the
 
new TV-war restrictions. . .The truth, of
 
course, is neutral. But not in a war.
 
Especially a popular one" ("Is It
 
TV's. . ." A8+).
 
We might conclude from DuBrow's opinion, that in time of a
 
popular war, the less the public knows about all the facts
 
of the war, the better it is for the chances of winning,
 
for bad news might turn off public support. People will
 
also interpret news to support their beliefs. Marvin Kalb
 
adds another view: "The sainted Walter Lippman . . . wrote
 
'that in time of war what is said on the enemy's side of the
 
front is always propaganda and What is said on our side of
 
the front is truth and righteonsness'" ("Live From . . .'• B7)
 
Two letters to the editor on the same day illustrate
 
Lippman's quote by showing contrasting opinions of the news
 
media's role in reporting bombing of the bunker in Baghdad
 
Author's note: All types of metaphors will be
 
highlighted as they appear in the quotations used in the
 
remainder of the political section of this study.
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where civilians were killed. The first writer's mythical
 
perception sees the event as a cynical propaganda ploy by
 
Hussein/ and the second writer sees only the U.S. as
 
slaughterers of the innocent. Tom Wagner of Buena Park says
 
May we wonder when the networks
 
will question why the civilians were
 
herded into a military facility; who
 
ordered their placement (death—let's
 
call it what it is); who benefits
 
from the deaths and how is that
 
benefit obtained? May we wonder, does
 
one cry out in anguish on the
 
occasion of a child's death, in whole
 
declarative sentences vith good
 
vocabulary and correct syntax in a
 
foreign language?
 
I see no reason to be surprised at
 
Saddam's use of his own civilians, or
 
the civilians of other countries, as
 
human shields and indiscriminate
 
targets. He's done it before. He
 
continues to target Scud missiles
 
against the civilians of both enemy
 
and non-combatant countries. My
 
surprise is at media gullibility.
 
I'd always thought reporters and
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editors had a more rounded education/
 
questioned their sources more care
 
fully and reported the news more
 
accurately" ("Letters to. . ." B6).
 
Phyllis De Joseph of Rancho Cucamonga offers an alternate
 
opinion
 
I felt a sickening sense of
 
horror as I watched the newscast
 
showing the bombed out bunker where
 
hundreds of old men, women and
 
children who sought shelter from our
 
bombing raids in Baghdad were killed
 
or wounded. I saw the relatives
 
weeping and crying out their terrible
 
grief over the loss of their loved
 
ones. . . I feel the anger of these
 
innocent people in a distant land
 
directed towards the policies of our
 
government. Americans need to know
 
the truth concerning these policies.
 
We need more in-depth reporting by
 
a media that is not controlled by the
 
people responsible for such policies"
 
("Letters to. . ." B6).
 
In addition to its staff of reporters and editorial
 
writers, the Times occasionally prints viewpoints from
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controversial public figures. For instance/ it includes
 
contrasting arguments from conservative politician Patrick
 
Buchanan and a CNN representative. Buchanan argues that in
 
war/ the press is a legitimate weapon and must support the
 
country/ while CNN/ when criticized for keeping Peter
 
Arnett in Baghdad at the disposal of the Iraqis/ argues
 
that their job is to report the news as world events and
 
not to support a side. Buchanan states
 
Is it the duty of American reporters
 
in Wartime to be neutral and objective/
 
or to be on the side of the U.S.? If
 
the former/ we are in trouble. For in
 
wartime Americans do not want objectivity
 
or neutrality. They believe that/ once
 
U.S. soldiers/ sailors/ airmen and
 
Marines are committed to battle/ every
 
American/ be he journalist/ janitor or
 
jailbird/ should back the troops ("Is
 
CNN. . ." M7).
 
Readers have been given two opinions and must decide for
 
themselves.
 
So far we have Observed American writers discussing
 
how objective the American press is or should be. But when
 
it comes to news from Iraq/ we find the Iraqi press has no
 
autonomy at all from the Iraqi government. Times staff
 
reporter Fineman writes
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.. .the state-run station now renamed
 
Mother of Battles Radio, reported Sunday
 
that Syria had turned over to U.S. officials
 
in Damascus seven American pilots who had been
 
Shot down during allied air strikes on Iraq
 
but somehow made their way into Syrian
 
territory.
 
Both reports were not only untrue, but
 
further removed from reality than Baghdad
 
Radio has been since the start of the
 
Gulf War 19 days ago, analysts said ("On
 
Baghdad. . ." A9).
 
The Times falls short of labeling Iraqi news propaganda,
 
but goes so far as to call it untrue. Here, Fineman
 
identifies a false story deliberately planted by official
 
Iraqi sources to mislead its public. Other articles quote
 
the dispatches from Iraq, but the next one explains how
 
biased quotations from the public are likely to be
 
Baghdad Radio—Exhorting Iraqis to
 
relish their 'victory,' the regime's
 
announcer declared: 'The [Republican]
 
Guards have broken the backbone of their
 
aggressors and thrown them beyond the
 
borders. Let us celebrate the epic of
 
the brave Republican Guard, who
 
protected Iraq and preserved its great
 
\ ^
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power.'
 
. . .'He's now making his case to his
 
people to prepare them for the battle
 
field reports they're bound to hear when
 
the bodies and prisoners start coming
 
back,' said one Western diplomat who
 
was based in Baghdad until late last
 
year. 'But more importantly, he's
 
telling his people he's still in charge,
 
which means they better accept his
 
version of events or else.'
 
. . .Most interviews in Baghdad's
 
streets or marketplaces are closely
 
watched by civilian agents, whose mere
 
presence produces comments from shop­
keepers or shoppers that are consistent
 
with the prevailing line of the ruling
 
regime (Fineman, "Iraqi Radio. . ." A8).
 
Not only do Iraqi officials create the news to try to
 
manipulate Iraqi public opinion, but they also apparently
 
have the public afraid to say anything about the war but
 
politically safe parroting of the government's
 
pronouncements.
 
Another account of Baghdad Radio's transmission is
 
covered by Tracy Wilkinson and John Brody
 
Iraq insisted that the ground offensive
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•so far has totally failed' and asserted
 
that the allied forces were 'vadlng in
 
their Dim blood' at Iraq's defensive
 
positions in an around Kuwait. Declaring
 
that the Iraqi forces have already won/
 
Baghdad Radio said/ 'Victory is sweet'
 
("Allies Push. . ." A1+).
 
The American public could read for themselves in the Times
 
and see on television news that the opposite was being
 
reported. For the Times to have been able to report a more
 
balanced picture of what was actually going on inside Iraq,
 
reporters would have to have been allowed in/ but in a
 
country where there is no such thing as a free press/ that
 
was prohibited. The Times did the next best thing by
 
reporting on news transmissions from Iraq and then
 
explaining their doubtful authenticity.
 
On the other hand/ we find the Times also exposes
 
American efforts at manipulating opinion. Alan C. Miller
 
writes
 
Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.)/
 
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
 
subcommittee on Europe and the Middle
 
East/ Stated/ 'When we personalize the
 
conflict/ we undercut our goals of
 
characterizing the conflict as one
 
between Iraqi aggression and the
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world community. .. Targeting Saddam
 
would help him portray himself through
 
out the Arab world as a martyr who has
 
single'-handedly taken on the world*
 
("The Risk. . ." A1+).
 
A careful reader of Hamilton's remarks that the Times chose
 
to print will discover that the congressman is deliberately
 
against personalizing the war because that will affect how
 
readers think about it. He uses theatrical terms to
 
explain this. But the question is, why would Hamilton
 
think he should determine how the public characterizes the
 
war? In addition, the idea of not targeting Saddam so that
 
he might not become a martyr, would seem to place
 
propaganda value above lives.
 
True to the idea that propaganda is a weapon. General
 
Schwarzkopf even reveals that the military deliberately
 
misled reporters so that their articles would confuse the
 
Iraqis
 
Schwarzkopf, the commander of the
 
allied forces, exuded satisfaction at
 
apparently having fooled the Iraqis
 
into expecting a frontal offensive over
 
the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. And he teased
 
the press for its inadvertent role in it.
 
Information on a fake amphibious landing.
 
Imminent Thunder, was leaked to reporters
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—and extensively reported on--to make
 
the Iraqis fortify their positions on
 
the eastern shores of Kuwait. . . In fact/
 
the brunt of the allied offensive would
 
come on the far-western flank (Wilkinson/
 
"Schwarzkopf. . ." A6).
 
This situation is quite ironic. If the military
 
leaked the information about the location of the coming
 
attack and the press reported extensively on the false
 
information/ this shows that the military may have been
 
clever as far as its own goals were concerned by carefully
 
monitoring the press' access to strategic information. The
 
leaks did serve the allies as an effective weapon by
 
causing the Iraqis to expect a frontal attack along the
 
Saudi-Kuwaiti border and an attack from the east along the
 
Gulf. If the press all during the conflict had been
 
allowed easy access to sensitive strategies and had readily
 
published that information/ the American readers could have
 
better formed their assessments of the government's
 
actions/ but then the Iraqi resistance could have been more
 
effective. More allies' lives may have been lost. In war/
 
a press that reveals military strategies may indeed be seen
 
by some as an enemy.
 
Although war is not argument with language but with
 
force/ when news story language affects public support of
 
war/ we can see how the government would want to censor
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news. The problem with censorship and manipulation of
 
information by the military is that it raises concern about
 
what crucial information is being withheld that the public
 
should know, for why should the public trust military
 
leaders to be acting in their best interest? Further, the
 
people's need for accurate information is the basis for
 
keeping government officials responsive to the public's
 
wishes. Where war is concerned, the First Amendment to the
 
Constitution which guarantees freedom of the press is
 
sidestepped by labeling information classified. A loophole
 
in the public's right to information exists here that
 
provides a potential for abuse by allowing the hiding of
 
errors and illegal activities in classified information.
 
The more readers understand how and why manipulation of
 
news works, the less they will tolerate distortion of
 
information. The Times works under the constraints of
 
government news censorship as well as knowledge of their
 
power to endanger American troops by revealing American
 
military strategies so that the enemy may take more
 
effective action. This affects the quantity and quality of
 
what and how news is written.
 
The military has also traditionally used
 
understatement or euphemism to soften the seriousness of a
 
situation. The Times merely reports the statements of
 
military officials. For example, ". . .a Pentagon
 
official, who declined to be identified, said that Iraqi
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soldiers certainly have been "hurt' by heavy bombardment.
 
But the official added: 'Hurt's a relative thing. We've
 
degraded him, but we haven't stopped him"' (Kennedy and
 
Murphy, "U.S. Jets. . ." A1+). In printing the
 
understatement within quotations, the Times allows the
 
readers to respond to the information according to their
 
own myth.
 
Bob Drogin's own reportage uses dramatic terms to
 
describe rocket attacks on the Iraqis, but he exposes the
 
euphemistic military terms for the effects of the attacks
 
American troops call it 'steel rain'.
 
The Iraqis probably call it hell.
 
For the past week, U.S. artillery
 
batteries have launched hundreds of
 
shrieking, fiery rockets at enemy
 
positions in southern Iraq. Each 12­
foot rocket explodes into a deadly
 
shower of 644 bomblets, each of which
 
then shatters into 600 pieces of
 
shapnel that rip into artillery,
 
buildings and 'soft targets,' military-

speak for human beings.
 
'I prefer not to say we are killing
 
other people,' said Capt. Richard
 
Nichols, commander of Bravo Battery,
 
6th Field Artillery. 'I prefer to say
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we are servicing a target' ("Rockets. .
 
A6).
 
Drogin's irony Illustrates for readers the contrast of the
 
harshness of what actually happened with how the military
 
described it.
 
Reporter Edwin Chen shows how the military also uses
 
euphemisms for our own soldiers
 
Among the toughest decisions facing
 
these doctors and nurses will be
 
when to send a patient to the ward
 
designated 'expectant'--meaning expected
 
to die. . . 'These soldiers will die no
 
matter what we do/ and they are given
 
painkillers and made comfortable/' said
 
Lt. Col. James Startzell/ deputy
 
commander of the hospital's clinical
 
services ("At Front. . ." A7+).
 
"Expectant" sounds so much gentler than "hopeless/"
 
"fatal/" or "terminal." While Chen has not pointed out the
 
euphemistic quality of "expectant," readers have been
 
informed and may interpret its meaning according to their
 
own myth.
 
We have seen the use of propaganda within quotations
 
from both sides in Times reportage of the war. Whether the
 
Times itself can be accused of using propaganda will depend
 
on readers' own myths and expectations of what and how the
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 Tines should dover events. It does report on both Iraqi
 
and American military use of propaganda, and it reveals
 
understatement and euphemism in use in military
 
terminology. It printed criticism of its own reportage in
 
its "Letters to the Times" section. Thorough readers will
 
find that the Times prints articles on many sides of issues
 
to the extent that information is accessible.
 
From political metaphors, mostly falling into the
 
category of propaganda, we move to our metaphysical and/or
 
spiritual perceptions, and how our ideas of religion and
 
justice appear in Times reportage.
 
* * *
 
Spiritual and Values Metaphors
 
Cultural beliefs that involve a god, rules and
 
punishment for violation of thOse rules, and individual and
 
group responsibility for adherence to the values held in
 
esteem by a culture, are strong themes in a society's myth
 
system. Within the outermost Spiritual and Values circle
 
on the Diagram of Metaphorical Subjects (p. 42) we find the
 
ideas of good versus evil; God and the devil; justice,
 
punishment, and hell; liberty; morality as might be 
practiced by righteous martyrs; or depravity as might be 
practiced by barbaric infidels. According to what we find 
in Times reportage of the Persian Gulf War, both the allies
 
and the Iraqis see themselves as fighting an evil enemy Of
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God. God [Allah] Is on the side of the Iraqis, but God is
 
also on the side of the allies. Both sides see the behavior
 
of the Other side as evil, therefore, they reason, the
 
violent actions of warfare are permissible against a
 
heinous enemy. The idea that evil should be combated
 
sooner—or it must be combated later, provides
 
justification for military action. The allies could cite
 
Aristotle's statement, "We make war that we may live in
 
peace," as ancient, infallible wisdom. Hussein calls for a
 
iihad (holy war) against the U.S. as infidels and Bush as
 
the Great Satan while the U.S. compares him to Hitler—a
 
Western embodiment of "evil"—who must be neutralized so
 
that Kuwait may be liberated and the world may move to a
 
peaceful New World Order. Yet, to his followers, Hussein
 
represents a dream of Arab unity and autonomy.
 
Common religious concepts appearing in the language of
 
both the American and Iraqi public at large and in the
 
reportage include terms such as "hell," "hellfire,"
 
"prayer," "God," "savior," "demon," "Satan," "prophetic,"
 
"providence," "faith," "infidel," "moral," "good," "evil,"
 
"just," and expressions such as "praise the Lord," and "God
 
willing." Most of these references in the Times are used
 
in direct quotations, yet some are found in the reporters,^
 
own texts, as examples in this section will show.
 
Iraq's religious metaphors are usually quoted in the
 
Times as writers select segments of information from Iraqi
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government controlled newspapers or Baghdad Radio
 
broadcasts. Since the press in Iraq operates under close
 
government supervision/ it represents more a propaganda
 
tool for the leadership than a source of news. The Iraqi
 
press also tells the Iraqi people what positions they are 
expected to support. For example/ David Lauter reports: 
"'It is Bush who wanted the war/' announced Iraq's army 
newspaper/ A1 Qaddissiya. 'But let him know that the 
furnace of hell will be open to the Americans and to the 
allies when they come'" ("U.S./ Iraq. . ." Al). Readers 
will understand from Iraq both moral condemnation as well 
as the threat of hideous/ violent punishment. Others add 
analysis to the information released from Iraq: "But with 
the outbreak of war/ some now sense an almost ■essianic 
tone—particularly in his [Hussein's] speech after 
Thursday's first wave of allied bombing raids/ with its 
images of President Bush as Satan and courageous Iraqis as 
'descendents of prophets and believers'" (Tumulty and 
Fineman/ "Hussein now. . ." Al). The "messianic tone" 
description of Iraq's pronouncements will be understood by 
American readers to mean that the Iraqis have set 
themselves up as spiritually correct and that the Americans 
are the embodiment of evil. The effect of this is likely 
to cause American readers to see Hussein as the embodiment 
of evil and become more convinced that "our cause is just." 
Reflecting the American myth/ we find a reporter's 
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analysis of Hussein using similar/ yet less dramatic
 
comparisons of him to the devil: "To Americans/ Hussein
 
is both the persbnification of evil and an enigma. The
 
rush of events has obscured his motivations; wartime
 
blindness to his complexities has simplified and deaonized
 
his life" (Braun and Wilkinson/ "What Sort. . ." Al). And
 
the Times includes Bush's own words/ as he expresses his
 
view of Hussein and his wish that God will protect the
 
allied troops
 
Bush said/ 'Tonight/ as this
 
coalition seeks to do that which is
 
right and Just/ I ask only that all of
 
you stop what you are doing and say a
 
prayer for all the coalition fbrces/
 
and especially for our men and women in
 
uniform. . . May God bless and protect
 
each and every one of then/' Bush said/
 
'and nay God bless the United States
 
of Anerlca' (Gerstenzang and Williams/
 
"Ground War. . ." Al).
 
Another reporter also quotes Bush? "'in these 12 days of
 
thinking over things/ I've resolved all the noral issues in
 
my own mind. This is a case of good versus evil" (Nelson/
 
"Deadline. . ." A1+). Readers/ if they believe Bush is
 
sincere/ surely will feel a sense of justification for the
 
war effort/ for clearly/ his words show God must be on our
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side. However, for those readers who don't quite subscribe
 
to Bush's brand of religious justification, editorialist
 
Colman McCarthy takes a cynical approach
 
To show that God is on onr side. Bush
 
brought in the ultimate in ewangelistic
 
ground-and-air support, the Sev. Billy
 
Graham. Two days after the war began,
 
the preacher conducted a Washington prayer
 
service for Bush and assorted politicians,
 
generals and admirals. Long a sycophant
 
to White House power, Graham went along
 
with the war hysteria and blessed Bush's
 
intervention: 'There comes a time when we
 
have to fight for peace' ("Shh!, . ." B7).
 
Those readers who dislike Bush and understand satire will
 
probably appreciate McCarthy's remarks, but Bush and Graham
 
supporters will find these remarks sacreligious. By
 
printing both Bush's words and McCarthy's response, the
 
Times offers readers an opportunity to pick the position
 
they prefer.
 
Another editorialist, Robert E. Hunter, describes
 
Hussein in a most uncomplimentary way: ". . .his failure
 
places him in the ranks of other false saviors in the
 
region who have only brought grief to their peoples" ("A
 
Deal. . B7). Readers may conclude that Bush's position
 
is shared by others, but Hunter's calling Hussein a "false
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savior" may incite a bit of concern for the Iraqi people
 
who have suffered under Hussein's false promises.
 
Two days later/ J. Michael Kennedy reports rah-rah
 
hyperbole from Baghdad Radio/ in which the Iraqi
 
broadcasters tell the people that God is on their side
 
As the Iraqis rolled/ Baghdad Radio
 
broadcast a war cry. . . '0 Iraqis! 0
 
Arabs! 0 Muslims who believe in Justice!
 
Your faithful and courageous ground
 
forces have moved to teach the
 
aggressors the lessons they deserve!
 
They have launched their lightning
 
land attack/ bearing high the banner
 
saying God is great/ and crushed the
 
armies of atheism as they advance
 
routing those who could run away
 
while cursing the infidels and heathens!
 
Our forces managed to enter the
 
coastal town of A1 Khafji at midnight.
 
Thus God has given the faith a great
 
victory with the collapse of the front
 
of infidelity on the earth which God
 
has blessed so it vill continue to
 
defend his banner and sing his
 
praises' ("Allies Battle. . ." A1+).
 
Although the expressions are a bit different from Bush'S/
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the religious ferver is just as strong/ and Iraqi
 
supporters of Hussein would surely find comfort in it.
 
By observing quotations fom both Bush and Baghdad
 
Radio, Times readers will apply their own reading or
 
mythical application to what has been said. It is
 
unlikely, however, that Baghdad Radio's condemnations of
 
allied forces will engender sympathy for their side, but
 
rather further destroy American sympathy for Hussein's
 
position, while allied news sources condemning Hussein may
 
further alienate the Iraqis from understanding why the
 
coalition is opposing the Iraqi actions.
 
In addition to the American and Iraqi media, both the
 
allied Arabs and Israelis use religious references that
 
invoke the help of God and condemn Hussein's behavior. Kim
 
Murphy reports on Kuwaiti resistance leaders: "'It has
 
been something incredible. Most of the time, we work
 
without the help of anybody. The Only creature with us was
 
God,'said Ahmed Hindi, one of the best known of the
 
resistance leaders" ("Kuwait's Rebels. . ." A1+). Kenneth
 
Freed reports on how the king of Saudi Arabia also feels
 
God is working against Hussein for the benefit of other
 
Arabs
 
The kind [Faud] said he believes that
 
Hussein's rejection of all the U.N.
 
resolutions 'is an act of providence—
 
ordained by Alnigbty God--designed to finish
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with Saddam and his untoward principles. ..
 
I believe that God has worked oat his purpose
 
to prevent Iraq's hand from reaching out to
 
grab other lands' ("Some Arab. . ." A8).
 
Williams' report also shows Israeli leader Shamir referring
 
to God: "'Israel has a great interest in the results of
 
the war. We hope the liquidation of the tyranny in Iraq
 
will bring about/ God trilling/ an openness on the part of
 
the Arab states for peace with Israel/'he said in comments
 
greeting the allied victory" ("Israelis Fear. . ." A9+).
 
Of course/ Israelis/ who had been the arch enemy of some
 
Arab states for years/ also hope that God will work on
 
their behalf.
 
Religious metaphors are found throughout the reportage
 
both in the reporters' own texts and those whom they quote.
 
For example/ we see a repoter as both reporter and subject
 
as Mark Fineman tells of Bob Simon's return after having
 
been held prisoner by the Iraqis: "'I thank God that the
 
four of us are alive/'Simon said in an emotional CBS
 
broadcast. . ." ("Iraq Frees. . ." A8). Tom Bethell says:
 
"War's bellishness ought to be brought home to us/ if only
 
to encourage prudence in our leaders" ("The Public. . ."
 
B5). Religious references among the troops are common:
 
"'Kuwait is on fire/'said Col. Hal Hornburg/ a U.S. Air
 
Force pilot who overflew the emirate. 'Southern Kuwait
 
looks like what hell must look like'" (Lamb and Broder/
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"Allies Accuse. . A1+); or "He [Lt. Col. Scott
 
Linganselter3 said the rockets could devastate Iraqi
 
artillery. 'We put a six-pack on an enemy battery location/
 
and we will make that sucker go to Allah/' he said"
 
(Drogin/ "Rockets. . ." A6); Or "Yes/ the men at Viper
 
could think about leaving this desert they had come to
 
hate. 'This is the place/' they joked/ 'where God dumps
 
all the vacuum cleaner bags'" (Balzar/ "Forward. . ." A7).
 
Times reportage reveals how widespread is use of religious
 
reference. God is called on for suppot by several nations
 
in the war. The idea of the ultimate horror and
 
destruction of hell is also understood by all sides and
 
used by troops/ reporters/ and leaders.
 
Even though both sides see themselves as right and the
 
enemy as wrong/ at least among American troops/ some feel
 
compassion for the enemy and invoke the help of God on
 
their behalf: "Army soldiers in one unit deployed along
 
the northern Saudi border have begun to ask for a prayer
 
for the enemy during religious services" ("See Corn. . ."
 
H7). Readers may feel more supportive of the war effort if
 
they think American troops are not vicious killers but
 
compassionate toward enemy soldiers.
 
Among letters from readers to the Times/ the editors
 
choose to print opinion pieces representing many
 
perspectives. The comments of letter writer Harry M.
 
Bauer/ sees the sides in the war from a more calculating
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angle
 
Nations on all sides of a conflict
 
have alvays insisted on the ■oral
 
excellence of their canses. It is
 
very presumptuous and arrogant to invoke
 
God in this wayr and entirely unnecessary.
 
Considering Saddam Hussein's threats of
 
nuclear, biological and chemical veapons,
 
his apparent willingness to use them if
 
possible, his extreme cruelty and his
 
intransigence, we may view this war, not
 
necessarily as a Just or nnjust nor as
 
good or a bad war, but simply as a
 
prudent war (B6).
 
Readers may agree with Bauer's reasoning, that using 
religion as a moral imperative is unnecessary, that 
stopping Hussein now even though war is required, will save 
more lives in the long run. 
Reporting on the religious metaphors in use on both 
sides may make it seem that the Times endorses specific 
religious views, yet it is more likely that the writers are 
simply dutifully reflecting the attitudes of those they 
write about. The ideas of good versus evil explained by 
the ideas of God versus the devil, and heaven versus hell, 
seem so fundamental to Our ways of knowing that they may be 
called archetypal and be basic to our humanness. 
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 Because Times, writers were restricted from gathering
 
comments from the people inside Iraq* it is impossible to
 
know what amount of them saw the allies as instruments of
 
the devil. That Americans had access to knowledge of
 
Hussein's brutal leadership, no doubt, made it easier for
 
Bush to remain credible as he invoked the help of God for
 
the allies. But the gap between cultural belief systems
 
seems ludicrous when both sides are calling on God, calling
 
their enemies devils, and killing each other in the name of
 
what they perceive as righteous morality. While the Times
 
does not draw this conclusion for us, after thorough
 
reading, one can find opposing views represented enough that
 
there is no choice—readers must draw their own conclusions
 
about the degree of righteousness of the various factions.
 
In the last section, we move from specific categories
 
of metaphors to other figurative language which is
 
prominently used in the Times. When these figures are
 
identified and considered, we see that they may have unique
 
effects on readers.
 
* * *
 
other Figurative Language
 
Four Other types of figurative language are found in
 
Times war reportage that are of particular significance to
 
the Persian Gulf War. Although some of them may have been
 
identified as types of metaphors in earlier portions of this
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 study (for instance, Isody parts, aniinals, colors, etc.)/
 
their collective effect in some cases is quite unique and
 
should be identified. They are symbolic language,
 
personification, irony, and metonymy.
 
* * * ■ 
Symbolic Language
 
The use of symbolic language in Times reportage often
 
identifies the symbols themselves and tells how they are
 
being used. Most accounts concern Americans, and a few
 
involve allies and the Iraqis.
 
Flags and the colors in those flags have been known and
 
displayed for centuries as a way of showing allegiance to a
 
group. The display of flags is well understood in the
 
American culture. An account by Patt Morrison about
 
displays at the Super Bowl demonstrates the scope of the
 
influence of symbols to represent patriotism
 
The way Tom Tornabene had it figured,
 
it was not just a football game that he
 
showed up for Sunday, his ticket in his
 
hand and the flagpole from his front porch
 
tipped back on his shoulder like am M-16.
 
This most American of pageants stood
 
for something. Defiance, maybe. Resolve.
 
Patriotism, even. Like poking a stick in
 
Saddam Hussein's eye.
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 . . . From the national antben which even
 
the hot dog vendors sang—to the blowout
 
finish, the Bill's colors and the nation's
 
—red# white and bine for both—pooled
 
indistinguishably. . . Locals were exhorted
 
to bring flags to the stadium. A pizza
 
chain gave them away free. Over in tunnel
 
A-8, usher Pat Lewis pointed to the upper
 
deck. They had a flag so big they had to
 
take it down. It was blocking everybody's
 
view ("Over There. . ." All).
 
To the troops, the knowledge that people at home are
 
displaying symbols to express concern and support for their
 
safe return was a real morale builder. Jehl reports
 
'In my town, our pictures are hung up in
 
Wal-Mart,'said Pfc. Kenneth Eversole,
 
22, of Hyden, Ky. . . Added Pvt. Edgar
 
Uriarte, 19, of Garfield, N.J.: 'My
 
father told me flags are flying in every
 
town and there are yellow ribbons
 
everywhere. That really makes me feel
 
good' ("GIs Pleased. . ." A8).
 
That reporters sought out such reports featuring language
 
about symbols of support for troops and the war effort is
 
likely to encourage readers to get on the band wagon and
 
also support the war. Quoting soldiers personalizes the
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 allied effort. When a reader knows the name of a
 
19-year-old soldier who is cheered by the support shown
 
with yellow ribbons and flags, it becomes much harder to
 
be critical of the war effort. These reports definitely
 
promote the American myth in support of the troops.
 
The Times also prints criticism of both the war
 
effort and the display of symbols in Barbara Ehrenreich's
 
article, "Yellow Ribbons or Yellow Bunker?" She says
 
But Americans are a strong and noble
 
people, our yellow ribbons say, and—yes!—
 
Good must triumph over Evil.
 
So why, then, are the yellow ribbons
 
beginning to look like a huge yellow
 
streak down the backbone of America?
 
. . . Ribbons are fine, of course,
 
and may even help us cope. Only, please,
 
let's stop covering our nation in a
 
coward's color. The ribbons should be
 
black (B7).
 
Ehrenreich uses the yellow ribbons satirically, for rather
 
than representing support for soldiers, she argues that
 
they represent cowardice, another symbolic meaning for
 
yellow. When she says the ribbons should be black, the
 
reader will understand black as absense of right and good
 
and will sense her bitterness about the war. By using
 
symbolic colors, she shows dissatisfaction with America's
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handling of the Persian Gulf crisis.
 
Other symbolic actions combined with symbols are
 
described by Scott Harris and Larry Gordon
 
Symbols dramatized the human cost of war.
 
Protesters employed body bags in
 
demonstrations in Boston, Philadelphia and
 
Pittsburgh. In Los Angeles, nine activists
 
poured 40 gallons of oil and two pints of
 
blood on the marble steps of the downtown
 
federal building and then waited for
 
arrest. Demonstrators found it ironic when
 
maintenance workers poured sand on the
 
steps to soak up the blood and oil (A17+).
 
These symbols are easily understood by readers so that the
 
reporters found it unnecessary to explain their meanings.
 
Because of the economic value of oil from the Middle East,
 
the United States was willing to spend the lives of
 
American soldiers. The cost is represented by the blood
 
shed by American soldiers from injuries and death, and the
 
"body bags," of course, represent the return home for burial
 
of dead soldiers. The expression harks back to the loss of
 
life in the Vietnam War. Readers will understand that the
 
protesters are against having soldiers die for oil.
 
Another writer, Susan Christian, reports on
 
how "a new generation is embracing the dusty badge of
 
idealism. . . 'Basically, we have an anti-war crowd on
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Melrose,' Gorilla [shop owner's nickname] said. 'A lot of
 
them are draft age. This Is their first war, and If a
 
peace-sign button can ward It off, they'll buy It. It's
 
like voodoo'" ("Return . . ." (El). Here, readers will
 
recognize protest In the "peace sign buttons," previously
 
used during the Vietnam War. The "voodoo" reference may be
 
understood as magic. If the buttons helped then, they may
 
help now.
 
Moving from the visual symbols to show political
 
position, we find that names of fierce animals, peoples, war
 
weapons, or natural phenomena are used by the American
 
military to suggest aggressive power so that even the names
 
may Intimidate the enemy and bolster the courage of the
 
American troops. The Times must Incorporate these names In
 
news stories since they are proper nouns, and by doing so.
 
Inadvertently support the military's use of the power of
 
these symbols. We find Apaebe and Cobra helicopters;
 
Toatabavk, Havk# Lance# Hellfire# and Maverick missiles;
 
Strike Eagles# Wartbog# and Tbnnderbolt fighter aircraft;
 
and terms Such as bavkisb for warlike and dovisb for
 
non-combative.
 
Other symbols are also readily understood and employed
 
by the troops: "The men at Viper [forward operation base],
 
dirty and tired from a relentless drive across southern
 
Iraq tbrust tbeir fists in tbe air and cheered" (Balzar,
 
"Forward U.S. . A7). The fist, readers will understand.
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represents resolve, willingness to fight. In another, "The
 
GIs were laden with ammunition, grenades and mortar rounds.
 
Many of them waved the Aaerican flag. Others flashed the *V
 
for victory* sign. . . Another chimed in: 'Purple heart'-—
 
the military award given to those wounded in battle. A
 
third infantryman called the upaved path 'highway to hell'"
 
(Chen, "For Troops. . ." A8). All of the bold print items
 
in Chen's writing show his cognizance of the meaning of the
 
symbols, and by reading them together, readers will get a
 
sense of the attitude of the troops as they move forward.
 
Other colors are commonly used: At Monesson High
 
School, one of the yellow ribbons on display for graduates
 
in the Gulf was changed to black to commemorate Anthony
 
Madison" (Miller, "Pennsylvania. . ." A22). Madison's
 
death is illustrated by the display of black ribbons. And a
 
veteran spoke of the clarity of meaning using colors: "Bill
 
Rutledge, a 43-year-old Vietnam veteran turned away from the
 
[TV] set and said that he was glad that 'we had the backing
 
in this war that we didn't have in Vietnam. That was
 
gray—this is black and white*" (Braun, "Promise . . ." A22)
 
"Gray" means undecided while "black and white" means clear,
 
decisive. Readers will understand that Vietnam didn't have
 
decisive support, but the Gulf War has all the ambiguities
 
cleared up and the country is not holding back support from
 
the military's efforts against Iraq.
 
The symbolic white as well as raised arms both are
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universally understood and indicate surrender. "'It's been
 
a pretty brisk fight. But they [Iraqi troops] have been
 
coining out waving white flags and one of them said: 'We're
 
happy to give up/ but we had to make a token fight first#'
 
said Col. John Sylvester" (Gerstenzang and Williams, "Ground
 
War. . ." A1+). When we see that the Iraqi troops wave
 
white flags to show surrender# the readers are likely to
 
feel a bit of compassion for them# for no longer are they
 
just part of Iraq's war machine; now they are trying to
 
communicate in a way we can understand# and they are no
 
longer a threat. In another account# we read that
 
Neal [Marine Brig. Gen. Richard I.] said
 
that while the U.S. command has no firm
 
assessment of the Iraqi forces' will to
 
resist# he cited one incident that might
 
provide a clue: An unarmed allied F-18D
 
forward control airplane aimed its nose at
 
some front-line Iraqi troops and they
 
raised their ams in surrender (Kennedy
 
and Healy# "Iraqis Torch. . ." A1+).
 
Other countries use symbols as well: "'Blood for
 
Freedom: Welcome Allied Forces#' read a banner draped over
 
the main highway into Kuwait" (Murphy and Drogin#"Crowds
 
Cheer. . ." Al). Readers will sense the commitment of the
 
Kuwaitis and possibly sense a comparison of the liberation
 
of Kuwait from Iraq to the liberation of America from the
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British because of the Revolutionary War.
 
A bit of news from the Iraqi civilians also shows
 
their use of the color black for mourning and death.
 
"Outside the mosque [in Bahgdad], the walls were bedecked
 
with five black banners with white script in mourning for
 
soldiers and civilians killed in the Gulf War" (Holmes,
 
"Mourners, Shoppers. . ." A6). American readers,
 
recognizing the symbols of black for mourning and
 
blood for war dead are likely to feel some kinship
 
both with allies and Iraqis. Symbols are easy to
 
understand even though language may be different.
 
Most of the previous examples of symbolism have been
 
in quotations, but occasionally. Times' writers will use
 
symbols in their own texts, as does Nick B. Williams; "When
 
Saddam Hussein wrapped biaself in tbe flag of Palestinian
 
nationalism in the first weeks of its occupation, the
 
streets of Amman flowered with pro-Hussein posters" ("Jordan
 
Striving. . ." A9). William's language suggests that
 
Hussein, who "wrapped himself in the flag," deliberately
 
played-up to the Palestinians, knowing their desire for a
 
homeland, and they feel for his professed concern for them
 
by posting his picture everywhere, much as many flowers
 
springing up represent the new life and promise of spring.
 
Some symbols are unique to particular countries, such
 
as the United States• use of yellow ribbons to indicate
 
support for the troops, but many symbols, such as black for
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 mourning, are found on both sides. Each side uses symbols
 
to represent its own cause or position, and some of these
 
symbols are the same or similar.
 
While symbols represent something else as a means of
 
comparison, personification represents another thing by
 
giving it the characteristics of a living creature. In the
 
next section we will examine how personification is used in
 
Times reportage.
 
* * *
 
Personification
 
As an example of figurative language in this study,
 
personification incorporates some of the other metaphorical
 
concepts already discussed, yet calling attention to some of
 
the special qualities of personification in Times Gulf War
 
reportage is worthwhile, for it has a power all its own.
 
In the expression, "the arms will speak," we are
 
saying that weapons can use language. We have expressed
 
the idea that human speaking has failed, and now arms
 
must express the intent of the sides in a dispute.
 
Weapons take over when human language fails. Healy and
 
Balzar report, "In France, President Mitterand. . .told the
 
French people that efforts to maintain peace had failed and
 
that 'the arms will speak'" ("Cheney Hints. . ." A1+).
 
Almost any force that can be a factor in war may, in
 
an effort to explain its influence, be given human
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characteristics; "Truth is the first casualty, people
 
always say gloomily at the prospect of war. True enough
 
(though even at the best of times truth hobbles aronud ulth
 
its leg in a cast). . ." (Cockburn, "Sifting for. . ."
 
B7). By taking an abstract idea such as truth,
 
personifying it, then giving it an injury, readers can
 
understand an abstract idea in a concrete way.
 
James Gerstenzang's article gives life to a peace
 
proposal: "'This matter is too sensitive to negotiate in
 
public,' said State Department Spokesperson Margaret
 
Tutwiler. 'The surest way to hill souething like this is
 
to talk about the details and let people take shots at
 
theu'" ("Soviet Peace. . ." A1+). Readers will understand
 
the peace proposal as a delicate, living thing that must be
 
potected so that it may develop to maturity.
 
Geographical locations may be personified: "Some of
 
the bombardment was concentrated on Iraqi minefields lying
 
in wait for allied troops to cross the border" (Kennedy and
 
Broder, "Tide of Arms. . ." A1+); and "The thousands of
 
American soldiers here Sometimes seem svallowed np by the
 
yawning ei^tiness of the northern Saudi desert" (Jehl, "To
 
Troops. . ." A8). The personification of minefields and
 
the desert gives them the power to destroy American troops
 
even though enemy soldiers are not present. This heightens
 
readers' understanding of the danger the soldiers face.
 
In another example, we read, "Thus, the area's
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port-city svagger has given vay to cautions tiptoeing
 
through an emotional maze of neighborly concern/ resolve to
 
win the war and a fear that a protracted struggle in the
 
Gulf will profoundly diminish the quality of life here,
 
economically and socially" (May/ "Navy Ships. . ." A9).
 
The port-city may seem like a drunken sailor once loud and
 
bragging/ who has become quiet and considerate now/ because
 
it cares about the soldiers and needs their economic
 
support.
 
Although the "war is a machine" metaphor was discussed
 
earlier in this paper/ the following four examples each help
 
show the variety of human abilities inanimate objects may be
 
given. A bus can open fire: "'The first bus sened to
 
accept what was going on without a problem/ but the second
 
bns/ all of a sudden opened fire on U.S. troops/' he said.
 
'Fortunately their aim wasn't too good and they paid the
 
price'" (Wilkinson/ "2 Americans. . ." A1+). Since we are
 
talking about buses/ may we now assume that only the buses
 
pay the price and not the people inside them?
 
Personification allows for killing the buses but cushions
 
the soldier against killing people. A ship can do what
 
humans can: "The $l-billion-guided missile cruiser
 
Princeton liiqted back under tow to a Persian Gulf port for
 
inspection Tuesday" (Kennedy/ "Allied Aircraft. . ." A1+).
 
Readers easily understand that a limping ship is disabled.
 
Bombs can have intelligence: "Smart bombs are
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aerodynamlcally designed 2,000-pound bombs bearing miniature
 
computers and television cameras that guide them to their
 
targets with great accuracy" ("'Smart Bombs'" A9). Calling
 
bombs "smart" is likely to take away fear of them and
 
replace it with respect, for readers admire intelligence.
 
Jets have emotion and will: . .the narrow, keening jets
 
fling thenselwes into the glaze-white sky" (Morrison,
 
"Flying Was. . ." A1+). Jets who "keen" and who "fling
 
themselves" sound like machines with consciences, who
 
regret what they must do. The pilots inside are out of
 
readers' minds entirely. The scene takes on a fictional
 
quality.
 
Personification lends an emotional urgency to what
 
really are ideas or things. This emotional urgency may
 
affect readers by evoking sympathy for the object as in a
 
"limping ship" or a "keening" jet. But it may also promote
 
fear or apprehension, as in a desert that can swallow up
 
people or a bus that can shoot. How can a reader fail to
 
respect a bomb that is smart? Personification Of an object
 
may have subtle powers of its own if used by a skillful
 
reporter to evoke in readers an emotional or sympathetic
 
response. However, the next figurative tool, rather than
 
intensifying the effect of a thing or idea, may show its
 
flaws and thereby make it subject to criticism.
 
141
 
Irony
 
The rhetorical tool Irony is dealt with plainly in
 
Times stories as reporters reveal the odd juxtapositions
 
of conflicting ideals. Often reporters even identify
 
the irony in their reportage. Each of the following five
 
examples exposes ideological inconsistencies that/
 
although they are dealt with as news and quote spoJcespeople
 
who give most of the opinion about the problem/ raise
 
serious philosophical questions.
 
We begin with the subject of religion
 
Praying for those vho bear anas: It
 
is a practice as old as time itself/
 
but the irony is always fresh. Through
 
out the country/ people in religious
 
services confronted the contradiction
 
of war and religion/ many torn between
 
their spiritual inclination to press
 
for peace and their natural desire to
 
wish the best for those fighting in
 
the Middle East (May/ "Reality of. . ."
 
A19).
 
Thoughtful readers will recognize the conflict between the
 
Biblical commandment "Thou shalt not kill" and praying for
 
the safety of American soldiers whose job it is to kill
 
the enemy.
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 Next/ Daniel Weintraub writes of the problem of gender
 
equality in the Middle East
 
Patricia Ireland/ NOW's executive
 
vice president. . . pointed out that
 
U.S. soldiers are being asked to
 
rescue and defend male-dominated Arab
 
governments and societies—in Kuwait
 
and Saudi Arabia—whose discrimination
 
against women represents a form of
 
'gender apartheid.' She said it is
 
a 'tragic irony' that women/ albeit
 
in support roles/ were part of such
 
a force and were being instructed not
 
to offend the sensibilities of their
 
Arab hosts ("NOW Opposes. . ." A-26).
 
Another ironic twist may be whether the war causes
 
human rights' violations in other countries.
 
Former Judge Robert H. Bork brands any
 
suggestion that the Gulf conflict has
 
given rise to widespread civil liberties
 
violations as 'nonsense.' 'Those groups
 
have gotten themselves to the point where
 
things previously regarded as legitimate
 
no longer are/'Bork says. 'What's
 
expanding is their notion of what civil
 
rights are' (Miller and OstroW/ "Some
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Fear. . ." A9).
 
In this example, by quoting a prominent judge, the Times
 
draws attention to the irony of civil rights groups
 
expanding what they think is needed beyond the rights that
 
people actually want.
 
Kennedy and Broder write of the duplicity of
 
Iraqi propaganda: "But at the Pentagon, U.S. military
 
officials said they have evidence that in another instance,
 
the Iraqis damaged one of their own buildings so they
 
could blame allied bombing. One official said it was a
 
mosque in the city of Basra" ("Tide of. . ." Al). The
 
Iraqis had indignantly blamed the U.S. for deliberately
 
destroying their sacred religious sites, yet they do it
 
themselves, blaming the U.S. Apparently the religious
 
sites make good propaganda tools.
 
The most powerful example of irony is the idea that the
 
Iraqi army is the enemy that should be killed and not the
 
leader of that army, Saddam Hussein himself. Laurie
 
Becklund reports after having spoken to Iraqi-Americans
 
The painful irony for these Iraqi-

Americans is that, once the U.S. govern
 
ment did turn on Hussein, it was not the
 
Iraqi leader who suffered, but their
 
own families. Many have been horrified
 
to hear American generals on television
 
speaking of 'softening np' Iraqi troops
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and Inflicting I*collateral daeage* on
 
government buildings and oil refineries
 
and bridges near their relatives* homes.
 
Many would have been happy to lose
 
Hussein and spate their country. In
 
stead, they nowI feel they may have lost
 
■ ■ ■ . t - ' . . , 
■ ' ' 	 ■ I 
their country and Hussein may have been
 
■	 ' : ■ ■ ■ ■ ' 1 ■ ■ ■ . '
 
spared ("Iraqi-fmericans. . A9).
 
■■ ■ ■ ■■ 1 ■ ' . . , ■ 
Some of these ironies are so serious that they lend
 
themselves to further comment in the opinion section
 
of the paper, but on this last irony, going after
 
the army rather than Hussein, the Times remained silent
 
although it did cover the Presidential policy which
 
forbids direct attempts on the lives of foreign leaders.
 
Reporting affairs ini ironic terms exposes readers to
 
illogical situations|which may erode readers'confidence in
 
the ability of leaders to do what is in the best interest
 
of their countries.
 
By the Times' exposing ironies but not doing opinion
 
pieces on them, readers will form opinions as they will.
 
How irony was expressed in the preceding quote is by the use
 
of metonymy, which w$ will examine in our last section about
 
figurative language.
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Metonymy
 
The figure of speech/ metonymy/ that adapts names for
 
vhole things by using a related name/ is widely used by
 
!' ■ ■ ' 
Times reporters themselves and in quotes from American and
 
Iraqi sources. However/ metonymy can be dangerously
 
I
 
misleading in case of war/ if language really can move us to
 
action. For example; we may say we are attacking Hussein
 
rather than the many I Iraqi troops/ or we may say that Iraq
 
is our enemy/ when our enemy is not the whole country but
 
its leader and attacking troops. The latter example shows
 
how hostility towardienemies can be diffused by using names
 
for them that misdirect indignation. Times Persian Gulf War
 
reportage perpetuates the metonymic names for the
 
perpetrators of the invasion of Kuwait by use of age-old
 
speech patterns which often include people and objects not
 
directly to blame.
 
Metonymy is most commonly used in referring to the enemy
 
by calling it the country's name. Saddam and his military
 
i
 
leaders who fire the weapons at the coalition allies are
 
called Iraq/ while most of the residents of the country are
 
not and do not want to be involved at all. For instance:
 
"In Washington, Kelly characterized Tuesday as a 'healthy
 
day of bombing,' contributing to a 90% reduction of Iraq's
 
ability to resupply its troops in and around Kuwait"
 
(Kennedy and Healy, "iFront Line. . ." A1+). But the
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President of the United States has already spoken shoving
 
the same way of understanding the enemy: "This suspension of
 
offensive combat operations is contingent upon Iraq's not
 
firing upon any coalition forces and not launching Scud
 
missiles against any other country" (Bush/ "Bush Text. .
 
A25). This naming of the whole country as the enemy in
 
place of the true perpetrators of the aggression may serve
 
to ease the apprehension some may have toward destruction
 
of innocent parties within Iraq/ for calling the enemy the
 
inclusive term "Iraq" makes enemies of all within its
 
borders. At the same time/ if the President uses the same
 
figure of speech for the United States/ then he has
 
verbally aligned everyone against an enemy: "'JUBerica is
 
angry/ and I think the rest of the vorld [is also]/' Bush
 
said" (McManus/ "U.S. May. . ." A1).
 
But the Iraqi leaders also understand the same use of
 
metonymy/ for they include all Americans and Israelis in
 
their threats from Iraqi state radio: "'Israel has to get
 
out of the Palestinian land and other Arabs' land/'the
 
broadcast said. 'Let the UUited States hear the wailing of
 
its daughter implanted in the heart of the Arab homeland'"
 
(Goldberg and Tuohy/ "After False. . ." A7+). In addition/
 
the radio message identifies a familial relationship
 
between the U.S. and Israel by calling Israel the daughter
 
of the U.S./ and further implying/ by using a body part for
 
a large chunk of the Middle East/ that the heart as the
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center of life for Arabs has been contaminated by Israelis.
 
On the other hand* names of leaders can be used to
 
represent the entire country as in referring to Saddam
 
Hussein as the power the allies are fighting and to Bush as
 
the representative of the allies* interests. This type of
 
figurative language may be more accurate/ for most people
 
on either side have little power in affecting the actions
 
called for by the leaders. For example: "Saddaa Hnsseln
 
faces a $l-trillion-plus array of lethal weaponry. . ."
 
(Schrage/ "War With. . ." Dl). Yet the incongruity here is
 
that although Hussein's leadership set the war in motion/
 
Hussein's troops faced the lethal weaponry while he hid in
 
nuclear-resistant underground bunkers. By a metonymic use
 
of language/ we permit ourselves to attack the
 
representatives (troops) of the true enemy (Hussein) who
 
instigated the whole hostile situation. It is not so easy
 
to attack the Iraqi people/ but it is not so difficult to
 
attack their leader. However/ political pressures from the
 
Arab allies and Hussein's own survival skills made an
 
actual attack on him impossible.
 
The Saddam name/ however/ became very commonly used in
 
Times articles/ both in reporters' own words and the words
 
of those quoted. This suggests the powerful effect of this
 
use of metonymic expressions in warfare. Some persons
 
understand its meaning clearly: "Rep. Dana Rohrabacker
 
(R-Long Beach) said/ 'Saddaii is getting exactly what he
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asked for. .. 1 hope that we find out where Saddam Hussein
 
is early on in the conflict, and, if we do, it will be a
 
much shorter conflict. It's clear our fight isn't with the
 
people of Iraq; it's with this megalomaniac who has forced
 
this fight upon us'" (Tumulty and Eaton, "Lawmakers. . AlO)
 
Others, particularly troops, call the recipients of
 
the destruction of their weapons "Saddam" but Hussein
 
himself will not be hurt at all. "Spec. Rich Klementovich,
 
21, of Mannville, N.J., chalks "Sadda* is Going to Die' on
 
one of his mortars. "They don't have a chance,' he says.
 
We're going to do bin in'" ("Seed Corn .. H7). By
 
switching his naming of the enemy from Saddam, to "they,"
 
to "him," the soldier indicates that he knows he is firing
 
the mortar at the Iraqi soldiers, yet he prefers to direct
 
his hostility at the leader, Hussein. Another soldier does
 
the same thing: "'Yee hah!' shouted Specialist David
 
Langston, of Garland, Tex., as his battery fired more than
 
1,000 MLRS rockets and howitzer rounds earlier this week.
 
'Saddan, yon didn't know what yon got yonrself into,
 
bnddy'" (Drogin, "Rockets. . ." A6). Again, by this use of
 
metonymy, the troops suffer literally as symbols for their
 
leader. Times reporters make no effort to explain this
 
metonymic effect, but merely report what the troops say.
 
Readers must be aware enough to understand this transfer of
 
hostilities from the instigator of all the trouble to his
 
troop representatives.
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The Iraqis themselves also see Hussein as the cause of
 
the conflict/ and his name represents the damage to Iraq.
 
Fineman reports on second-hand news from Baghdad: "One of
 
the western journalists/ Richard Beeston of the Times of
 
London/ quoted one man in his mid-40's who approached him
 
and said/ 'This isn't our war. This is Saddam's war. He
 
has taken the country back 40 years'" ("Bomb-Weary. . ."
 
A1+).
 
Bush himself is seen by Lauter and Gerstenzang as
 
fostering this centering of blame on Hussein. They say,
 
". . .the President turned the war against Iraq into a war
 
against one man—Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. . . 'No
 
one should weep for this tyrant when he is bronght to
 
justice/' Bush said. 'No pne~anywhere in the world'"
 
("Bush and . . ." All). But it is ironic that a
 
Presidential directly forbids the direct targeting of
 
Hussein/ and Bush knew that. Yet the language Bush uses in
 
the rest of the quotation avoids mentioning the destruction
 
of the Iraqi troops: "In what aides Said was a speech Bush
 
wrote himself/ the President said that 'all life is
 
precious/ whether it's the life of an American pilot or an
 
Iraqi child. Yet if life is precious/ so too are the
 
living principles of liberty and peace'" ("Bush and . . ."
 
All).
 
Yet all Times readers haven't accepted the allied part
 
in the war as the metonymic targeting of Hussein. In an
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opposite example/ a "Letters to the Times" writer centers
 
all the fault metonymically on Bush: "President Bush, I do
 
more than pray for peace/ as you prescribe. I demand
 
peace. God will not fix the damage that you have created/
 
and will/ no doubt/ continue to create. It is up to the
 
people who care to stop this lawbreaking crusade before
 
more destruction has occurred" (DesiletS/ B4). Bush/ as
 
leader of the allies/ has become the symbol of all the
 
allies and their war efforts.
 
Other examples Of metonymy are also common in the war
 
reportage/ but their use is not so loaded with impact for or
 
against particular sides or leaders. For instance/ in
 
commonly understood expressions/ the Pentagon can speak/
 
the brass are the officers/ blue-collar towns can mourn
 
their dead/ the Washington Post can protect what it knows
 
about battle plans/ other countries can be consulted/ the
 
Arab street can have an opinion/ and most common of all/
 
the body part "hands" may have control of a situation as in
 
allied hands or having a free hand.
 
While the use of metonymy/ as such/ is not the likely
 
subject of casual conversation/ it is widely used/ and may
 
have power to influence attitudes and actions of the public
 
for or against public figures by oversimplifying and
 
depersonalizing an enemy. We can say we are fighting Iraq
 
or say we are fighting the aggressor Hussein when we are
 
actually attacking his troops who are merely following
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orders. Metonymy in war reportage may reveal a way of
 
justifying violent action without squarely facing who the
 
true enemy is or who the true victims will be. But
 
metonymy may be of benefit as well, for it can help focus
 
whole groups of people into productive understanding with a
 
"common sense." For instance, we can say, "the Liberty Bell
 
has rung again, this time for the Kuwaitis," and American
 
readers will understand that the Kuwaitis again have
 
freedom from Iraq just as Americans havey freedom from
 
English colonization. Metonymy can add more complex
 
meanings to simple syntagms, and writers as well as readers
 
will be more efficient in their use and understanding of
 
language if they are aware of the power of metonymy.
 
In this chapter, we have examined the wide variety of
 
metphoric concepts and other figurative language employed
 
by Times writers as they report and comment about events
 
and ideas concerning the Persian Gulf War of 1991. In the
 
next chapter, we will see how language reveals the cultural
 
myths of the warring factions.
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Chapter 3
 
Preavailing Myths Influencing the War
 
Examples of metaphorlc expression which we examined in
 
the last chapter have their own unique power to influence
 
how we perceive our world. As writers infuse their
 
reportage with figurative language/ the stories may reveal
 
the writers' myths which color their approach to subjects
 
which may/ in turn/ influence readers to accept reporters'
 
positions. If we examine news stories according to Barthes'
 
argument about myth/ formed from the personal histories of
 
the writers/ and then we see how the writers illustrate
 
their stories with metaphoric expressions as identified and
 
explained by Lakoff and Johnson/ and Lakoff and Turner/ we
 
can see larger cultural myths emerging. In this last
 
chapter/ by using Times reportage/ we will study the most
 
prominent American myth. It will include the positions held
 
by president Bush/ the government/ the military/ and those
 
in the American public who supported the war. We will see
 
first how this myth is expressed and then try to explain its
 
origins and meanings. Next/ we will examine the myth of
 
Hussein and the Iraqi people/ see how it is expressed/ and
 
try to explain its origins and meanings. A few myths of
 
other countries directly affected by the war will be
 
examined in the same way.
 
As language shapes and expresses our cultural mythS/ it
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is manifest in political positions such as our attitudes
 
toward our own government's behavior and our judgment of the
 
actions of other governments. When cultural myths are not
 
understood or accepted by another group, and when
 
communication cannot bring about understanding leading to
 
mythical coexistence, one side may take action that leads to
 
violent confrontation. We will try to discover how
 
divergent opinions can lead to violent confrontation.
 
We will explore through what the Times printed how the
 
American cultural myth clashed with what the Iraqi
 
leadership said and did in the name of Iraq. We will see
 
how all the previously identified metaphors and other
 
figurative language are used to express meaning. Once
 
again, these figures will be highlighted with bold type so
 
that a glance may give readers an idea of the frequency of
 
their use. Any sentence or paragraph may contain several
 
types of metaphors or other figures, yet all may work
 
together to create a more complex level of meaning. From
 
this examination, we should be able to tell if Times
 
reportage is likely to affect public opinion.
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The American Myth
 
Although the Persian Gulf crisis occurred on another
 
continentr and Saddam Hussein's actions against his
 
neighbors were not a direct threat to the physical safety of
 
the United States, characteristics of the prevailing
 
American cultural myth allowed the United States to become
 
involved. President Bush took a stance on behalf of the
 
United States against the behavior of Iraq when it invaded
 
Kuwait, for America perceives itself to stand against naked
 
aggression of one nation against another. In this instance,
 
it was against Hussein's danger to factions of his own
 
people, against Iraq's hostile takeover of Kuwait, and
 
against Iraq's implied threat Of invasion of Saudi Arabia
 
and possibly other Persian Gulf nations. However, having
 
Iraq control Kuwait's vast oil fields was also a serious
 
economic threat to the United States. Since none of the
 
surrounding nations had military power equal to Iraq's huge
 
military force, the United States was the only nation
 
capable of stopping and reversing Hussein's invasion of
 
Kuwait. By taking a stand against Iraq, the Bush
 
administration could suggest to other national leaders that
 
such behavior would not be tolerated. The U.S. could assume
 
the position of world policeman to ensure a harmonious
 
future among all nations. Bush's vision of a "new world
 
order." In Bush's idea of the "new world order," we see
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reflected certain cultural beliefs that show how Americans
 
see the world--other people all deserve the right to "life,
 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" just as Americans do.
 
Americans understand these as inalienable rights, for they
 
are spelled out in the Constitution. Early Americans were
 
willing to die to secure these rights. They are a part of
 
the "common sense" or American history. But the term
 
"rights" can be misused and capitalized upon by those with
 
the desire and the ability. Readers must determine for
 
themselves whether American leaders were distorting the
 
mythical understanding of "inalienable rights" in their
 
attempt to apply them to other nations, then use American
 
soldiers to try to enforce them.
 
The Times prints Bush's explanation of how he justifies
 
American involvement on another continent
 
This was war thrust upon us, not a war
 
that we sought.
 
But naked aggression such as we have
 
seen must be resisted if it is not to
 
become a pattern, and our success in the
 
Gulf will bring with it not just a new
 
opportunity for peace and stability in a
 
critical part of the world but a chance
 
to build a new world order based upon the
 
principles of collective security and the
 
rule of law ("Text of. . ." A16).
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To serve as analysis to Bush's myth for the American
 
people, the Times prints Ronald Brovnstein's comments
 
•The public doesn't want Americans
 
fighting all over the world for all
 
sorts of arcane causes,• said Democratic
 
pollster Mark Mellman. 'But, on the
 
other hand, we do feel a responsibility
 
as a world leader, and for the most
 
part people want to see America exer
 
cising that responsibility.'
 
Many say that the Gulf War has
 
demonstrated the continuity of more
 
traditional American attitudes toward
 
war: the willingness to rally behind
 
the commander-ln-chief, defer to his
 
decisions and embrace his objectives.
 
'We really are a fairly homogenous
 
society,' said Republican pollster
 
William Mclnturff. Those are very,
 
very, enduring values in our country'
 
("War Shows. . ." AH-).
 
In addition, Joshua Muraychik has now transferred
 
Bush's ideas to that of all America. Muravchik has
 
accepted and adopted Bush's ideas as the way it is and
 
should be
 
In this first chapter of post-Cold
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War historyrAaerlca has decided that
 
wants to be a leader rather than
 
repair to isolation/ and it has shown
 
that in place of bipolarity we now live
 
in a world of one superpower.
 
Military prowess is but one part of
 
America's strength. The coalition of
 
nations assembled to assist or support
 
our effort in the Gulf is a mark of the
 
respect and trust America enjoys. Whatever
 
envy or resentment others may feel of
 
our power/ all know that we are not out
 
to Subjugate any nation or build an
 
empire. . .
 
Decline should ever be so sweet
 
"Decline Should. . ."B7).
 
A Times editorial takes a position that U.S.
 
involvement in the Middle East could be of use to the
 
region/ but the cultural differences between American
 
society and Arab societies are likely to thwart American
 
goals. The Times editorial writer/ showing a strong opinion
 
against Hussein/ offers that Hussein has severely harmed 
his own country/ and states/ "Iraq and the region would/ 
Of course/ be far better off if this thuggish ■egal(»anlac 
went qniclcly as a matter of noral Justice/" but the 
editorial writer has reservations about our ability to 
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effect lasting harmony in the region. "The plain fact is
 
that Western political values remain essentially alien to
 
these societies and there is no reason to think that will
 
Change. .. The United States can't reshape the Middle East.
 
Maybe, though it can play a lead role in eoving the region
 
to a more stable future: ("Now That. . ." B6). Most readers
 
understand that in editorials, the writer's opinion will be
 
expressed, that a position will be taken, and that readers
 
are expected to engage in debate with those opinions. The
 
opinions express mythical approaches of how America should
 
react to the Persian Gulf conflict, and readers, according
 
to their own mythical backgrounds, will agree with, argue
 
with, or ignore the opinions of the writers. If the
 
writers' opinions are sufficiently convincing, some readers
 
who have disaigreed in the past, may let their old beliefs go
 
and replace them with the writers' arguments.
 
vice-president Dan Quayle's support of America's role
 
as a leader in human rights enforcement is reported by
 
Gerstenzang. Quayle is restating the Americaii myth while
 
admonishing the Kuwaitis to uphold it
 
'To discourage future Saddams, we need
 
to stand np against the human rights
 
violators, whoever and wherever they
 
are,' the vice-president said. . . 'That's
 
where you cone In, as leaders of a lib
 
erated Kuwait. You will have a key role
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to play in creating a new Middle East that
 
is free. Where Saddam Hussein trampled on
 
the rule of law, you must uphold it,'
 
Quayle said ("Kuwaiti Trainees. . ." A12).
 
Quayle's position in admonishing the Kuwaitis to uphold
 
American ideals is another way of stating to the world that
 
he believes in the correctness of America's actions in the
 
Gulf as well as encouraging the Kuwaitis to improve their
 
own human rights behavior in the future. The United States
 
has become the model of correctness, and therefore has the
 
justification to point out errors in other countries'
 
behaviors.
 
But the Times also prints in its editorial section,
 
"Column Left," which contains divergeht opinions that
 
criticize the American myth as promoted by Bush and Quayle.
 
While pin-pointing television reporting, Alexander Cockburn
 
expresses his interpretation of America's attitude as
 
patronizing and colonialist that he says more nearly explains
 
how some anti-American Arabs see the U.S. He writes
 
In sum, TV news mostly amplifies the
 
government agenda and eradicates history
 
where it is inconvenient. Thus now the
 
majority can rejoice that a Just war has
 
been fought by a principled government,
 
rather than confront the actual fact that
 
disproportionate violence has unnecessarily
 
160
 
been aebed out according to colonialist
 
precepts that would have been well under
 
stood by any imperial power a hundred
 
years ago ("War Proves. . B7).
 
Cockburn contrasts the myth of America's benevolence in
 
trying to help a small nation recover from the domination of
 
the bully Iraq by pointing out that the U.S./ in turn, has
 
been bullying Iraq. We can see exposed here the mythical
 
conflict/ that when left unresolved with language/ may erupt
 
into physical violence. Careful readers of Cockburn's
 
arguments may be influenced to abandon their support of the
 
government's policies/ ignore him/ or intellectually argue
 
with his position.
 
Besides printing opinion which seeks to define the
 
American myth/ the Times includes the comments of citizens
 
and soldiers who support the President's leadership in the
 
handling of the war. First/ a woman agrees with the idea of
 
the U.S. role as the world's police force to enforce "what
 
we believe in"
 
Barbara Lee/ a former Marine/ and
 
married to deployed staff sergeant/ Chris
 
Lee/ said/ 'I grew up watching Jobn Wayne
 
■ovies and 'Conbat' with my father/ and I
 
joined because I was always willing to
 
fight for what we believe in. . .'
 
The United States/ Lee suggests/ has a
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duty to be the world's poilceun. If not
 
US/ Lee askS/ 'Who? Should it be Saddam
 
Hussein? Should it be [Libyan leader
 
Moammar] Kadafi? Or maybe we should let
 
Manuel Noriega out and let him do it'
 
(Harris/ "Marine Town. . ." Al).
 
The mythical belief of Lee that the U.S. is right/
 
therefore others are automatically wrong/ is what drives
 
her position that the U.S. must fight.
 
Second/ a myth exists among service people that
 
Americans are proud to treat POWs humanely because
 
Americans are "the good guys." It is ironic that American
 
soldiers will kill the opposing force/ but when the enemy
 
surrenders (and by so doing/ acquiesces to the American myth)/
 
the American soldiers will see that they receive humane treat
 
ment. This attitude indicates that the Americans believe in
 
the correctness of their myth. This idea is illustrated in
 
Edwin Chen and Paul Richter's report: "For Spec. 4 Brannon
 
Lamar of North Augusta/ S.C./ it was sunied up in a single
 
event; 'When we took all those POWs and didn't mistreat
 
them or gun them dawn, I wanted to cry,'he said/ 'I was so
 
proud to be a U.S. soldier. Maybe we are the good guys this
 
time'" ("U.S. Shakes. . ." Al). By adding "This time/" he
 
is showing that he thinks in previous conflicts Americans
 
weren't always "the good guys." The old myth of "my country
 
right or wrong" may be changing to "my country only if we do
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what I think is the right thing."
 
In addition, the troops have been trained to be
 
sensitive to Arab culture, so Schwarzkopf says he feels the
 
U.S. has been especially considerate. David Lamb reports:
 
"On American soldiers coming to Saudi Arabia: 'The world
 
predicted, 'Oh my goodness, culturally the Americans are
 
really going to step in it over there. They're going to be
 
drunken soldiers rolling around inside the souk.' It hasn't
 
happened. The fact that we have culturally respected this
 
area cannot be ignored in the Arab world'" ("Schwarzkopf
 
Views. . ." A17).
 
But Bearak adds a touch of satire as he turns the
 
rah-rah for our side approach to one of buffoonery as he
 
concludes with a fabricated colloquial parody of what he
 
thinks represents mindless patriotism
 
And so the war had cone to this, few
 
Americans killed, the enemy turned tail, the
 
'■other of all battles' no more than a
 
shrinking violet easily plowed under. . .
 
'I tell you, at school we say the ' 
pledge of allegiance every day, but those 
kids lately, they say it like they mean 
it,' said Vernon Paul, high school 
principal in the tiny West Texas town 
of Seminole. . . 
Sea to shining sea, the prevailing 
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sentiment was much the same: Hooray for
 
us! We kicked butt! America the Great!
 
We take no guff from no one no more no
 
how ("Feeling on .. A1).
 
As Bearak ridicules patriotic slogans, readers whose
 
beliefs disagree with his are likely to be offended at his
 
belittling approach and consider his remarks to come from
 
one who is disloyal to the country. It is almost as if the
 
Times places Bearak's article on page Al to prove to any
 
critics that they are trying to give exposure to points of
 
view which depart from the majority of the readership who
 
believe someone had to stop Hussein's aggression, and
 
citizens must support those sent to do it.
 
To keep alive the American myth that "our cause is
 
just," it is necessary for the government and the military
 
to reveal the justification .of punishing the opposing force
 
for what the American public understands as outrageous
 
atrocities. Hussein made this easy; killing his own
 
people, the Kurds, and the Kuwaitis, and practicing
 
"environmental terrorism" outraged the sense of justice of
 
the American public. We find the Times dutifully reporting
 
many articles over the entire span of the war telling of
 
Hussein's behavior which violated Americans' sense of
 
decency. We will include samples from a variety of these
 
sources. .
 
Lamb reports on February 7, midway into the war
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 . . . Saddam Hussein, Schwarzkopf says,
 
isn't a military man; he is simply a
 
terrorist.
 
Hussein's record is difficult to defend,
 
even for Arabs who admire his boldness in
 
standing up to the west. Among the
 
accusations:
 
He has had many of his closest advisers
 
executed, used gas on his Kurdish
 
minority, fired Scud missiles at civilian
 
centers in Saudi Arabia and Israel,
 
brutalized Kuwait with a vengeance not
 
seen since the Pol Pot era in Cambodia,
 
sacrificed half a million of his country
 
men in a senseless eight-year war against
 
Iran and left his army to defend itself—
 
and die in large numbers—in the desert in
 
order to satisfy his own need to achieve
 
some sort of personal victory from Iraq's
 
invasion of Kuwait ("Saddam Hussein. . ."
 
A5).
 
By citing Schwarzkopf's opinion that Hussein is a
 
terrorist, then listing Hussein's misdeeds. Lamb has made a
 
strong argument for readers who respect both Schwarzkopf
 
and the Times that the United States is justified in
 
military involvement in weak Kuwait.
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Joshua Muravchlkr in another obvious opinion piece,
 
includes his rationale that our cause is just. Yet the
 
writer's work is nearly bare of metaphor, perhaps because
 
he feels the arguments against Hussein's behavior is
 
sufficiently powerful to readers that metaphorical examples
 
are unnecessary
 
President Bush linked this act of
 
ecocide [dumping 11 million barrels
 
of oil in the Gulf] to other vicious but
 
militarily useless attacks on Israeli
 
and Saudi cities and the abuse of POWs.
 
Yet there is a difference. Cowardly and
 
vile as are the Scud attacks, cruel and
 
illegal as is the abuse of prisoners, we
 
can grasp that Hussein sees Israel and
 
Saudi Arabia and the POWs as his enemies.
 
But what conceivable grievance has he
 
against the water fowl and fishes?
 
("Striking a .. ." B7).
 
The Times editorial staff shares the previous writer's
 
da
 
convictions and adds more
 
This is a regiae that flouts its
 
contempt for humane values by aurder­
ing its own citizens and those of
 
Kuwait in the thousands. This is a
 
regiae that has reintroduced poison gas
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as a battlefield weapon, and as a weapon
 
against its own helpless civilians.
 
This is a regime that uses its terror
 
missiles against another civilian popu
 
lation in a desperate effort to transform
 
Israel from a noncombatant into a
 
belligerent ("The Ail-Too. . ." B6).
 
Again, we see few metaphors. But metonymy, using "regime,"
 
places blame on Iraq's whole government rather than Hussein
 
only. Yet the unembellished list of evidence against the
 
"regime" marches relentlessly into readers' consciences,
 
leaving little room for argument. Some readers may feel
 
that this Times editorial has proven beyond a reasonable
 
doubt that "our cause is just."
 
One particular rhetorical figure, however, enables
 
writers to focus hostility narrowly toward Hussein. By
 
metonymically placing all the blame on the leader, the U.S.
 
is justified in using its most powerful military weapons on
 
his troops, calling them "him." We find this rhetorical
 
figure being used to further Americans' myth of seeing them
 
selves as helping out those they deem to be in need against
 
a common enemy, easily understood as only Hussein. The
 
President, reporters, military leaders, troops, and citizens
 
all employ this kind of metonymy as we shall see in
 
several Times reports. First Healy quotes Bush; "President
 
Bush said in his first speech since the earliest days of the
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 allied offensive. . .'There can be no pause now that
 
Saddaa has forced the world into war'" ("Iraq Defeat. . ."
 
A1). Reporter Balzar speaks for himselfj "Each big war
 
has its Bonster. This war's is Saddaa Hussein" ("When
 
Masks. . ." HI). Lamb describes the behavior of American
 
military leaders Richard Cheney and Colin Powell: "When
 
someone asked Cheney and Powell to sign a bomb being
 
prepared for a Stealth mission/ they obliged with a black/
 
felt-tipped pen. 'To Saddan: You didn't move it and now
 
you'll lose it. Colin Powell/' the chairman wrote. Cheney
 
added: 'To Saddaii/ with affection. Dick Cheney. Def.
 
Sec.'" ("Cheney/ Powell .. ." A6). And a citizen also
 
singles out Hussein for destruction as reported by Jennifer
 
Warren
 
. . .'War's an ugly business/' said [James]
 
Brunni/ a steely-eyed Vietnam veteran laid
 
off with 34 others from a mining job a few
 
weeks back/ 'but you've got to face the
 
realities. We've got a guy over there who
 
wants to rule the world. The bottOB line
 
is/ you've got to take bin out . . .It's
 
not fun/ it's not glory/ it doesn't always
 
end like the Raiibo novies but it's got to
 
be done' ("Stealth Jet. . ."Alt).
 
Metonymy allows us to name Hussein as the enemy/ and
 
so our myth of being the good guys remains strong/ yet
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rather than target him directly/ we wage war against his
 
representatives. The Times does not explain this
 
phenomenon/ but explains what concerned people are
 
doing and saying.
 
In addition/ the Times provides background material on
 
Hussein that attempts to exlain his behavior. This
 
information would be gathered by reporters' as they research
 
biographical material from primary and secondary sources.
 
However/ unlike regular academic research/ news articles do
 
not require disclosure of all sources. Readers must judge
 
the information's validity by considering the credibility of
 
the totality of the newspaper's reportage.
 
For instance/ Stephen Braun and Tracy Wilkinson
 
summarize Hussein's background in less than flattering
 
description
 
From childhood/ swaggering to school
 
with a gun under his belt/ to his present
 
role as chosen enemy of the Western World/
 
the coraon denomilnators in Hussein's life
 
have been his pursuit of revolution/
 
personal and political power and a place
 
in history. Now 53 years old/ he steeped
 
himself in the tactics of insurrection/
 
refining them over two decades of polit
 
ical carnage that shaped modern Iraq
 
("What Sort. . ." A1).
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 The reporters have chosen to depict Hussein as a bully by
 
describing him "swaggering to school with a gun under his
 
belt" and pursuing violent revolution. Casting this light
 
on Hussein enhances the American belief that he is
 
dangerous and cruel. Again# the effect on readers is meant
 
to be that America's "cause is just" in putting such a
 
bully in his place.
 
We see more justification of the need to stop Hussein
 
in the next article which uses the authority of a medical
 
expert. A professor of psychiatry at George Washington
 
University describes Hussein's mental health
 
While he [Saddam] is psychologically
 
in touch with reality# he is often
 
politically out of touch with reality.
 
His world view is narrow and distorted.
 
He has scant experience outside the
 
Arab world;. . . He is surrounded by
 
sycophants who are cowed by his rep
 
utation for brutality and afraid to
 
criticize him.
 
. . . What began as an act of naked
 
aggression toward Kuwait has been
 
transformed into the culminant act of
 
the drama of his life. . . His psych
 
ology and his political options have
 
now become captives of his rhetoric.
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His heroic self-iaage is engaged as
 
never before. He is fulfilling the
 
■essianic goal that has obsessed him—
 
and eluded him—throughout his life.
 
He is actualizing his self-concept
 
as leader of all the Arab peoples/
 
the legitimate heir of Nebuchadnezzar/
 
Saladin/ and Nasser (Post/ "Crazy
 
Like. . ." B7).
 
Another picture of Hussein has been presented to readers to 
prove that the U.S. is fighting someone mentally 
twisted—further evidence that "our cause is just." 
Times staff reporters themselves reveal their depth of 
conviction that "our cause is just" with an amazing metaphor 
comparing Hussein to a vampire/ known to American theater 
audiences as a dreaded/ blood-sucking monster. Healy and 
Broder/ while extending the threat of Hussein to include his 
Republican Guard force/ write of stopping him as one might 
stop the evil Count Dracula. "Administration strategists 
believe that crushing the 150/000 man Republican Guard will 
drive a stake through the heart of Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein's regime and lead to the collapse of the rest of 
Iraq's million-man army" ("Key U.S.. . ." A1). Because this 
article appears on page one as hard news where most readers 
expect less sensational imagery to be used in reporting 
world events/ readers might assume the Times as a whole 
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 endorses the position taken by Healy and Broder. Iraqi
 
sympathizers who had been reading the Times carefully/ would
 
conclude that it definitely supported the American side in
 
the conflict.
 
Other articles speculate about what further hostile
 
actions Hussein might order in the future. The slant of the
 
articles suggests that this pattern of his behavior must be
 
stopped. Therefore/ the American ideal of trying to right
 
the wrongs in the world surely needs to be applied in this
 
case/ and therefore/ the war becomes necessary. Healy and
 
Balzar quote Lt. Gen. Peter de La Billiere who sayS/
 
Saddam Hussein is a man who uses human life as a currency
 
to buy what he wants in this world. . .' and that he 'is
 
quite deliberately deploying his weapons among civilians
 
with the precise aim of killing civilians'" ("Cheney Hints
 
. . ." Al). William Schneider analyzes Hussein's
 
behavior: "He stages an oil spill in the Persian Gulf to
 
prove this war will have terrible consequences. He tries
 
to lure the United States into a bloody ground war to drive
 
up our casualty count. Maybe we're not fighting the
 
Vietnam War/ but he is" ("Bush insists. . ." M1+).
 
Nick B. Williams adds another dimension as he explains a
 
communique from Baghdad Radio and selects quotations from it
 
Hussein/ . . . has trieid to cast Iraq as
 
the victim of big-power bullying since
 
U.S.-led forces invaded on Jan. 17.
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. . . Baghdad Radio broadcast .. .an
 
undisguised call for revolutions in Egypt/
 
Syria and other Arab countries committed
 
to driving the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.
 
'0 ArabS/' the broadcast said/ "this is
 
your Iraq. .. a strong and confident
 
Iraq. Take to the streets of revolution.
 
This is your historic chance/ this is the
 
[Arab] nation's historic chance/ to get
 
rid of its treacherous and cowardly
 
rulers ("Cease-Fire. . ." A?)*
 
Rather than have the effect he wanted/ however/ Hussein's
 
words inspired little reaction from his fellow ArabS/ and in
 
the Dnited States/ when contrasted with the American myth
 
that was beginning to see him as a monster/ these words were
 
taken as the desperate rhetoric of a madman. The Times
 
received little reader complaint concerning how articles
 
like the previous examples characterized Hussein. This says
 
that the readers either read the Times because they already
 
agree with its position/ so they would have no reason to
 
argue/ and/or that the reportage presented is sufficiently
 
convincing so that readers agree with the Times' position.
 
Whether or not it supports the myth of the United
 
States being morally correct in its actions in the Gulf/ the
 
Times includes articles that show the allies practicing the
 
very virtues that the U.S. has accused Hussein of violating.
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 For example, we perceive ourselves as being
 
compassionate to the prisoners of war
 
•I wanted to look at my adversary in
 
the face after 20 years in the Army,'
 
said public affairs specialist Lt. Col.
 
Bob Parrich, 40, of Greeley, Colo. He
 
rode the jumpseat in a CH-47 Chinook
 
helicopter during one mission to pick up
 
this 'opporttmlty cargo [Iraqi POWs].'
 
'They were like Americans, more or
 
less, only Iraqis,' said Sgt. [Robert]
 
Simpson. 'They've just got someone
 
else telling them what to do. They
 
didn't look aggressive, they didn't
 
look like they wanted to be out killing
 
anything. They didn't look like they
 
wanted to do this anymore' (Balzar,
 
"Surrendering Iraqis. . ." A7).
 
Bearak shows us that some people's thinking justifies
 
fighting to defend the helpless: "Richard Hull, 42, raises
 
hogs in Graham, Tex. 'I am not an advocate of war. But
 
with this experience, it just shows you that some people
 
don't understand any other language but force'" ("Feeling on
 
. . ." A1+). When readers read the quoted opinion of an
 
ordinary American, a hog farmer, they get a sense of the
 
grass roots support for the war. If average folks around
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the country see the need to fight Hussein, readers may feel
 
compelled to join what they think is a groundswell of
 
agreement with the government's actions. If in addition,
 
readers feel that in spite of the American military
 
superiority, Americans care about the well-being of the
 
average Iraqi citizens, the lines are clearly drawn to show
 
that Iraq's government is the true enemy of the Iraqi people
 
as well as of the Americans and allies. The effect of this
 
approach furthers the idea that "our cause is just."
 
Peter D. Feaver explains that the Iraqi people should
 
understand their own government, and that the allies now
 
must not treat the Iraqi people as the enemy.
 
The Iraqi people must not be left
 
thinking that the war was a noble effort
 
sabotaged by back-stabbing Arab brothers
 
in a Zionist conspiracy; they must see
 
it as it was, the tragic Begalomania of
 
a corrupt regime.
 
But they must also see Justice
 
tempered by mercy. The pitiful perfor
 
mance of Iraqi troops proves their claim
 
that this was Saddam Hussein's war
 
("Generosity Begins. . ." B7).
 
In addition, because the American myth says the U.S. must
 
be "the good guys, "Fineman's article tells readers how
 
the enemy went astray. He reports on the analysis of
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strategists
 
Ever since Hussein caae to power more
 
than a decade ago, he has manipulated the
 
Iraqi's deep desire for symbols of
 
national pride. Each major military
 
advance that Iraq achieved filled the
 
Iraqis with as much pride as it fueled
 
the fears of Iraq's enemies and the
 
West' ("Hussein Playing. . ." A5).
 
If readers accept Fineman's explanations of how the Iraqis
 
could have tolerated Hussein's rise to power, readers may
 
also feel some pity for a nation Fineman claims has been
 
duped into believing that Hussein's actions were brave and
 
honorable against the influence of the U.S. on Arab
 
interests.
 
The preceding quotes contain points Of view which
 
suggest that Americans perceive their myth to be so correct
 
that they can even try to understand the Iraqi's position.
 
American readers may be glad to read reports of how the
 
Iraqis have been led astray by their leader, for this
 
approach does not attack the American belief that "our
 
cause is just." Americans will not feel pressured to
 
rethink their support of their government's actions. Add
 
to this expressions of gratitude from the Kuwaitis, and
 
American readers are likely to be even more convinced the
 
government has taken the correct action.
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On Sunday about ICQ Kuwaitis and
 
their American friends gathered at the
 
Federal Building in Westwood. A strong
 
wind made it hard to hold signs that
 
declared: 'It's Not for Oil. It's
 
for Justice/ Hussein is a baby killer'
 
and 'Thank you/America' (Harris/
 
"Kuwaitis in. . ." A8).
 
As the Times prints an opinion from parents of a Scud
 
victim of what should happen to Hussein after the war/ he
 
is seen as the focal point of blame
 
The, parents [of Scud victim SteVe Farnen]/
 
who are churchgoers with four children in
 
all/ said they were not mad at the Iraqis.
 
'It's their damn fool leader,'Hugh Farnen
 
said. 'I hope the Iraqi people take care
 
of him; he's brought more hell on them
 
than anybody' (Israel, "Parents of. . ." A12).
 
An American officer also condemns Hussein
 
'Whenever I [A-6E squadron leader, Cmdr. Lou
 
Crenshaw] look down there and I see the
 
pounding they're taking, I just can't
 
believe it,' Crenshaw said. 'It's just
 
unbelievable [Saddam Hussein] has allowed
 
that to happen to his own people. It's
 
inconceivable. He should be hanged just
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for that' (Drogln/ "Land Battles. . A6).
 
The power of the American myth, we see here, is so strong
 
that a flyer attacking the Iraqi army assumes no
 
responsibility for the destruction that he causes because
 
Hussein is to blame. Readers who also believe Hussein is
 
to blame may wonder why Hussein, himself, is not the
 
subject of attack rather than his soldiers. However, one
 
congressman calls for Hussein's death: "Rep. Dana
 
Rohrabacher (R.-Long Beach) said a presidential ban on
 
assassinations should be loosened to permit U.S. forces to
 
go after Hussein, arguing that there is 'nothing inoral
 
about killing a bloodtlilrsty tyrant'" (Ross, "Lawmakers
 
Back. . ." A20). Rohrabacher's position shows readers that
 
he's given up on language as a tool to effect change, and
 
that he sees Hussein as a monster not capable of reason.
 
Continuing the argument that Hussein literally is the
 
enemy who should be targeted is Edward A. Gargan. He cites
 
the opinions of a Nuremberg prosecuter: "'What Saddam has
 
done, or said would be done, are plainly gross violations of
 
the Geneva conventions, which, of course, among others, he
 
for his country signed and accepted. . . Then the two other
 
things we have been talking about, the treatment of
 
prisoners in those two ways [parading them and using them as
 
shields] would be chargeable under war crimes. .
 
("Telford Taylor. . ." M3).
 
Although hunting down and assassinating Hussein was
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not carried out/ the ideas that he has committed var
 
crimes, and that his death might ultimately save many
 
lives, surface from several opinion writers. Readers are
 
given various facets of the argument that, since Hussein is
 
the instigator of the war, he should be targeted rather
 
than his soldiers or the people of Iraq. Because these
 
writers express no doubt that they speak from the "correct"
 
position, they have no difficulty arguing in favor of
 
targeting Hussein. As a way of ending the war, Alan C.
 
Miller explores the possibility of trying to assassinate
 
Hussein
 
Indeed, some Western analysts believe
 
that Hussein's death might mean an
 
immediate end to the war—preventing
 
the slaughter of hundreds, perhaps
 
thousands, of American soldiers as well
 
as innumerable Iraqis in a bloody
 
ground conflict.
 
'One of the things we want is to be
 
sure he doesn't repeat this adventure,'
 
says former CIA director William E.
 
Colby. 'The commander of the enemy
 
force is a legitimate target. . .'
 
Political murder has a long and
 
inglorious history, dating back
 
through biblical times' ("The Risk. . . " A1).
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What the Iraqis think or want is not mentioned. Tom
 
Bethell argues the logic of going after Hussein instead of
 
his reluctant army
 
By the logic of President Bush's
 
description of the ruthless Iraqi
 
dictator, those who serve in Saddam
 
Hussein's army have little choice in
 
the matter. In which case, maybe it
 
would have made more sense to go after
 
the tyrant rather than those subjected
 
to his tyranny ("Patriotism Doesn't. . ."
 
B7).
 
And apparently Bush was considering such action, according
 
to a report by Gerstenzang
 
As for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,
 
Bush would hot say that the United States
 
is trying to 'hunt hi* down.' But in
 
response to a question about the Iraqi
 
leader. Bush said that 'nobody can be
 
absolved from the responsibilities under
 
international law on the war crimes'
 
("Allies and. . ." Al).
 
The Times has given readers several articles containing
 
arguments in favor of targeting Hussein. Readers may agree
 
and decide that war as usual (troops against troops) is
 
illogical in this case. Readers may think it is not fair
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to target people who are forced into war by an evil leader.
 
If we are "the good guys," why are we hurting the innocent
 
people of Iraq? This argument may be seen as an attempt by
 
the Times to help clarify the American myth.
 
As the war was winding down and it was clear the U.S.
 
and allies were defeating Iraq, a Times editorial sees the
 
U.S. as a helpful figure in the Middle East: "The United
 
States can't reshape the Middle East. Maybe, though it can
 
play a lead role in aioving the region toward a more stable
 
future" ("Now That. . ." B6). The underlying American myth
 
behind these ideas continues to be that we Americans know
 
our principles are correct, and we have a right to concern
 
ourselves with the affairs of the Middle East because "we
 
are the good guys." And Tumulty quotes Bush
 
voicing even more grandiose ideals
 
•In the final analysis,' President Bush
 
said earlier this month, 'ABerica and
 
her partners will be aeasnred not by how
 
we wage war but how we make peace. ..
 
We will have before us an historic
 
opportunity. From the confluence of the
 
Tigris and the Euphrates, where
 
civilization began, civilized behavior
 
can begin anew' ("The Balancing. . ." A5).
 
These remarks say to the reader that Bush firmly believes
 
the U.S. is the moral leader for Iraq, and that in spite of
 
181
 
Iraq's ancient history as the cradle of civilization,
 
America has now set the stage for civilization to begin
 
anew (since Hussein got it wrong). Americans who support
 
the United States' actions will find Bush's remarks
 
appropriate, but others, especially Iraqis, may find his
 
remarks to be an indication of what they were disgruntled
 
with in the first place—America's involvement in Middle
 
Eastern affairs.
 
While the preceding articles have asserted the moral
 
correctness of America's involvement in the Persian Gulf,
 
the Times did print a small amount of guest editorial
 
criticism of U.S. actions
 
We demonized and dehumanized our
 
adversary, we ihduiged in personal name-

calling, false analogies to past wars
 
and demonic leaders of earlier times, then
 
deliberately provoked Hussein through
 
threats and insults. In this way we
 
demeaned and humiliated our opponent,
 
while lessening his incentive to respond
 
to the pleas that were directed to him
 
by so many individuals and nations.
 
We took no account of cultural
 
differences. We listened to those who
 
said that Hussein was non-religious,
 
and interpreted his invocations to
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Allah and the Koran as cynical
 
political manipulation. We failed to
 
consider the people's dual heritage
 
as Iraqis and Muslims/ and thus
 
Hussein's villingness to martyr him
 
self and his people in standing np to
 
the Western 'infidel' (Mack and Rubin,
 
"IS This. . ." B7).
 
If readers are truly critical of the American myth of
 
the moral correctness of our involvement in the Middle
 
East, and if thev read the Times thoroughly and thoughtfully,
 
they will find some articles that seriously question
 
America's behavior. Some express philosophical oppposition
 
to war under any circumstances, and some argue that the
 
U.S. did not pursue sufficiently other alternatives to war.
 
However, these positions do not reflect the majority-held
 
belief of the American people, that "our cause is just" and
 
"we are the good guys."
 
For a profit-making business, it is not surprising
 
that the Times seeks to please the majority of its readers
 
by reflecting back to them in accounts of the Persian Gulf
 
War their own American cultural myth. Because it is a large
 
newspaper, it can cover an event with several approaches
 
written by a variety of reporters. It seeks out editorial
 
comment both supporting the American myth and criticizing
 
it, although the supportive articles are much more numerous.
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 To avoid feeling manipulated by what they may think is
 
a biased approach/ readers must read many articles over a
 
significant span of time, then apply critical thinking
 
skills to an analysis of all that has been read. Readers
 
must assume responsibility for interpretation and
 
assimilation of information that the Times reports.
 
In the next section, we will examine how the Times
 
handles the Iraqi and Arab points of View regarding the
 
Persian Gulf War.
 
* * *
 
The Iraqi and Arab Myths
 
Iraq, in the land of the historic Tigris and
 
Euphrates Rivers, has been called the "cradle of
 
civilization." Much of ancient Biblical history has its
 
roots in the region, as does Arabic tradition traced in the
 
Koran of Islam. While the Times does not retell the
 
history of the area in its writings, some articles, which
 
show the writers' knowledge of the Iraqi-Arab myths,
 
are written by Arab writers, university specialists in the
 
history and culture of the area, and include quotations
 
from Arab and Iraqi people.
 
One obvious rhetorical difference between American
 
English and Iraqi expression is the use of exaggeration.
 
Americans use hyperbole largely for special situations such
 
as for humor or to marshal team support in contests. When
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it Is usedf Americans are familiar with the context (as in
 
a political rally), expect it, understand the nature of its
 
use, but do not take it literally. Iraqi culture uses
 
hyperbole in one different context with which Americans are
 
not familiar. That is in expressing their opinions publicly.
 
In a reflection of Iraqi culture, hyperbole is frequently
 
used in Radio Baghdad's broadcasts and as people describe
 
their feelings, but their exaggeration is understood by them
 
as merely reasonable expression of feelings and not as
 
precursors of imminent acting out of the feelings. Later in
 
this section we will see examples of these expressions. As
 
this custom is not commonly understood by American readers,
 
when the Times quotes exaggerated statements of attitude,
 
but does not qualify such statements in the context of the
 
culture, readers are likely to become disgusted with and
 
intolerant of the Iraqi position. The Times does little to
 
explain the Iraqi custom of hyperljolic expression. As news
 
reports contain hyperbolic quotes from Iraqi Radio or
 
Iraqi citizens, American readers are likely to be offended,
 
not understanding that Iraqi hyperbole is not to be taken
 
literally. Throughout this section, we will see quotations
 
expressing each sides' myth, and speculate how these may be
 
misunderstood.
 
For Times' staff writers, the situation is difficult,
 
for they must try to overlook their own cultural myths in
 
order to gather information and report world news in
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 regions where freedom of speech and the press are not
 
granted.
 
In an October 4, 1993, telephone interview with the
 
Times, Simon Lee, Deputy Foreign Editor, answered questions
 
concerning possible cultural difficulties for Times
 
reporters covering the Gulf War.
 
The 	following is an account of the questions and his
 
responses.
 
Q. 	In Persian Gulf War reporting, did the news staff
 
ever discuss how writers* ethnic backgrounds or
 
personal bias might affect their writing?
 
A. 	It was never an issue at the official level.
 
Q. 	Did the women reporters in Saudi Arabia experience
 
any difficulty from Arab men while staying in the
 
country, interviewing Arabs, and gathering inform­
■ ation? ■ 
A. 	Yes. During Desert Shield before the war actually
 
began, they encountered some obstruction of their
 
activities. Kim Murphy bought ice cream in an
 
American-franchised shop and was told she couldn't
 
sit inside and eat by herself where Arab men were
 
present. Later Kim had received permission from a
 
Saudi government official in Riyadh to interview
 
three men in her hotel room. The "religious
 
police" broke in and stopped the interview because
 
a single woman isn't allowed to bring men into her
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room.
 
Q. 	The women reporters' writing seemed thorough. How
 
much were they hindered by this Arab attitude
 
toward women?
 
A. 	It definitely made the job more difficult/ but it
 
was really more of a nuisance. The women felt
 
very constrained/ separated.
 
Q. 	Did the presence of women reporters over there
 
cause any softening of Arab men's behavior toward
 
them?
 
A. 	No. Nothing changed.
 
With these constraints in mind then/ Times articles
 
reporting on events of the war regarding the Iraqi response
 
must be read with the awareness that access to information
 
from Arab sources for women reporters was more difficult
 
because of the Arab male mythical attitude toward women
 
regarding their expected and "proper" role. Further/
 
writers could not help but write from their own cultural
 
perspectives. Readers must determine for themselves whether
 
the reporters' own myths seriously bias the reportage.
 
Two themes emerge from the reportage which tries to
 
express the Iraqi and Arab myths—how the Iraqis and other
 
Arabs feel about the leadership of the United States and
 
how Saddam Hussein is perceived as a leader by his friends
 
and foes.
 
Rami G. Khouri/ a Palestinian political columnist and
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 author/ explains
 
Even though most Arabs don't support the
 
invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's fear
 
lessness In standing np to our enemies,
 
Israel and America, appeals to the new spirit
 
of the Arab world—a spirit that says we'd
 
rather die on onr feet than live groveling
 
on the ground.
 
Saddam Hussein Is, of course, nO Santa
 
Clans. He Is a rough man. He kills people
 
ruthlessly. He has lived by the gun all of
 
his life. Yet this unlikely, autocratic
 
man has become the medium of the new Arab
 
fearlessness that alms to cast off oppression
 
and subjugation both from abroad and home.
 
. . . The mlhute American forces landed
 
In the region, the whole egnation changed.
 
The Issue was no longer Iraq occupying
 
Kuwait. It was Iraq standing np to the
 
arrogant West. . . For all of us now, Iraq
 
synbolizes the willingness to get np off onr
 
knees and confront our enemies ("America
 
will. . ." B5).
 
However, Khourl speaks from the context of Palestinian
 
cultural myth, which generally sided with Saddam Hussein
 
because Hussein, knowing their desire, had made a Palestinian
 
188
 
homeland a key issue in the war. Five days later, a Times
 
editorial quoted Khouri and another Arab, as these writers
 
further amplify the Arab perspective
 
Saad Eddin Ibrahen, former secretary-

general of the Arab Thought Forum. . .[said]
 
•This, of course, does not change how
 
people feel about the West. Even the
 
most anti-Hussein forces in the Arab
 
world will never forgive the West for a
 
long list of grievances, the latest of
 
which is that the West helped Hussein to
 
become the Frankenstein he became. The
 
biggest grievance is the doable standard—
 
the implicit racism in many of the Western
 
policies toward this part of the world.
 
When Hussein pinpointed that, he was right.•
 
Kami G. Khouri, Palestinian-Jordanian
 
political columnist and author: [said]
 
"He [Hussein] articulated and person
 
ified a new Arab-Islamic spirit of defiance
 
and fearlessness in the face of clear enemy
 
superiority. That spirit rested on over­
wheIming Arab dissatisfaction with the
 
artificial, unnatural and failed economic-

political order following World War I; the
 
donble standard of the united Nations and
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the world in applying Security Council
 
resolutions; the legacy of the Western
 
colonial and neo-colonial powers sending
 
large armies to the Middle East to maintain
 
an order that sni'ts their Commercial and
 
strategic needs but does not salt the
 
aspirations of the indigenous Arab-Muslim
 
people/ and the U.S. insistence that
 
Israel should remain stronger than all
 
its Arab neighbors* ("How Much. . M2).
 
Because the authors are Arabs, Khouri and Ibrahen's
 
opinions of Arab attitudes and beliefs are likely to hold
 
much credibility for American readers, for their arguments
 
seem rational. American readers will find these arguments
 
more persuasive than hyperbolic.
 
An American professor whose Opinion piece also appears
 
in the Times shares much the same position
 
From an Arab point of view. Bush's offer
 
to talk constitutes more than a face-saving
 
gesture. It concedes nothing but publicly
 
acknowledges Hussein as a worthy adversary,
 
one who can be persuaded instead of humiliated
 
and despised. In Middle Eastern terms,
 
Hussein's reputation remains intact so long
 
as he can claim to work for a worthy
 
collective cause. . . Sudden reversal of tactics
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 does nothing to lessen Hussein's prestige, so
 
a peaceful solution with no loss of face among
 
his Arab public, the only public that counts
 
for him, is still possible. . . For Hussein's
 
Arab audience, the essence of human affairs
 
is provisionality. In changed circumstances,
 
only a fanatic would stick to the same course.
 
. . . Consider Hussein's labeling of Western
 
and Japanese hostages as 'guests,' an
 
Orvellian term even to Iraqis. In the world
 
of the Iraqi leader's youth and in some
 
parts of the Arab world today, the taking
 
of hostages from adversary groups is a
 
means of preventing violence until inter
 
mediaries can negotiate a settlement. . .
 
In Arab eyes, the mnited States Shows
 
honor by not yet using its overwhelming
 
force against Iraq and in making every
 
effort to show Hussein an exit. Under
 
Middle Eastern 'rules,' the stronger party
 
does not bully the weaker one into submission
 
without offering alternatives to physical
 
force, as the United States and its allies
 
skillfully continue to do so (Eickelman,
 
"Iraqi Retreat. . ." M2).
 
The writer adds to what the Arab authors have explained
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without condemning or praising Hussein, yet he offers
 
non-violent solutions to the Gulf Crisis by suggesting
 
actions based on cultural understanding.
 
We know that after this article was written, the U.S.
 
did use its awesome force on the Iraqis. Because of a
 
cultural myth different from that of the U.S., their
 
leadership chose to deny wrong fOr their invasion of Kuwait.
 
Yet we can see that the Times tries to offer its readers
 
thoughtful background material and expert analysis from
 
various positions that put ordinary reporting of the war in
 
a larger context.
 
Additional explanations of the Arab myth are expressed
 
in several articles. Readers must assume responsibility
 
for reading the bulk of Times war reportage in order to see
 
the war's events and underlying causes in context.
 
Continuing discussion of Arab culture, Doyle McManus quotes
 
Augustus Richard Norton, a fellow at the International
 
Peace Academy in New York
 
In Arab culture, there's nothing wrong
 
with giving in to a bully. If Saddam can
 
give in to the United States in a way that
 
■ ' ■ ■■ I 
allows him to claim that he has advanced
 
Arab interests--and keep his army intact—
 
he win have pulled a rabbit out of a bat
 
. .. He's playing the other hand in a very
 
tough gane of Texas stud poker and he's doing
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 it with some skill ("To Hussein. . ."A1+).
 
If readers accept this explanation of Hussein's behavior/
 
then Iraqi propaganda broadcast over Baghdad Radio that
 
tells the Iraqi people what Hussein thinks they want to
 
hear—name-calling and berating the U.S. and its allies as
 
bullies and infidels—seems perfectly predictable. Kenneth
 
Freed explains how this American misunderstanding of Iraqi
 
name-calling dissolves hope of a peaceful solution to the
 
conflict
 
Iraq. .. promised 'revenge against
 
President Bush for trying to expel Iraq
 
from the 20th Century.'
 
.. . Baghdad has worked incessantly
 
to portray the conflict as a war between
 
the infidel and imperialistic West against
 
the Arab and Islamic world. So cutting
 
diplomatic relations, no matter how
 
meaningless, is a finalizing symbol of the
 
chasm between the two sides ("Iraq Cuts. . ."
 
AID).
 
Healy and Balzar quote Baghdad Radio as it tries to
 
add religious determinism to the coming conflict: "in a new
 
call for terrorism against the allies, Baghdad Radio said
 
this 'mother of battles' is not like any traditional war.
 
'It is the battle to liberate Mecca, and the tomb of
 
Messenger Mohammed. . .' it said, 'to liberate Palestine,
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the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon. . (••Cheney
 
Hints. . .•• A1+).
 
A rudimentary knowledge of some of the fundamentals
 
of Islam would help the average reader understand that
 
liberating Mecca, the sacred city of Islam, means seizing
 
control of the area around this birthplace of Mohammed.
 
Mecca sits in the country of Saudi Arabia, a major ally with
 
the United states against Iraq. Seizing this land from the
 
Saudis implies that the Saudis are infidels. ••To liberate
 
Palestine, the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon•• declares
 
that the Israelis, who then occupied these areas, are also
 
the enemy. Baghdad Radioes message is trying to direct
 
Arabs and Muslims to unite for a holy cause in this ••mother
 
of battles.•' The Times, however, does not explain the
 
cultural/religious myth behind the Baghdad Radio broadcast.
 
Readers either understand these serious threats to the
 
whole region if they have some knowledge of Middle-Eastern
 
history, or they may be left to think of the Iraqis only as
 
bullying trouble-makers.
 
As it became apparent that Hussein•s troops were
 
hopelessly inadequate, we find another element of the Iraqi
 
myth that may explain why Hussein maintained such defiance
 
toward the U.S. and allies. Thomas B. Rosenstiel reports,
 
•'Simple survival can be especially meaningful given the
 
psychological affinity in the Middle East for the underdog.
 
Even to Arabs ambivalent toward Hussein, [Neil] Livingston
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[Georgetown University professor] said, 'It could be like
 
Davy Crockett at the Alamo'" ("Allies/ Iraqis. . ." A1+).
 
Even defeat can be explained
 
.. . said Assad Abdel Rahman, a Jordanian
 
political scientist. . . 'Military defeat in
 
an Arab culture: As long as you put up a
 
fight, there is no problem in it. People
 
are willing to take it, they are even willing
 
to justify it,' he said. 'But to surrender
 
would be to kill the Image of the hero, and
 
the image of the martyr, and this is an
 
image that has been borrowed from history.'
 
.. . As for Hussein, he has joined Nasser
 
in 'articulating something which lurks
 
beneath the surface of our lives,' explained
 
another Arab academic (Murphy, "Revisiting
 
the. . ." A1+).
 
The most vociferous support came from Palestinians.
 
Many Palestinians live in Jordan, whose King Hussein claimed
 
neutrality and offered many supportive arguments for
 
Saddam Hussein, who linked an anti-Israeli component and
 
the creation of a Palestinian homeland to a settlement of
 
the conflict.
 
For instance, even an official pronouncement from the
 
Jordanian Parliament engages in religious rhetoric
 
The Parliament of Jordan on Friday
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backed Iraq in the Persian Gulf War and
 
branded the United States a 'Great Satan'
 
set on dominating the Arab and Muslim
 
world.
 
'Our people hold America fully respon
 
sible for every drop of blood that is shed
 
in battle/' the lower honse said. . . "God
 
will decree victory for the Iraqi people
 
and hmiliation for all enenies of God and
 
hnnanity. Tell those infidelsr *Ton vill
 
be overcone and cast into the fnmace of
 
hell/' said the 80-seat chaaber ("Jordanian
 
Parliament. . ." A20).
 
That these expressions seem Unanimous is effected by the
 
reporter's metonymic expression/ "said the 80-seat
 
chamber." Such hyperbole is likely to offend American
 
readers/ and the statements from Parliament take a
 
unilateral position in favor of Iraq while ignoring Iraq's
 
atrocities in Kuwait. If the Jordanian parliament hoped to
 
influence the Western world's opinion in favor of Iraq's
 
call for a Palestinian homeland/ they misunderstood the
 
mythical backgrounds of Europeans and Americans/ who are
 
repulsed by what they see as illogical religious hyperbole.
 
One wonders if, as Westerners try to apply a certain debate
 
style in seeking to negotiate peace in the region/ even the
 
verbal boxing is seen by those steeped in the Islamic/Arab
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myth as a type of "Big Brother" patronizing, for if the
 
basic accepted forms of expression are very different,
 
understanding will be restricted* But even more likely is
 
that the Arabs and Moslems resent the U.S. for what they
 
think is its attempt to mold them into its myth, as if it is
 
the only correct myth.
 
This resentment of Americans can be demonstrated in
 
comments quoted from Iraqi civilians. While these comments
 
represent opinions of people not apprised of all the
 
facts on both sides of the Conflict, and while they may
 
seem simplistic and inflammatory to American readers,
 
they also demonstrate how people (Iraqis or Americans) may
 
react when they have not received reasonable objective
 
information.
 
Fineman reports of Palestinian oil tanker truck
 
drivers, who violate the embargo against providing war-

enabling supplies to Iraq. They come under attack from
 
American aircraft because they are breaking the embargo
 
'If I could get my liands on Bush,' [Faouzi]
 
Jamil continued, reflecting the fury shared by
 
all the tank drivers who were interviewed, 'I
 
would ask him, "Why is this happening to us?"
 
What is our fight with him? Let him go fight
 
at the war front.'
 
Mahmood. . . unlocked a tool box and
 
pulled out two rusty 12-inch butcher knives.
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•When I drive on that road,' he said, 'I
 
wish that one day an American pilot will
 
fall so I can cut ont his kidneys with
 
these knives and give them to stray dogs
 
while he watches.*
 
Mahmood's anger and bitterness reflected
 
just how deeply and emotionally the once
 
pro-American Jordanians feel they have been
 
hurt by the United States continuing to
 
hit their countrymen and their lifeline to
 
oil ("Arab Truckers. . ." A8),
 
And as the war concluded, we see the Palestinian
 
denial of what they don't want to believe
 
Meantime, Palestinians received the news
 
of the halt in fighting with resignation
 
mixed with fanciful inaginings of an Iraqi
 
victory. 'I know it is an Iraqi victory,'
 
said Jafer, an activist in the Palestinian
 
uprising who lives in the village of Kfar
 
Malek. 'The Americans are lying when they
 
say they took so many prisoners. I have
 
only seen a hundred on TV (Williams, "Israel
 
Cautiously. . ." A12).
 
The effect of these kinds of quotes on readers is to
 
humanize the enemy. As readers see the Palestinians' and
 
Iraqis' words and feelings, they are confronted with the
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depth of conviction of people on the opposing side.
 
Readers must consider whether the American and allied
 
side's justifications for the war are completely correct.
 
However/ Jordanian criticism of the United Nations*
 
stand against Iraq is more reasonably based/ yet narrowed
 
against the United States and omits the many other Arab
 
nations aligned against Iraq. Two members of the Jordanian
 
royal family speak out. Again we see the influence of the
 
Palestinian cultural myth (feeling unjustly excluded from a
 
homeland) influencing the remarks/ to the extent that the
 
approach is unilateral and ignores the position assumed by
 
the Arab allies
 
The growing evidence of civilian
 
destruction also is taking its toll on
 
the political level throughout the region/
 
Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan warned
 
Sunday. Each day that the bombardment
 
continues/ America's image and that of
 
its allies is declining throughout the
 
Arab and Islamic worlds/ he said.
 
'There's a picture of the United States
 
sadly reducing a Third World country/ in
 
the name of what? In the name of
 
restoration of Kuwait?' the prince said
 
during an interview Sunday with CBS-TV
 
in Amman (Fineman/ "Refugees From. . ." A1+).
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Flneman in another article two days later reports
 
comments of Jordan's King Hussein t
 
•If this is an example of the future
 
role of the United Nations in the "new
 
world order/" what an ominous future lies
 
before all nations/'he said.
 
The king made no mention of Iraq's
 
brutal occupation of Kuwait/ calling only
 
for Iraqi-American and Arab-to-Arab
 
dialogues under the uid>rella of a cease
 
fire to settle all disputes behind the
 
conflict ("Jordan King. . ." A8).
 
King Hussein is operating under his belief that Middle
 
Easterners should settle Middle Eastern problems. The
 
United States is included in the dialogues since it is
 
already heavily involved in the war and in oil-related
 
business interests in the area. With King Hussein's call
 
for talks/ if they should be held, power and leadership for
 
settlement of the war goes back to Arabs, and they can also
 
deal with underlying issues that led to the war in the
 
first place. That a cease fire for talks did not ensue,
 
suggests that the United States and some of its Arab allies
 
did not wish to relinquish power to determine settlement of
 
problems in the region to the Palestinians. In this case,
 
the allies' mythical beliefs prevailed, and they had the
 
military force to see that they did.
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Meanwhile, the Times attempts to reveal more about
 
Saddam through expert analysis of his background and
 
behavior, his own words from Iraqi state-controlled
 
publications and Baghdad Radio, comments from citizens, and
 
explanatory material by Times reporters as they place events
 
in context.
 
For instance, Robin Wright quotes an expert who
 
analyzes Hussein's behavior: "'He's convinced his role in
 
history will be written by those who say this is the man who
 
could withstand punishing blows from the Americans and, in
 
the midst, take the initiative against Israel,' said
 
William B. Quandt, a former National Security Council staff
 
member. . ." ("Patriot Move. . ." A1+). And Nick B.
 
Williams adds his own touch regarding Hussein's style of
 
speaking, as he paraphrases a speech by the Iraqi leader.
 
He says Hussein ". . . speaking to a domestic audience,
 
rallied in his familiar martial rhetoric. He said that a
 
war with the American-led forces—a conflict that he once
 
again termed 'the motlier of battles' in an Army Day Address
 
on Sunday—-would 'lift humanity'" ("Hussein Sees. . ." A12).
 
In the same article, Hussein's threat to cause American
 
soldiers "to btIm in their own blood," further casts him, in
 
American eyes, as a bloodthirsty lunatic. Doyle McManus,
 
just three days later, tempers Hussein's threat by
 
interpreting his strategy
 
And Hussein appears to genuinely
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believe that the U.S. Congress and public
 
will stop a war if Iraqi forces inflict
 
enough casualties on American troops. . .
 
At least two other factors appear to be
 
guiding the Iraqi leader's decisions: First,
 
his coldblooded calcalation that he would
 
lose by capitulating to the West's demands,
 
and, second, his well-developed sense of
 
'dignity'—both Iraq's and his own
 
("To Hussein. . ." A1+).
 
As the war progresses, we find the analysis of Hussein
 
continuing in light of his increasingly hopeless position.
 
James Gerstenzang reports
 
Some experts in Arab affairs have
 
concluded that Hussein may have given up
 
on achieving a military victory. They
 
believe his objective is to seek a pol
 
itical victory of sorts by holding out as
 
long as possible against the UiS.-led
 
coalition so he can portray hiaself among
 
the Arab nationalists as a hero for having
 
stood tip to the United States. Asked
 
whether he subscribes to this view, the
 
official said: . . . 'A lot of the things
 
he's doing . . . are intended primarily to
 
enhance his iwage not only among Iraqis,
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but also among poor Arabs throughout the
 
Middle East*. .. The official also said,
 
as have others, that the Iraqi president
 
appears to be surrounded by aides who are
 
unwilling to present him with an accurate
 
picture of the military situation with
 
which he is faced. . . 'People tend not
 
to tell him the actual situation, but
 
paint it in colors that tend to make them
 
look good,* he said ("Baffled White. . ."
 
A8).
 
Additional information about Hussein comes directly
 
from General Schwarzkopf who tells of Saddam's duplicity.
 
"The fact that Hussein now confines his movements to
 
residential neighborhoods, sleeping each night in a
 
different house, is convincing evidence, he [Schwarzkopf]
 
said, that even the Iraqi president knows that the allies
 
are not targeting civilian areas" (Lamb, "Schwarzkopf
 
Sees . . ." A1+). The collective effect of the American
 
reporters' analyses of Hussein picture him for American
 
readers as someone out of touch with what is actually
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happening in the war. He seems to be playing a role,
 
telling the Iraqis what he thinks they want to hear.
 
American readers who try to understand the beliefs behind
 
his rhetoric might get a bit of understanding of what
 
frustrations underlie Iraqi toleration of Hussein's
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seemingly self-destructive leadership.
 
On February 21, the day the Iraqis were beginning
 
their withdrawal, the Times prints an excerpt from a
 
hyperbolic speech of Hussein's. He says that what has
 
happened Is God's will and refuses to admit defeat
 
0 great people. 0 nobles In the
 
forces of jihad [holy war] and faith.
 
0 glorious men of 'the mother of battles.'
 
0 truthful, sealoQS believers In our
 
glorious nation and all Muslims and good
 
people In the world. 0 glorious Iraqi
 
women: . . . Today, our fight against
 
aggression and atheism In a 30-country
 
coalition that has officially waged a
 
U.S.-led war on us will have lasted from
 
the night of Jan. 16-17 until this moment-

two months of the legendary shovdovn. ..
 
Everything we went through or decided was
 
with compliance with 6od*s vill. Faith Is
 
a record of honor to the people, the nation
 
and the values of Islam and humanity. . .
 
You defeated wrong with right and God's
 
help. You were victorious the day you
 
declined. In the name of faith, evil's
 
will. .. The Iraqis will remember and will
 
never forget that on 8/8/90 AD It [Kuwait]
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became a part of Iraq, legally, constitu
 
tionally and actually . . . (Hussein,
 
"Hussein: 'Circumstances'. . ."All).
 
American readers are likely to view this speech only as the
 
desperate remarks of a loser, for "God is also on the side
 
of the Americans and allied Arabs." American readers, whose
 
cultural myths encourage independent, critical thinking,
 
face a culture clash when they read such rhetoric as is
 
found in Hussein's speech.
 
However, earlier official statements from Hussein and
 
the Iraqi government had laid the foundation for such
 
remarks to be understandable in light of Hussein's trying to
 
convince the Iraqis that this war was a religious extension
 
of their myth. Hussein called for a Jihad, a holy war. If
 
any war were fought, the Iraqi resistance could be
 
interpreted as a Jihad. He referred to Iraq's role as one
 
"given to it by God" (Williams, "Iraq Rebuffs. . ." Al). If
 
he is merely carrying out God's wishes, how can he be wrong?
 
In the same article, Williams says, "One of Hussein's
 
aides. . . told a press conference. . .'The question is now
 
a question of the American aggression, and violent and
 
imperialist aggression, which is intended to destroy Iraq
 
and subjugate the region. . . The issue of Kuwait has been
 
used as a cover for aggression.'" Here the Iraqi leadership
 
has used a verbal trap of sorts in its message to the people
 
much like the old "Do you still beat your wife?" question.
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They have set up the situation so that if the U.S. did not
 
act to assist small nations in stopping Iraq's aggression,
 
Hussein would have his way with impunity, but if the U.S.
 
tried to stop Iraq, the U.S. was just looking for any excuse
 
to be aggressive toward Iraq. Therefore Iraq, directed by
 
God, is totally innocent while the U.S. and its allies,
 
enemies of God, are totally guilty. The Iraqi argument is
 
part of the myth of Hussein, the underdog, who, trying to
 
serve God, is merely standing up to the bullying Americans.
 
The Times prints a quotation from an Iraqi in which he
 
seems to understand Hussein's real meaning, and he supports
 
his efforts. Fineman reports
 
According to HaSsan Bayaji, an articulate
 
Iraqi, '. . . Now the target is the Iraqi
 
government, the Iraqi regime,' he said. 'They
 
are trying to get rid of our leader and our
 
regime, and they want to pulverize Iraq and
 
put an end to our economic growth. . .It
 
isn't the liberation of Kuwait. It's pun
 
ishing Iraqis' ("Bomb-Weary. . ." A1+).
 
Fineman describes Bayaji as "articulate," which suggests
 
that readers should pay some attention to what he says.
 
Whereas Hussein's aide denounced America for its aggression,
 
Bayaji gives evidence to support his argument that the U.S.
 
is punishing Iraqis. It is hot so difficult for American
 
readers to understand Bayaji's opinion, because America was
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trying to get rid of the leader and his regime. And Iraqis
 
vere punished indirectly, for they had to endure the
 
embargo, the disruption of water and power, and the deaths
 
of Iraqi citizens. The Times' printing of Bahaji's remarks
 
as a quote in Fineman's story provides its readers with an
 
Iraqi citizen's heartfelt complaint to show the Iraqi
 
people's position toward the war.
 
The Iraqis were also sensitive to how the American
 
press treated Hussein. After various reports were printed
 
in the U.S. calling Saddam a pathologically narcissistic
 
megalomaniac, we find similar name-calling directed at Bush
 
that tries to shift blame toward Bush as the evil scapegoat
 
and away from allied Arab nations, members of the coalition
 
'George Bush is a stupid contrary
 
boy,' one radio broadcast said. 'It
 
would have been possible to overlook
 
this except for the fact that this
 
madman, who suffers from mcsgalomania
 
and the insanity of war, destruction
 
and aggression is the President of the
 
United States' (Gerstenzang and Williams,
 
"Ground War. . A1+).
 
For his own people, Hussein singles out Bush as the true
 
enemy, and he shows he can discredit the American leader
 
with the same accusations as have been used against him.
 
To the Iraqis, their leader is still putting up resistance
 
207
 
against their enemy/ but to American readers/ his remarks
 
are likely to be understood as copycat namecalling by a
 
desperate loser. To the Iraqis/ Hussein speaks culturally
 
accepted and understood hyperbolic rhetoric that shows he
 
is a brave underdog/ but to Americans who are not familiar
 
with Iraqi hyperbole/ his exaggeration is illogical and
 
inflammatory. We can see here how language laced with
 
metaphor expresses cultural myth/ and that that very
 
language/ when misinterpreted by another culture/ may
 
exacerbate cultural differences.
 
Further argument supporting Hussein's bravery against
 
the "American bullies" is found in comments by the
 
previously mentioned tanker drivers. Their rationalization
 
of Hussein's behavior shows a willingness to support
 
Hussein's leadership in spite of the attacks they are
 
enduring. Their myth calls for the removal of Israelis
 
from regions of disputed land claimed by the Palestinians/
 
and Hussein has added this belief to his reasons for
 
resisting the united States
 
'Hey/ did you hear?' Nimr called out
 
to his fellow drivers and Jordanian friends
 
when he emerged from the war zone about
 
noon Wednesday to spread the news of the day.
 
'Saddam went 20 kilometers into Saudi
 
Arabia. He took it and then gave it back.
 
It was just to show he could do it.'
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'Saddam is God!'shouted Abdul Ahmad/
 
another driver who made the run Wednesday.
 
'Even if every single American comes here
 
to fight/ they cannot face him even
 
standing alone.'
 
Such is the stuff of the emerging cult
 
of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Fineman/
 
"Cult of . . ." Al).
 
The Palestinian tanker drivers at last have found in Hussein
 
someone to stand up for them. A festering injury to them
 
is that they believe the United States has favored Israel by
 
tolerating its occupation of land the Palestinians feel
 
should rightfully be their homeland. To them/ America is
 
the bully.
 
In spite of the volume of damning evidence against
 
Hussein and his atrocities/ the Times still researched and
 
printed an article showing an unexpected side of Hussein.
 
According to Naim Twaina/ a Jew who lived in Baghdad in 1971
 
and had been imprisoned/ Hussein showed him mercy
 
'He [Hussein] came in/ took a cigarette
 
and put it in the eye of one of the Baath
 
men/' who fainted from the pain.
 
Twaina thought his end had come.
 
But/ 'He got to me and said/ "Who's
 
this? It's not a Baath member." They
 
said/ "No sir/ it's a Jew/ a Zionist." He
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 said, "No. He's a good man. I know him.
 
Take your things and go."'
 
'. .. It was an hour of ■ercy, ' he said.
 
'Maybe it was because Iwas good with him—
 
Iwould buy from him all the time.'
 
. . .But Hussein has also reportedly
 
helped the estimated 150 remaining Iraqi
 
Jews, allowing many to leave the country.
 
'He's against Zionists, he's not against
 
the Jews of Iraq,' Twaina said (Goldberg,
 
"Jew Credits. . ." A8).
 
The effect of this account is complicated. It further 
shows Hussein as erratic in behavior—unspeakably cruel to 
one he deems enemy, yet tolerant of Iraqi Jews. Possibly 
non-Zionist Jewish readers might believe Hussein is not 
dangerous to them. 
However, the non-critical articles about Hussein and 
the Iraqi leadership fail to balance the Times' news 
reports that, through the Iraqis' own words, continue the 
violent hyperbole against the United States, which is likely 
to antagonize American readers against Hussein. The 
following article by Healy and Balzar is an example 
'All news reports confirm that the number
 
of Americans killed will exceed tens of
 
thousands, ' the state-run radio said. 'This 
means that tens of thousands of coffins will 
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arrive/ together with tribulations/ after
 
which [President] Bush will not be able to
 
dodge the correspondents' questions. ..
 
The American people are living in a state
 
of paniC/ fear and chaos' because of allied
 
casualty rates/ it said ("Cheney Hints. . ."
 
A1+). .
 
At that time/ the broadcast was considered just a bluff and
 
an example of more Iraqi hyperbole/ but a few days later a
 
Scud blew up barracks/ burning to death 27 members of the
 
National Guard. When Iraqi Radio brags about it/ Times
 
reporters need only to use direct quotations/ and the Iraqi
 
leadership has further alienated itself from any sympathy
 
from the American public. No longer are Iraqis just
 
braggarts—now they are vicious, gloating murderers, who
 
call American youth "coward traitors." Bob Drogin and Patt
 
Morrison quote Baghdad Radio: "Baghdad Radio hailed the
 
attack, saying the missile struck 'the coward traitors who
 
mortgage the sacred places of the nation. . . and turn Arab
 
youth into shields of flesh'" ("Iraqi Missile . . ." Al)^
 
In a related article on the same day, Tracy Wilkinson and
 
Nick B. Williams explain further
 
Before the withdrawal announcement,
 
Baghdad Radio claimed that Hussein's forces
 
were inflicting heavy damage on the allies
 
and bragged about the fatal Scud attack on
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the barracks in Dhahran. 'The defeated
 
have abandoned their tanks, vehicles and
 
equipment* . . and fled tripping over
 
their own feet to escape lethal Iraqi fire,*
 
the communique said. 'Our heroic missile
 
corps continues to pound the coward traitors'
 
("Iraq Orders. . ." A1+).
 
The following day, Fineman explains what all of this
 
may mean according to the Iraqi myth
 
But it remained unclear Tuesday
 
whether the senior command of the Iraqi
 
military would buy his claim to a victory
 
of endurance. The senior commanders are
 
known to have endorsed Hussein's military
 
strategy to hold out just long enough to
 
inflict major casualties on the allied
 
forces, particularly the Americans.
 
Within the Arab context, analysts in
 
the region said, Hussein could legiti
 
mately claim victory in the eyes of his
 
supporters if be drew significant
 
American blood before a tactical with
 
drawal. Several analysts said that
 
Monday night's Scud missile attack on U.S.
 
servicemen in Dhahran may have given Hussein
 
enough ammunition to confront his skeptics
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at home ("For Soldiers. . H5).
 
American readers are unlikely to care about Hussein's
 
problems with his skeptics once they have read the
 
braggadocio about the killing of the "coward traitor"
 
Guardsmen. If drawing "significant American blood" was
 
merely a calculated political goal for Hussein to gain
 
favor among his critics, now readers are likely to view
 
Hussein with contempt for his ruthlessness. No longer are
 
Americans supporting humanistic ideals for all people; now
 
the battle has become personal.
 
What other Arabs and Moslems thought of Hussein also
 
is covered by Times writers as they quote and analyze
 
authorities. For instance, the King of Saudi Arabia fires
 
back at Hussein's rhetoric using the familiar blood and
 
religion metaphors. He addresses Hussein straight on
 
'Why do you try to ignore the direct
 
cause of what has happened in the Arab
 
arena. . . This Injury you have caused will
 
continue to bleed for years to come. .. [you
 
must begin] an immediate withdrawal from
 
Kuwait to pave the way for the return of the
 
normal situation. . . But who has authorized
 
you to involve the Iraqi army and people in a
 
bloody and fruitless war with Iran? Who
 
authorized you to occupy Kuwait and kill its
 
sons, rape its women, loot its property and
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destroy its landmarks? No doubt Satan
 
and your covetonsness have urged you to
 
do so at the expense of the Arab gulf
 
countries which were proud of the Iraqi
 
army* (Murphy/ "Fahd Tells. . A6).
 
The effect on American readers may be that they can
 
dispense with gnawing doubts at the correctness of their
 
cause after reading another Arab's condemnation of Hussein.
 
Lamb/ in an analytical article/ pulls the opposing
 
attitudes toward Hussein together by using the Dracula
 
metaphor again
 
. . . he [Saddam] has cast his country
 
into bankruptcy and a war that his army/
 
the world's fourth largest/ cannot win.
 
Against him/ in addition to the U.S.-led
 
Western coalition stand the only three
 
Arab influences on the Middle East's
 
balance of power: Egypt/ Saudi Arabia
 
and Syria. Their presence alone represents
 
a spike driven into the heart of so-called
 
Arab unity ("Once Again. . ." A22).
 
Readers will find Lamb's argument that Iraq cannot win
 
believable/ for he supports it with strong evidence. If
 
they agree, they will probably willingly accept the "spike
 
driven in the heart" metaphor as suiting the awfulness of
 
Hussein's aggression toward his neighbors.
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The accuracy of the preceding two reports about the
 
effect on the people of the region is played out in several
 
articles as the surrendering Iraqi POWs also explain their
 
disgust with Hussein and his war. They bore the brunt of
 
the allied attacks while their leader hid in sophisticated
 
bunkers and used his troops like cannon fodder much as many
 
modern leaders continue to do
 
'What he [Hussein] told us [Iraqi POWs]/
 
that Arab countries were going to invade us
 
and take our sisters and mothers and fam­
ilies/ it's not true/' the man complained.
 
'We hope the victor will be the Saudis.
 
It's senseless that our young people are
 
going to get killed. . . As soon as they
 
came/ we told them we didn't want to
 
fight/' he said. 'As soon as we raised
 
our hands/ they welcomed us. . . I was
 
captured by our brother Saudis' (Murphy/
 
"Arab Forces. . ." A1+).
 
No articles speculate on how these same troops would have
 
reacted had they been the victors/ so readers are left to
 
assume the POWs are against Hussein rather than just saying
 
what they think will save their lives. Drogin adds more a
 
few days later
 
Most important/ perhaps/ all [Iraqi
 
POWs] are furious that Hussein sacrificed
 
215
 
the world's fourth'-largest Army—and
 
brought devastation and humiliation to
 
his country—for nothing.
 
•He destroy all Iraq/ and the army/'
 
said Ahmad M./ a wounded infantryman.
 
"Ipshallah/ God will crush him.'
 
•From Aug. 2, I thought this war
 
would be the same result as happened—
 
a disaster/' said Mahadi M./ a 43-year­
old Iraqi warrant officer. 'Saddam/
 
he is a crazy man. A lonatic."
 
Despite the punishment/ the POWs say
 
Iraq's army was so demoralized that 50%
 
of some units/ including the supposedly
 
elite Republican Guard/ had deserted by
 
the time the ground war began ("Iraqi
 
POWs. . ." A1+).
 
But even more damning evidence against Hussein's
 
leadership is found in Richter and Chen's report. They
 
tell of Iraqi troops being slaughtered by their own officers
 
Allied forces say many Iraq POWs are
 
begging their captors not to repatriate
 
them/ and their fears may be understandable.
 
They know Hussein as a man who executed
 
officers for retreating during the Iran-Iraq
 
War/ and who more recently dispatched
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execution squads to shoot front-line
 
soldiers who would not fight allied forces
 
("POWs Begging. . Al).
 
Healy interviewed a sociologist who shed additional
 
light on an Arabic cultural trait that contradicts
 
Hussein's description of his soldiers as martyrs for Allah
 
Sociologist Yohoshefat Harkabi/
 
Who analyzed Egypt's defeat in the 1967
 
Six-Day War for Israeli intelligence/
 
argues that Arab fighting forces lack co
 
hesion—a reflection of a culture in which
 
Arab men are divided from one another by
 
suspicion and hostility.
 
'Because of this defect in the social
 
fabric/ each Arab soldier/ in the critical
 
moments of combat' finds himself fighting
 
not as a member of a team/ but as an
 
abandoned individual/' Harkabi wrote in
 
his analysis. 'Consequently/ each indiv
 
idual tends primarily to look after himself/
 
and the unit disintegrates* ("In Face. . ."
 
A8+).
 
The effect of these stories detailing abuse of Iraqi
 
soldiers by their own officers and lack of cohesiveness of
 
military units is likely to further convince readers that
 
"our cause is Just/" for the Iraqi soldiers appear to share
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no dedication to what Hussein has been telling them is
 
their cause. Other Arabs provide readers additional
 
arguments against Hussein/ but they show compassion for the
 
iraqi people who, they seem to think/ suffer under such a
 
leader. Gosaibi/ a Saudi interviewed by Murphy/ sums up
 
how many non-Iraqi Arabs feel about Hussein's leadership
 
'What did Saddam Hussein offer the Iraqis
 
in 25 years of rule? Persecution/ terror/
 
mass executions/ eight years of war/
 
another new war. What did he bring to
 
them? He did not bring them prosperity/
 
not happiness. Only terror and sadness.
 
No nation/ no people are so ■asocbistic 
as to love such a leader' ("Ghazi al . . ." 
M3). 
An Arab-American critic of the allied effort, Sermid 
Al-Sarrof/ argues that Hussein cold-bloodedly calculated 
and used for propaganda value the air attacks which caused 
collateral damage, yet subtly, Al-Sarrof shifts the blame in 
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti situation to the allies for not being 
more sensitive to the suffering of the Iraqi people 
Saddam Hussein calculatedly camouflages 
civilian areas as military areas or vice 
versa. Everyone seems to understand this, 
but people don't seem to be sensitive to 
that. They understand that he is not 
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concerned about casualties. He's not
 
concerned about the lives of his people.
 
Dnfortunately/ the allies have been willing
 
to play into that gaa». And they've
 
inflicted severe casualties on civilians.
 
No matter their best intentions# they have
 
inflicted a toll on Iraqi people. At the
 
same time# they expect the Iraqi people
 
to forgive them ("World Didn't. . ." B7).
 
Here# Al-Sarrof has shown readers that if the U.S. had
 
better understood Hussein's trickery and been more
 
sensitive to the needs of the people of Iraq caught in the
 
middle# maybe the Americans could have devised a better way
 
to deal with Hussein.
 
But more vitriolic is Rashid I. Khalidi# who accuses
 
the Americans directly of meddling in Arab business
 
It may be argued that it doesn't matter
 
what people in the Arab world think of the
 
United States: Americans know that they
 
are right and strong enough to impose their
 
will on those who disagree. It may well be
 
that Arab grievances over the devastation
 
wrought by 95#000 allied air sorties#
 
directed mainly against targets in the
 
cities and towns of Iraq# will eventually
 
be forgotten without leaving lasting scars.
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And perhaps the United States will avoid
 
snccmblng to its long-standing tendency
 
to meddle in other people's domestic
 
affairs (always justified/ of course/
 
by the highest moral purposes)/ and will
 
leave the Iraqis to their own devices
 
after the war ("Arab Hearts. . B7).
 
This bitter attack will jog readers' comfortable acceptance
 
of America's involvement in Middle Eastern business. They
 
will be forced to rethink whether their cultural beliefs
 
are moral. Is Hussein really a monster? Are American
 
forces liberating the people of Iraq as well as Kuwaitis?
 
Would the United States be involved at all if it weren't
 
for oil interests in Kuwait? Is the United States passing
 
off business interests as human rights concerns?
 
Thoughtful readers will likely feel some discomfort as they
 
try to answer these questions.
 
Arab-American women are represented in a Times report
 
by Kathleen Hendrix who tells how Arab women in the United
 
States struggle with their split loyalties. They may be
 
Times readers too/ and by running an article which shows
 
sensitivity to their position/ the Times gives voice to
 
their unique position. They
 
described rage at what was being done to
 
Arabs; of women and children being de
 
humanized with phrases like 'collateral
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daaage': of the double standard they say
 
Americans use to aeasure Arabs and
 
Israelis; of ambivalence about their own
 
feelings towards the war and Saddam Hussein;
 
of dual loyalties as Americans and Arabs;
 
of being hurt by "Nuke Iraq" bumper stickers
 
and T-shirts; of perplexity and worry as
 
mothers ("Fears From. . ." E1+).
 
The idea of mothers worrying about loved ones in time of
 
war is as old as history, and American mothers whose sons
 
may be in the war zone can surely feel empathy for the
 
Arab-American women. The article humanizes the conflict,
 
in contrast to the military language used in press
 
briefings which dehumanizes war.
 
In an article by Kenneth Reich, a final quote tries to
 
sum up the Arab-American position
 
Nazih Bayda, regional director of the
 
Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Com
 
mittee, spoke for many when he said: 'First
 
of all, everybody is relieved that the Kuwaiti
 
people are back in their own country. . . I
 
hope now that the United States and the rest
 
of the allied forces will work on vlnning
 
the hearts and minds of the Arab masses and
 
implementing U.N. resolutions to solve the
 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian
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issue.'
 
As for Iraq/ [Saud/ an Iraqi-American]
 
Cano asserted/ 'The Iraqi population is very
 
sophisticated and smart. .. I'm confident
 
they have learned from this. They learned
 
the hard vay that var does not pay/ and
 
they're probably going to have to make some
 
changes in their form of government' ("Arab-

Americans. . ." A13).
 
By reading these quotations of Arab-Americans/ readers can
 
feel a sense of justification of America's correctness on
 
the issues underlying the war. Americans could tell
 
themselves they did the right thing/ but most realized the
 
"Palestinian issue" must be settled. And the Iraqis have
 
learned their lesson. Hussein led them into another destruc
 
tive war that was not the solution to their problems.
 
It would be difficult for a critic of the Times to
 
find legitimate complaint concerning the scope of coverage
 
of Moslem and Arab concerns in the Gulf War. While the
 
Times' foreign correspondents/ with differing familial and
 
religious cultural backgrounds/ cannot be totally objective
 
in their reportage/ neither can anyone else. Therefore/
 
readers must assume some responsibility for interpreting the
 
variety of reportage. Ideally/ readers would try to remain
 
open-minded/ yet understand and acknowledge the effect of
 
their own cultural myths on their reactions to the news.
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 The Times does print a quantity of articles attempting to
 
reflect the Arab point of view. Times reporters, some more
 
objective than others, write from many angles and include
 
many quotes from Arabs which represent varying points of
 
view. Add to that the number of articles by Arab authors
 
which express several points of view, and we have a
 
newspaper that tries to provide comprehensive and
 
sophisticated coverage. Bear in mind that the Times, as a
 
viable business, must deal with the fact that American
 
readers want to see their myths expressed. If they don't,
 
the paper will lose readers as well as advertisers. When
 
special interest groups do not see their myths expressed as
 
fully as they wish and then complain about it, we can see
 
the impossibility of any newspaper successfully pleasing all
 
readers. Yet the very quality and quantity of reportage on
 
any major issue printed by the Times is challenging and
 
thorough enough for most American readers of varying
 
cultural backgrounds.
 
* * *
 
We see that on a subject as gigantic as warfare, the
 
Times has tried to print information and opinion on both
 
sides Of the conflict. While the reporters' own myths are
 
bound to influence their approach to the news they are
 
covering, we must also acknowledge that there can be no
 
objective reportage. The very volume of articles written by
 
a variety of male and female writers of many ethnic origins
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provides a reasonable spectrum of information from which
 
readers must assume responsibility in agreeing with or
 
rejecting the information according to their own personal
 
cultural myths.
 
The perceived facts and issues of the Persian Gulf
 
conflict are complex. We have seen that at the very center
 
of our disagreements as human beings are the ways we see
 
and understand things. These can differ dramatically
 
because of our varying histories and how our myths are
 
formed/ expressed/ and acted on due to our language and its
 
variety of figurative and metaphoric expressions.
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In Summary
 
From this examination of how the Los Angeles Times
 
reported on the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991/ we can
 
arrive at some important conclusions. First/ the commonly
 
held belief that the news is "just the facts" is entirely
 
too simplistic. Second/ of the multitude of newsworthy
 
historic events that newspapers cover/ the subject of war is
 
certainly one of the most highly charged. When nations resort
 
to war/ ordinary communication ceases. Rather than
 
opposing parties using the force of logic/ they resort to
 
the logic of force. As the warring sides use language to
 
explain their use of force/ their different histories and
 
cultural myths are expressed/ providing important clues
 
about why the conflict exists. Additionally/ these myths
 
are suffused with metaphoric expressions that reveal how
 
each side perceives the idea it is expressing.
 
Times reportage reflects these mythical forces behind
 
events and includes an array of metaphoric language/ both in
 
reporters' own texts and in words of persons quoted.
 
We have found that because these myths are embodied in
 
language/ and because we understand through metaphorical
 
concepts/ that there is no objective language. If there is
 
no verbal expession of absolute truth in political affairs/
 
especially regarding warfare/ then no newspaper can possibly
 
be totally unbiased or objective/ for readers will apply
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their own "reading" to the signifiers and syntagms of the
 
writers/ that is to say/ their understanding of what is
 
[signified. And/ of course/ the writers will have written
 
their texts from their own mythical perspectives using
 
metaphors that shape as well as express their own beliefs.
 
All that can be hoped for in seeking truth in verbal
 
expression is through a reasonable understanding of the
 
"common sense/" or common beliefs of any culture. As
 
Barthes explains/ "Writing is precisely that space in which
 
the persons of grammar and the origins of discourse mingle/
 
combine/ and lose each other until they are unidentifiable:
 
writing is the truth not of the person (of the author)/ but
 
of language" (Semiotic Challenge 8). As writers are
 
limited by the constraints of structure/ vocabulary/ and
 
metaphor used in verbal expression/ they are also limited
 
by their own personal histories as they try to express
 
"common sense." All verbal expression becomes another
 
entity beyond syntax/ vocabulary/ myth/ and metaphor/ which
 
Barthes calls simply "language." As writers use language/
 
they are also used by that language/ for its very nature
 
alters (limits or adds to, and hence/ changes) their
 
original felt sense.
 
In this study, we have examined what Barthes means as
 
he explains the importance of our cultural myths—how we
 
understand political events as a result of our personal and
 
community histories and beliefs. By examining the ideas of
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George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner, ve have seen
 
how they identify various metaphorical concepts that enable
 
us to interpret events through the filter of comparisons
 
that are so embedded in our language, we are often not even
 
aware of their use, yet they affect our cultural myths.
 
Lakoff and Turner in More than Cool Reason, have asserted
 
that this figurative language has power to affect our
 
behavior.
 
For the same reasons that schemas and
 
metaphors give us power to conceptualize
 
and reason, so they have power over us.
 
Anything that We rely on constantly,
 
unconsciously, and automatically is so
 
much part of us that it cannot be easily
 
resisted, in large measure because it is
 
barely even noticed. To the extent that
 
we use a conceptual schema or a concep
 
tual metaphor, we accept its validity.
 
Consequently, when someone else uses it,
 
we are predisposed to accept its validity.
 
For this reason, conventionalized schemas
 
and metaphors have persuasive power over
 
us (63).
 
This is disturbing when we realize that in the reportage of
 
the Persian Gulf War we have found that the language of war
 
is a weapon itself. We have seen how the U.S. government
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and military sought to detoxify the horror of suffering and
 
death by deliberately dehumanizing the targets with the war
 
is a machine metaphor. On both sides/ the enemy had to be
 
demonized with language strong enough to unite people
 
against a common foe. Both sides insisted God was on their
 
side, using religious references to validate their
 
positions. Both sides endured the horror of bloodshed and
 
the awful finality of loss of life.
 
We found that metaphors could be categorized by placing
 
them in an ever widening circle (see Diagram of Metaphorical
 
Subjects, p. 42). Beginning in the center with heart and
 
blood, figures we understand are essential to life, we move
 
outward to other body parts, then to metaphors using bodily
 
responses. Outside the body entirely, we find metaphors of
 
home and its near environment which preserve the body, then
 
outward further to the social interaction and work of people.
 
Beyond these, we find metaphors dealing with political
 
affairs of people in their cultural groups, and in the
 
outermost circle, we find metaphors dealing with people's
 
ethical values and spirituality. Our metaphoric system
 
shows us that we see the world from an egocentric position;
 
we understand what is going on outside of ourselves in
 
relation to how it affects our personal cultural histories.
 
From our basis of myth and metaphorical concepts, we
 
form meanings with which we frame our understanding, and
 
hence, our behavior. An understanding of how variable our
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 myths can be should enable us to be tolerant of beliefs
 
different from ours. However/ some critics of the press/
 
such as Noam Chomsky, use their own myths as benchmarks by
 
which to measure differing ideologies.
 
In Language and Politics, Chomsky argues that the media
 
as a business is controlled by a privileged sector that owns
 
and runs society. He says ". . .we discover that the media
 
tends to present an overwhelming picture of the world that
 
conforms to the interest and needs of the sectors of the
 
population it serves and represents" (536). He claims the
 
"privileged educated elites. .. The journalists, the
 
academics, the teachers, the public relations specialists
 
... have an institutional task, and that is to create the
 
system of beliefs which will ensure the effective
 
engineering of consent" (671). He calls this
 
indoctrination (725) and says "The only advice I can offer
 
is the obvious thing—telling people the truth. Bring them
 
the news that they aren't getting. Give them the kind of
 
analyses they are not receiving. . . I think people can be
 
reached with critical analyses and truths that are
 
generally hidden from them" (537). Chomsky does not say
 
who is the bearer of this "truth" and who may "reach" the
 
people. What Chomsky calls the "system of beliefs" to which
 
"elites" must be sure others "consent," is a way of
 
describing other myths with which he disagrees. Most Times
 
readers would not agree that they have been indoctrinated.
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However, the subtle effect of metaphorical structures in
 
language may have power to influence readers' thinking and
 
actions more than conscious efforts at "engineering consent."
 
From the Times' Persian Gulf War reporting, we have
 
identified many metaphorical concepts in common use in
 
language, and of course, in use by reporters. These
 
metaphorical concepts help to frame the meaning that
 
readers will gather from the reportage.
 
With these metaphorical concepts suffusing language,
 
we have discovered evidence of the similarities and
 
differences in mythical approaches to the war. As countries
 
differ greatly in their histories, religions, beliefs in
 
human rights and responsibility for the good of the rest of
 
the world, great gulfs of ignorance of one another can
 
separate cultures. Reporter Fineman writes of Jordan's
 
Prince Hassan, who seems to understand the nature of the
 
mythical clashes
 
He [Jordan's Prince Hassan] said Hussein, for
 
his part, did not understand the Americans
 
because he was listening as well as speaking
 
in 'vernacular Iraqi, which more often than
 
not was badly translated.' .. . Thus, there
 
was 'a clash of idiom, culture, of mentality. . .
 
right up to the point of the 15th of January
 
("What's Next. . ." A1+).
 
While the Times does little to identify these cultural
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differences as myth, this examination has identified,
 
through how language has been used, two prominent cultural
 
myths—the American, and Iraqi/Arab. Each myth is revealed
 
through similar metaphorical language, yet cultural beliefs
 
cause differing interpretations of those metaphors.
 
Because newswriting is by nature formulaic, reductive,
 
and often written under pressure of deadlines, and because
 
each writer cannot help but write within his or her own myth,
 
no one story can be isolated as a representative of the
 
entire Times. However, because of its size (approximately
 
forty foreign correspondents), the Times can cover major
 
stories from several angles by several different reporters,
 
creating a larger contextual background for the events and
 
meanings of any one happening. Readers must, then, assume
 
responsibility to read comprehensively, assimilate, and
 
interpret the material as fairly as they can according to
 
their own myth.
 
This study shows that Times reportage of the Persian
 
Gulf War represented the majority-held American myth, but
 
presented alternate perspectives on the war's events and
 
politics. While unvarnished support for the allied position
 
could be found in many articles, stories expressing Arab
 
views were presented to outline the cultural conflicts
 
behind the war. In one particularly poignant statement,
 
Gerstanzang and Williams quote Vitaly N. Ignatenko of the
 
Kremlin who expresses, '"We will not express our censure,'
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[he said] 'but only regret over the fact that the world
 
today turned out to be incapable of solving this problem by
 
peaceful means'" ("Ground War. . A1+). That even one
 
person can die because of inadequate communication from
 
another suggests that the human race still is quite
 
primitive in effecting a harmonious environment for the
 
heart/ blood/ bodies/ and homes of ordinary people. We
 
have seen in Times reportage how the power of language
 
describes our cultural myth and moved our country/ when
 
language failed, to take physical action against Iraq after
 
Iraq's myth/ as spelled out by Hussein/ quit language in
 
favor of force.
 
As Barthes explains/ we may share the same words/ but
 
we will never be able to share the same personal histories
 
behind those words/ therefore our understanding of words
 
and sentences will always be a little different from
 
everyone elses. If disagreeing parties would approach
 
opponents first with an understanding of the nature of
 
language/ and second/ with respect for each other's cultural
 
myth/ both sides should be able to settle disagreements
 
using communication. However/ for disagreeing parties to
 
hang on to the wrongs of the past impedes full progress into
 
the future.
 
The more readers of the Times understand the nature of
 
language/ myth/ and the reductive style of news reportage/
 
the better they will interpret what they read. Our struggle
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for understanding will never reach perfection, for we cannot
 
see through each other's eyes. But as we even acknowledge
 
this much/ we have made progress.
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